Guilt, Remorse and God: Response to Lynch and Dahanayake

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dc.contributor.author Cordner, Christopher cze
dc.date.accessioned 2019-05-22T08:38:54Z
dc.date.available 2019-05-22T08:38:54Z
dc.date.issued 2018 eng
dc.identifier.issn 0190-0536 eng
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10195/72797
dc.description.abstract Renewing an old theme, Tony Lynch and Nishanathe Dahanayake have argued that morality is founded in the assumption of an absolute God. They claim that guilt is integral to morality, and that guilt involves the internalisation of a God-figure. Echoing Nietzsche, they argue that in a world without God, morality is in collapse; and that the New Atheism is complacent and mistaken in asserting a simple transition to an objective secular moral standard. I agree that morality has roots widely unappreciated by contemporary secular ethics, but I argue that what they call guilt is a partial distortion of the more fundamental phenomenon of remorse, whose importance to morality need not implicate religion. I explain why. eng
dc.format p. 94-103 eng
dc.language.iso eng eng
dc.relation.ispartof Philosophical Investigations, volume 41, issue: 1 eng
dc.rights pouze v rámci univerzity eng
dc.subject morality eng
dc.subject God eng
dc.subject religion eng
dc.subject guilt eng
dc.subject remorse eng
dc.subject morálka cze
dc.subject Bůh cze
dc.subject náboženství cze
dc.subject vina cze
dc.subject lítost cze
dc.title Guilt, Remorse and God: Response to Lynch and Dahanayake eng
dc.title.alternative Guilt, Remorse and God: Response to Lynch and Dahanayake cze
dc.type article eng
dc.description.abstract-translated Renewing an old theme, Tony Lynch and Nishanathe Dahanayake have argued that morality is founded in the assumption of an absolute God. They claim that guilt is integral to morality, and that guilt involves the internalisation of a God-figure. Echoing Nietzsche, they argue that in a world without God, morality is in collapse; and that the New Atheism is complacent and mistaken in asserting a simple transition to an objective secular moral standard. I agree that morality has roots widely unappreciated by contemporary secular ethics, but I argue that what they call guilt is a partial distortion of the more fundamental phenomenon of remorse, whose importance to morality need not implicate religion. I explain why. cze
dc.peerreviewed yes eng
dc.publicationstatus published eng
dc.identifier.doi 10.1111/phin.12175 eng
dc.project.ID EF15_003/0000425/Centrum pro etiku jako studium hodnoty člověka eng
dc.identifier.wos 000418416900005
dc.identifier.scopus 2-s2.0-85029446092
dc.identifier.obd 39882223 eng


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