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## Funding of the Papal Army's Campaign to Germany during the Schmalkaldic War

*(Edition of the original accounting documentation "Conto de la Guerra de Allemagna" kept by the Pope's accountant Pietro Giovanni Aleotti from 22 June 1546 to 2 September 1547)*

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*Abstract:* This article is based on the recently discovered text of accounting documentation led by the Papal secret accountant Pietro Giovanni Aleotti. He kept records of income and expenses of Papal chamber connected with the campaign of Papal army that was sent from Italy to Germany by Pope Paul III (Alessandro Farnese) in the frame of the first period of so called Schmalkaldic War (1546–1547). The author publishes this unique source in extenso and completes the edition by the detailed analysis of the incomes and expenses of this documentation. The analysis is extended by three partial texts dealing with 1) so called Jewish tax that was announced by Paul III in the financial support of military campaign, 2) credit granting of this campaign by the bank house of Benvenuto Olivieri in connection with the collection of Papal tithe in the Romagna region and 3) staffing of the commanding officers of Papal army during this campaign (in the attachment one can find a reconstruction of the officers' staff with identification of the most important commanders). In the conclusion the author tries to determine the real motives why Paul III decided to take part in this campaign. In comparison to the previous works the author accents mainly the efforts of the Farnese family to raise their prestige at the end of the pontificate of Paul III and their immediate financial interests that are reflected in the account documentation.

*Keywords:* Pope Paul III – Emperor Charles V – Schmalkaldic War – 1546–1547 – Farnese family – accounts – edition – Pietro Giovanni Aleotti – Italy – Germany – military campaign

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For Italian history, the participation of the Papal army in the so-called "Schmalkaldic War" (1546–1547)<sup>1</sup> in Germany represents seemingly a rather marginal matter. It has its logic. This campaign of the Papal army lasted only briefly and did not show any significant combat activity on the battlefield. Compared with what happened during the previous or following years on the Italian battlefields in the struggle between France, the Habsburgs and the Italian states (including the Papal State), it was as if there

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was no significant military action. In addition, it also related to events somewhere beyond the Alps, from the Italian point of view that is “among barbarians”. Therefore, it is no wonder that this campaign is mentioned only marginally (or even not at all) not only in the more general history of the Papal State,<sup>2</sup> but no greater attention is paid to it even in more recent specialised Italian works concerning the period of the pontificate of Paul III (1534–1549).<sup>3</sup>

In German historiography, the situation remains similar. For German history, the Schmalkaldic War represents a crucial historical milestone, determining the first phase of the culmination of the power conflict that took place between the Emperor Charles V and the Estates’ (mostly Lutheran) opposition during the years 1546–1555.<sup>4</sup> This conflict is usually interpreted primarily as a domestic affair, which was impacted by external influences on both sides, but the actual result was decided by the German internal forces. Perhaps this is the reason why, from the point of view of the current German historiography, the participation of the Papal army in the battlefields of the first phase of the Schmalkaldic War does not represent a particularly interesting circumstance, even within the confessional context.<sup>5</sup> In the most recent scientific literature we cannot find any mention of the campaign of the army of Pope Paul III in Germany not only in works that are generally devoted either to early modern warfare<sup>6</sup> or to the military activities of Emperor Charles V,<sup>7</sup> but this question is even ignored by D. S. Chambers in his specific synthetic monograph concerning the involvement of the Catholic Church in the wartime conflicts of the Renaissance period. The author mentions this situation only marginally, not in any political or religious context, however with reference to Renaissance art, in

2 Franz Xaver SEPPELT, *Das Papsttum in der Neuzeit – Geschichte der Päpste vom Regierungstritt Paul III. bis zur französischen Revolution (1534–1789)*, Leipzig 1936, pp. 41–42; Franz Xaver SEPPELT – Klemens LÖFFLER, *Papstgeschichte von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*, München 1938, pp. 211–214; Mario CARAVALE – Alberto CARACCILO, *Lo Stato pontificio da Martino V a Pio IX*, Torino 1978 (reprint 1997), chapter Relazioni tra Paolo III e Carlo V, pp. 259–260.

3 Elena BONORA, *Aspettando l’imperatore (Principi italiani tra il papa e Carlo V)*, Torino 2014.

4 Petr VOREL, *The War of the Princes: The Bohemian Lands and the Holy Roman Empire 1546–1555*, Santa Helena (California) 2015.

5 Gabriele HAUG-MORITZ, *Der Schmalkaldische Krieg (1546/47) – Ein kaiserlicher Religionskrieg?*, in: Franz Brendle – Anton Schindling (eds.), *Religionskriege in Alten Reich und in Alteuropa*, Münster 2010<sup>2</sup>, pp. 93–105.

6 David PARROTT, *The Business of War (Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe)*, Cambridge 2012; Brian SANDBERG, *War and Conflict in the Early Modern World 1500–1700*, Cambridge 2016.

7 James D. TRACY, *Emperor Charles V, Impresario of War (Campaign Strategy, International Finance, and domestic Politics)*, Cambridge 2010; Thomas MENZEL, *Der Fürst als Feldherr (Militärische Handeln und Selbstdarstellung bei Reichsfürsten zwischen 1470 und 1550) – Dargestellt an ausgewählten Beispielen*, Berlin 2003, chapter Karl als Kriegs- und Feldherr ab 1535, pp. 258–312.

which the subject of the Schmalkaldic War was used as a part of the visual representation of the House of Farnese (from which Pope Paul III originated).<sup>8</sup>

From the older works, the historical context of the campaign of the Papal army in the German territory in 1546 was last mentioned by Ludwig Pastor, who is known primarily as one of the most important German (confessionally Catholic) historians at the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> – 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, dealing with the history of the Papacy.<sup>9</sup> For his interpretation, L. Pastor used the comprehensive edition of diplomatic messages that were dispatched in the years 1546 and 1547 by the Pope's envoy Girolamo Verallo, published by W. Friedensburg in 1899.<sup>10</sup> In the introduction to this volume, W. Friedensburg summarised the main factual information concerning the campaign of Papal army to Germany. This text by W. Friedensburg remains the most significant synthesis of the topic of the involvement of the Pope's troops in the Schmalkaldic War. His earlier researches concerning the relationship between Pope Paul III and Emperor Charles V, based on the editions of messages sent by Papal envoys, were later summed-up (without significant expansion) by the same author in the form of a minor monograph.<sup>11</sup> The later Italian works are based on the interpretation of the Papal participation in the Schmalkaldic War (if at all), mainly from the cited works of by W. Friedensburg and L. Pastor from the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries.<sup>12</sup>

The short-term political alliance between Emperor Charles V and Pope Paul III (formed in the course of 1545 and culminating in the Allied Treaty of June 1546)<sup>13</sup> was of crucial importance for the initial phase of the Schmalkaldic War. Simply said: Without

8 David S. CHAMBERS, *Popes, Cardinals and War (The military Church in Renaissance and Early Modern Europe)*, London – New York 2006, chapter Paul III: War, Peace, Reconstruction, 1534–1549, pp. 152–162, here p. 161.

9 Ludwig PASTOR, *Geschichte Papst Pauls III. (1534–1549)*, Freiburg 1956<sup>13</sup>, Chapter XI Die päpstlich-kaiserliche Liga vom Juni 1546 und der Krieg gegen die Schmalkalden, pp. 555–573; Johannes JANSSEN – Ludwig PASTOR, *Allgemeine Zustände des deutschen Volkes seit dem Ausgang des sozialen Revolution bis zum sogenannten Augsburger Religionsfrieden von 1555*, Freiburg im Breisgau 1917<sup>19–20</sup>, pp. 695, 718–719, 754–755.

10 Walter FRIEDENSBURG (ed.), *Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland 1533–1559 nebst ergänzenden Aktenstücken, Erste Abteilung 1533–1559, Neunter Band: Nuntiatur des Verallo 1546–1547*, Gotha 1899 (next NBD I/9), pp. I–LVI.

11 Walter FRIEDENSBURG, *Kaiser Karl V. und Papst Paul III. (1534–1549)*, Leipzig 1932.

12 Carlo CAPASSO, *Il papa Paolo III 1534–1549*, II, Messina 1924, pp. 507–525; Angelo MERCANTI, *Ludovico barone von Pastor Storia dei Papi dalla fine del medio evo (Compilata col sussidio dell' Archivio segreto pontificio e di molti altri Archivi) – Nuova versione Italiana, Volume V. Paolo III (1534–1549)*, Roma 1959, pp. 542–559.

13 Paul KANNENGIESSE, *Die Kapitulation zwischen Kaiser Karl V. und Papst Paul III. gegen die deutschen Protestanten (1546)*, in: Festschrift zur Feier des 350 jährigen Bestehens des Protestantischen Gymnasiums zu Strassburg, Zweiter Teil, Strassburg 1888, pp. 211–244; L. PASTOR, *Geschichte Papst Pauls III.*, pp. 565–567.

this political and military support (though little effective it eventually proved to be), the Emperor Charles V probably did not intend to implement a direct military solution of a conflict of power (not primarily of religion) in the Holy Roman Empire of German Nation.

Compared to the religiously friendly policy that Emperor Charles V held in relation to the Lutheran reformation at the beginning of the 1540s, the change of his attitudes seemed illogical to his contemporaries. That is why, in the spring of 1546, leading figures of the German Estates' opposition did not expect the Emperor to be interested in solving the internal issues of the Empire by means of a direct military confrontation. In the context of the complicated relations that took place between the Imperial and Papal powers during the previous two decades, the Emperor's acceptance of the Pope's offer to conclude a military alliance against the German Lutherans, contained in the Allied Treaty of June 1546, constituted a fundamental change. However, in the background of this temporary (and from the point-of-view of the history of the 16<sup>th</sup> Century only a very short-term) friendly relationship between the Imperial and Papal powers were always primarily the family interests of both sides. In August 1545, the Emperor and the Pope both received joint biological descendants in the form of two boys, the twins Carlo and Alessandro. They came from the marriage between Ottavio Farnese (the son of Pier Luigi, illegitimate son of Pope Paul III) and Margaret of Austria, later called Margaret of Parma, the illegitimate daughter of Emperor Charles V. On the Farnese side, however, it is not possible to omit either clear property objectives or the question of the integration of this illegitimate lineage (the biological descendants of Pope Paul III) amongst the highest European aristocracy. I have attempted to interpret these circumstances in more detail in an independent study that has been published in parallel, which is why I do not consider them in detail here.<sup>14</sup> Their outcome was the complex formation of the new Italian Territorial Principality of Parma and Piacenza, in which the common biological descendants of the Emperor Charles V and Pope Paul III of the Farnese family were destined to rule.<sup>15</sup>

The Allied treaty guaranteed a specific military support for the Emperor, which was not a negligible amount. Pope Paul III undertook to provide the Emperor with an army

14 Petr VOREL, *Za obnovu řádu v říši a pravé víry (Dočasné politické a rodinné spojenectví císaře Karla V. a papeže Pavla III. při vojenském tažení do Německa roku 1546)* [The Struggle for the Restoration of Order in the Empire and for True Faith (The Temporary Political and Family Alliance between Emperor Charles V and Pope Paul III during a Military Campaign to Germany in 1546)], in: Jaroslav Pánek (red.), *Dějiny – umění – jazyk / History – Art – Language, Acta Societatis Scientiarum Bohemicae 3*, Praha 2018, pp. 19–164.

15 Giovanni DREI, *I Farnese (Grandezza e decadenza di una dinastia italiana)*, Rome 1954; Gian Luca PODESTÀ, *Pier Luigi e Ottavio Farnese (1545–1586) – Gli albori del Ducato di Parma e Piacenza*, in: Giuseppe Bertini (red.), *Storia di Parma IV – Il ducato farnesiano*, Parma 2014, pp. 37–65.

of 12,000 infantrymen and 500 light-cavalry soldiers designated for the forthcoming war in the Empire, together with the appropriate commanding corps and the main command to be provided by the envoy who was appointed by the Pope. This army was to be funded by the Pope for six months (or for a shorter time if the war actually ended sooner). In addition, he pledged direct cash support from the Papal Treasury in the amount of 200,000 ducats (100,000 were already deposited in Augsburg at the time of the treaty, while another 100,000 ducats were to be paid in Venice within one month of the signing of the treaty). In addition to these expenditures, which were to be financed directly by the Pope, the treaty still provided additional income that Charles V was meant to collect himself in Spain (and the Pope agreed to it), as the war in the Empire should have been supported by half of the annual income of the Catholic Church from all over Spain (the anticipated amount had not been specified). That was the overall sum of the military and financial potential that indeed could have resolved the situation in the Empire.<sup>16</sup>

Older literature does not bring much data concerning the specific activities of the Papal troops during the Schmalkaldic War between August 1546 (which was when they reached the Bavarian Landshut) and January 1547 (when the Pope issued an order to withdraw them back to Italy). Well known is only the initial phase described above, which Charles V and Paul III needed to use for propaganda purposes at the beginning of the war, i.e. the official launching of the “Crusade” in Rome, where the Farnese brothers had taken over both the symbolic cross and the Papal battle flags (July 4, 1546); a parade of the entire Papal army at the army grounds in Bologna (July 16, 1546); a demonstration of military force before the participants of the Council of Trent (July 26, 1546), and the ceremonial arrival of the Papal army at the ground of the allied army close to the Bavarian Landshut (August 14, 1546).<sup>17</sup>

This initial propagandistic phase had already confirmed a significant mismatch between the two allies: Pope Paul III did not hide the fact that his troops were marching to Germany with the Emperor to extinguish the Lutheran movement. The Papal Bull of the 15<sup>th</sup> July 1546 even promised indulgences to all who participated in the elimination of a dangerous heresy during a military campaign to Germany.<sup>18</sup> These activities were completely counter-productive from the perspective of Charles V because the Emperor in the German environment consistently stuck to his own interpretation, according to

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16 NBD I/9, p. XIII; L. PASTOR, *Geschichte Papst Pauls III*, pp. 566–568; Richard M. DOUGLAS, *Jacopo Sadoletto 1477–1547–Humanist and Reformer*, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1959, p. 218.

17 P. VOREL, *Za obnovu řádu v říši a pravé víry*, pp. 95–99.

18 *Bulla des grossen Ablaß, welchen der Bapst Paulus der Dritte, zu diesem Zuge vnd Ausreuttunge der Lutherischen Ketzereyen gegeben hat*, s. l. 1546 (ÖNB Wien, sign. 39.G.72); Henri HAUSER – Augustin RENAUDET, *L'età del Rinascimento e della Riforma*, Torino 1957, p. 551; Norman HOUSLEY, *The Later Crusades (From Lyons to Alcazar 1274–1580)*, Oxford 1992, p. 260.

which the forthcoming military suppression of the Schmalkaldic League should have no religious context; that on his part it only involves the establishment of a rule of order in the government of the Empire, which the leaders of this League (i.e. the Saxon elector Johann Friedrich and Philip von Hesse) disturbed, inter alia, with their military occupation of the Duchy of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel. Thanks to this, the Imperial party also gained (through material and other motivation) some important Lutheran princes (primarily Moritz of Saxony) and some lower commanders. This was important for the Lutheran allies of the Habsburgs because they could argue that by their engagement in the Imperial services in the coming conflict they did not actually betray their brothers in faith from amongst the members of the Schmalkaldic League, but they only contributed to the establishment of a legal order in the Empire.

In spite of this diplomatic mismatch, the Papal army played an important role, especially in the initial part of the military conflict between the Emperor and the Schmalkaldic League, which took place on the southern front along the Bavarian Danube region. From the beginning of the direct military conflict at the turn of August and September 1546 throughout the artillery battle of Ingolstadt until mid-October 1546, the Papal army constituted the most significant part of the Habsburg coalition army and secured a clear first victory for the Habsburg Party, which subsequently conquered the city of Donauwörth on the 8<sup>th</sup> of October 1546.

After a strong Habsburg army led by Earl Maximilian Egmont von Bürren, recruited predominantly in the Netherlands (and thereby it was made-up largely of soldiers of the Lutheran faith) reached the battlefield in mid-October 1546, the importance of the pontifical contingent began to decline and there were also problems with the coordination of military actions with the main command. Most of the remaining soldiers (mainly pedestrian units), still formally commanded by the Cardinal's brother, Ottavio Farnese, separated from the Habsburg army around the 18<sup>th</sup> of October 1546 and moved about individually along the Bavarian Danube region. Only the Papal cavalry units that were led by Giovanni Battista Savello remained under the control of the main Habsburg command. A part of the Papal army (approx. 3,000 men) subsequently left the battlefield around October 20, 1546 to accompany and protect Cardinal Alessandro Farnese on his return to Italy during the war. The possibility of fighting the main part of the Papal army in the struggle with the Schmalkaldic League had dropped to a minimum, especially when the number of combatant Papal soldiers had decreased rapidly as a result of illnesses, problems regarding material supplies and desertion.

The original mutual enthusiasm over the allied bond of the Emperor and the Pope in the Autumn of 1546 quickly cooled. This was undoubtedly contributed to by the fact that the combat effectiveness of the Papal troops did not meet the Emperor's expectations. Even

the effect of the “crusade” against the Lutherans anticipated by Paul III was not fulfilled. This was one of the reasons why in December 1546 Pope Paul III decided to consider the Allied treaty with the Emperor (which had only been concluded for six months) as having been fulfilled and then not to prolong it further. On the 22<sup>nd</sup> January 1547 he decided to withdraw the Papal troops from the Danube and to return them back to Italy. The Emperor did not oppose this act – on the contrary. His reply to the Pope was an ironic message of thanks, writing that he was glad that Paul III had finally rid himself of those Italian scoundrels who were no good anyway, and in Germany they were just causing damage. And he expected to complete the war successfully even without the Pope’s help.<sup>19</sup>

For the Emperor Charles V, however, with the advent of 1547, the war with the Schmalkaldic League was far from over. At the beginning of March 1547, the Saxon Elector Johann Friedrich began to win over the Habsburg allies in the north-eastern front and he gained predominance on the battlefield. Emperor Charles V had to quickly prepare for a new campaign of his army to Saxony and to the Czech-Saxon border, while his diplomats sought to provide political support and additional military assistance. Through his diplomats, therefore, the Emperor again turned to Pope Paul III with an urgent request for military assistance, yet this time in vain.<sup>20</sup> However, even without Papal assistance, Emperor Charles V eventually won this phase of the conflict with the opposition in the Empire thanks to the unexpected termination of the battle of Mühlberg in April 1547.

At that time Pope Paul III perceived the Emperor as an enemy who threatened both his personal and his family interests in Italy.<sup>21</sup> Their personal relationships deteriorated rapidly in 1547 and they found themselves at a “freezing point” in September 1547, when the Pope’s illegitimate son, Pier Luigi Farnese, the father of the Emperor’s son-in-law Ottavio Farnese, was murdered in his residence in Piacenza, located in the north of Italy. The Pope blamed the Emperor for this crime in connection with the power struggle that was taking place at that time in northern Italy. This did have its logic as the Habsburg military troops from the Duchy of Milan (to which the Duchy of Parma and Piacenza belonged to prior to 1545 and where the Emperor Charles IV ruled from 1535) occupied this area immediately after the death of Pier Luigi Farnese.<sup>22</sup>

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19 L. PASTOR, *Geschichte Papst Pauls III*, pp. 593–594; Hermann Joseph KIRCH, *Die Fugger und der Schmalkaldische Krieg*, München – Leipzig 1915, p. 85.

20 August DRUFFEL, *Sendung des Cardinals Sfondrato an den Hof Karls V. 1547–1548*, Erster Teil, *Abhandlungen des historischen Classe der königlich bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* 20, 1893, pp. 291–362.

21 L. PASTOR, *Geschichte Papst Pauls III*, p. 597.

22 Ireneo F. AFFO, *Vita di Pierluigi Farnese, primo Duca di Parma, Piacenza e Guastalla, Marchese di Novara ecc.*, Milano 1821, pp. 163–193; G. L. PODESTÀ, *Pier Luigi e Ottavio Farnese*, pp. 38–55.

The former allies became enemies and the ageing Pope Paul III, with the rest of his power, tried to protect the laboriously gained social and property positions of his biological descendants from the illegitimate branch of the Farnese family. Emperor Charles V in his symbolic political Testament of the 18<sup>th</sup> January 1548 also openly admits that he could not wait until the “*present Pope*” (i.e. Paul III whom he does not even define by name) finally died, which would resolve numerous problem.<sup>23</sup>

The text includes several problems that Emperor Charles V symbolically assigned to his son and his successors to resolve when after the death of Paul III another Pope stepped in, also briefly referring to the “*most recent war*” (i.e. the Schmalkaldic War). In his Testament Charles V reminds his descendants that it was necessary to ask the future Pope to fulfil what the present Pope contractually pledged (i.e. in the treaty of June 1546), because in the recent war the Pope left the Emperor to bear all the costs (“[...] *da er mich die ganze Last tragen lässt* [...]”). However, it is unclear from the context whether the Emperor meant only the promised monetary subsidies (which the Pope had apparently failed to provide at the promised level)<sup>24</sup> or also the cost of the army.

Such a suggestively worded statement in the symbolic “Testament” of Emperor Charles V naturally raises the question of how it actually was with the funding of the Papal army, which, in the summer of 1546 indeed crossed the Alps to Germany and participated in the ongoing struggles. There is not the slightest doubt about it since this had been documented by many sources. Such an action had to be paid for.

Early modern Papal accounting represents such a complex issue that to get oriented in the vast number of preserved written sources requires a great deal of courage and many years of patient work. To research the organisation and the administration of Papal finance during the early modern period and in terms of the long-term context, the most important is the work of W. Reinhard’s, published in German<sup>25</sup> and Italian.<sup>26</sup> The rich archive of the Papal Chamber of Accountants and other sources have long been

23 Armin KOHNLE (ed.), *Das Vermächtnis Kaiser Karls V. (Die Politische Testamente)*, Darmstadt 2005, pp. 69–97, Nr. 3 “Das Große Politische Testament Kaiser Karls V”, here pp. 75–77.

24 Hermann KELLENBENZ, *Das Römisch-Deutsche Reich im Rahmen der wirtschafts- und finanzpolitischen Erwägungen Karls V. im Spannungsfeld imperialer und dynastischer Interessen*, in: Heinrich Lutz – Elisabeth Müller-Luckner (eds.), *Das römisch-deutsche Reich im politischen System Karls V.*, München – Wien 1982, pp. 35–54, here p. 50.

25 Wolfgang REINHARD, *Papstfinanz und Kirchenstaat im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert*, in: Aldo De Maddalena – Hermann Kellenbenz (eds.), *Finanzen und Staatsräson in Italien und Deutschland in der frühen Neuzeit*, Berlin 1982, pp. 269–294; Wolfgang REINHARD, *Papstfinanz, Benefizienwesen und Staatsfinanz im konfessionellen Zeitalter*, in: Hermann Kellenbenz – Paolo Prodi (eds.), *Fiskus, Kirche und Staat im konfessionellen Zeitalter*, Berlin 1994, pp. 337–371.

26 Wolfgang REINHARD, *Finanza pontificia, sistema beneficiale e finanza statale nell’età confessionale*, in: Hermann Kellenbenz – Paolo Prodi (eds.), *Fisco religione Stato nell’età confessionale (Atti della settimana di studio 21–25 settembre 1987)*, Bologna 1989, pp. 459–504.



the subject of systematic research by Italian and foreign scholars dealing with economic history and Papal monetary and fiscal policy in the 16<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>27</sup> Specifically, for the period of the Pontiff of Paul III (1534–1549), we have available a detailed analytical work by the Florentine historian F. G. Bruscoli that brings a brighter light into what seems to be a confusing mix of interrelated accounting documents.<sup>28</sup>

The bookkeeping on the financing of the campaign of the Papal troops to Germany in 1546 was handled by the Papal secret accountant (*tesoriero segreto*), Pietro Giovanni Aleotti. His role in the accounting system of the Papal Chamber was quite extraordinary, perhaps one to say unsymmetrical. That is to say that he was in charge of both the private and “special” personal expenses of the Pope himself. Within the Papal Chamber of Accountants, he was perceived as part of the staff of the Main Treasury (*depositaria generale*), but he was also a member of the Papal Datary (*dataria*)<sup>29</sup> and he was also personally commissioned by Pope Paul III. This direct bond (and the very fact that he could talk privately with the Pope) naturally significantly increased the informal influence of the secret accountant, regardless of his formal position in the official hierarchy of the Papal Chamber.<sup>30</sup>

So far, historiography has not paid special attention to Pietro Giovanni Aleotti, although Benvenuto Cellini (1510–1571) and Giorgio Vasari (1511–1574) have written their testimonies of his important role as the “*éminence grise*” of the Papal Court. We know only that Pietro Giovanni Aleotti was already holding significant positions at the Papal Court in the year 1532 (i.e. the papal dresser and the chief chamberlain)<sup>31</sup> and at

27 Aloys SCHULTE, *Die Fugger in Rom 1495–1523 (Mit Studien zur Geschichte des kirchlichen Finanzwesens jener Zeit)*, I. Darstellung, Leipzig 1904; Clemens BAUER, *Die Epochen der Papstfinanz (Ein Versuch)*, Historische Zeitschrift 138, 1927, pp. 457–505; Melissa M. BULLARD *Filipo Strozzi and the Medici (Favor and Finance in Sixteenth-century Florence and Rome)*, Cambridge 1980; Peter PARTNER, *Papal Financy Policy in the Renaissance and Counter-Reformation*, Past and Present 88, 1980, pp. 17–62; Enrico STUMPO, *Il capitale finanziario a Roma fra Cinque e Seicento – Contributo alla storia della fiscalità pontificia in età moderna (1570–1660)*, Milano 1985; Moritz ISENMANN, *Die Verwaltung der päpstlichen Staatsschuld in der Frühen Neuzeit (Sekretariat, Computisterie und Depositerie der Monti vom 16. bis zum ausgehenden 18. Jahrhundert)*, Stuttgart 2005.

28 Francesco Guidi BRUSCOLI, *Benvenuto Olivieri – I mercatores Fiorentini e la Camera Apostolica nella Roma di Paolo III Farnese (1534–1549)*, Florence 2000. This work, based on years of careful study of accounting sources, has also been published in a supplemented and expanded English version, see Francesco Guidi BRUSCOLI, *Papal Banking in Renaissance Rome (Benvenuto Olivieri and Paul III, 1534–1549)*, Ashgate 2009.

29 Felix Josef LITVA, *L'attività finanziaria della Dataria durante il periodo Tridentino*, Archivum Historiae Pontificae 5, 1965, pp. 79–174.

30 W. REINHARD, *Papstfinanz und Kirchenstaat*, p. 270, Abbildung 1: Organisation der Papstfinanz um 1600.

31 Léon DOREZ, *La cour du pape Paul III, d'après le Registres de la trésorerie secrète (collection F. de Navenne)*, Paris 1932, pp. 59–61.

the end of the pontificate of Paul III he was promoted to be a secret accountant who had access to the main treasury that was located in the Angelic Castle. At that time, Aleotti held a larger church benefice in the small bishopric of Bertinoro (near Forlì) in the province of Romagna, from where he had come and where he also would return to at the end of his life. For many years he had patiently waited for the bishop's office in his native Forlì to be vacated. This is evidenced by the fact that Pietro Giovanni Aleotti was appointed as the Bishop of Forlì on the same day as Bishop Bernard Antonio de Medici died there (October 23, 1551). In the history of the city of Forlì he subsequently made his mark as a generous patron of art and a supporter of the Jesuit Order.<sup>32</sup> But the bishop's office he held only externally and of course he was receiving its income.<sup>33</sup> Subsequently Pietro Giovanni Aleotti remained in Rome at the Papal Chamber as a secret accountant. In this function he is still explicitly mentioned in January 1560.<sup>34</sup> He participated in the Trident Council meeting, where he died in August 1563. Bernardino Aleotti, his grand-nephew, took his body from Trident to the funeral in Forlì.<sup>35</sup>

Aleotti worked for a long time at the Papal Court, but apparently it was Paul III who appointed him as a secret accountant, probably only in connection with the preparation of the funding of the Papal army in early 1546. No earlier mention of Aleotti holding this position before 1546 has so far been found in the sources of the Papal Chamber of Accountants. Aleotti is explicitly mentioned as being in the function of a secret accountant at the beginning of 1546 on the title sheet of the first volume of the newly established series of accounting books, which record extraordinary payment orders that were issued by Pope Paul III himself. Here, for the first time (to my knowledge), Aleotti is titled, *inter alia*, as a secret papal accountant ("*Petro Iohanni Aleotto, thesaurario Secreto et custodi iocalium S. D. N.*").<sup>36</sup> A similar title for him was used on the 17<sup>th</sup> May 1546, when he was paid the amount of 40 scudo for the provision of unspecified important matters

32 Anna FERRETTI COLOMBINI, *Dipinti d'altare in età di Controriforma in Romagna 1560–1650 – Opere restaurate dalle diocesi di Faenza, Forlì, Cesena e Rimini*, Bologna 1982, p. 38; Giordano VIROLI, *Pittura del Cinquecento a Forlì, I–II*, Forlì 1991; Giordano VIROLI, *Secoli di prestigio nel decoro del privato*, in: Giordano Viroli (red.), *Palazzi di Forlì*, Forlì 1995, pp. 9–58, here p. 11.

33 The routine episcopal agenda of Pietro Giovanni Aleotti was fulfilled by his one generation younger nephew Simone Aleotti who was apparently destined to take over this office after his uncle had died. However, he died even shortly before Pietro Giovanni, so this family strategy did not work-out properly.

34 Archivio di Stato di Roma (next ASR), Camerale I, Mandati Camerali, seg. 905 "Liber mandatorum extraordinarium dd. Pauli pape IV d, Pii pape IV"; here he is listed as "*Petro Iohanni Aleotto episcopo Foroliviensis, thesaurario secreto Pauli pape IV*".

35 Hubert JEDIN, *Geschichte des Konzils von Trient, Bd. IV/2 Dritte Tagungsperiode und Abschluß – Überwindung der Krise durch Morone, Schließung und Bestätigung*, Darmstadt 2017, p. 295.

36 ASR, Camerale I, Mandati Camerali, seg. 883 "Mandatorum extraordinarium Pauli pape III, Liber primus".

(“[...] *eum expenderi in rebus necessariis ad usum forerie sue* [...]”). Here he is listed as “*Petro Joanni Aleotto thesaur[ari]o et Jocalium S[anti]te Sue Custodi secreto*”.<sup>37</sup>

I infer from this that putting Pietro Giovanni Aleotti into the office of a secret accountant was directly related to the preparation of the financing of the military campaign to Germany. The management of the accounting documentation for this campaign was probably the first “financial project” to be entrusted to Aleotti. He must have enjoyed the extraordinary trust of Paul III. It is clear from the context that as a secret accountant, Aleotti had to dedicate himself to the massive transfers of cash from the assets of the Papal Chamber to the private treasuries of the Farnese family, and he also co-created the accounting documentation that legalised these cash flows from the accounting perspective of the Papal Chamber.

A brief account of Aleotti’s accounting documentation (simply the introductory part of the expenditure items with the names of the captains of the Papal troops of the size of just one-half of the printed page) was published in 1878 by the Italian historian Antonio Bertolotti. In his selective edition, however, he did not indicate the source of the data from which he had drawn his statements and also mistakenly read or recorded the year; it should be “22 *Giugno 1546*”, not “1547”.<sup>38</sup> The transcript of an incomplete copy (or the extract) of the accounting documentation which Aleotti led, was also included as an addendum to Walter Friedensburg’s edition of the Papal envoys’ reports in 1899.<sup>39</sup> However, in the later works related to the papal politics of that time, this source was practically unused and even L. Pastor referred to it only in an illustrative form without looking into the contents in greater detail.<sup>40</sup>

When working on another subject on the monetary politics of Pope Urban VIII (1623–1644),<sup>41</sup> I have more or less accidentally found the original Aleotti’s accounting documentation from 1546–1547. Its content is slightly different from the description that was published in 1899 by W. Friedensburg. This source has not yet become known to the scientific public. After the division of the papal archives in modern times, this accounting documentation did not remain in the Vatican’s Secret Archives (Archivio

37 Ibidem, seg. 882, fol. 30v.

38 Antonio BERTOLOTTI (ed.), *Spesie segrete e pubbliche di Papa Paolo III*, Atti e memorie per la Deputazione di storia patria delle provinzia dell’Emilia 1878, pp. 169–212, here pp. 210–211: “Estratti dal Registro di contailta per la guerra d’alemagna tenuto dal Tesoriere Segreto dal 22 Giugno 1547 al 2 Settembre 1547”.

39 NBD I/9, pp. 686–698. This source from “Tesoreria segreta pontificia” (exact source is not indicated by Friedensburg) could be identical with the transcription made by Baldassare de Opiciis, see Editorial Attachment, expenditure (May 25, 1547).

40 L. PASTOR, *Geschichte Papst Pauls III*, p. 571.

41 Petr VOREL, *La storia della piastra d’argento di Urbano VIII (L’attività della zecca romana sul finire del pontificato di Urbano VIII e il catalogo dettagliato delle piastre d’argento pontificie degli anni 1634–1644)*, Praga – Roma 2013.

Segreto Vaticano), as could reasonably be expected, but it was transferred to the State Archives of Rome (Archivio di Stato di Roma). But even here it is not logically saved in the *Tesoriere segreto* (where it was originally found), but in the archive fund called the “Military and Maritime Commission”, containing mainly sources related to the history of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries.

The original of the accounting documentation of Pietro Giovanni Aleotti is entitled “*Conto de la Guerra de Allemagna*” and it contains a summary of the Papal Chamber’s income and expenditure in connection with the campaign of the Papal troops to Germany from the 22<sup>nd</sup> June 1546 to the 2<sup>nd</sup> September 1547.<sup>42</sup> From the copy (or a statement) published by W. Friedensburg it differs not only in the details of the specific records (particularly in the expenditure section) but also in the reported amounts (though not very significantly). Above all, however, the original document contains also additional notes concerning the cost of the “German War” and the conduct of the Papal Court in this matter, including the financial statements. They took place from January 18, 1549, when the Bolognese Dean, Giovanni of Zophya, presented this documentation for inspection before the assembly of the officials of the Papal Chamber (“[...] *in Plena Camera* [...]”), until the 28<sup>th</sup> January 1549, when the inspectors, Dean Hieronymus Barentus and the Notary Antonio Bononiensis, wrote the final report. That is why I considered it appropriate to include the edition of the mentioned source in this study as well.

From the formal point of view, this source is not dissimilar to other accounting documents of the Papal Chamber from the middle of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, which created a very complicated and internally interconnected system of various incomes and expenditures, but also loans and their instalments. In this complex system, the “German War” represented only one of the sub-items that needed to be properly accounted for. The “income” and “expenditure” items therefore do not create a clearly interlinked system in this accounting source, since the army had also been funded from sources other than those initially established for that purpose.

The accounts are kept in the then normal numerical system of the Papal Chamber (1 scudo = 20 soldi = 240 denari, 1 soldo = 12 denari); the basic entity was “golden scudo in gold”, the equivalent of a contemporary Papal coin weighing 3.3 grams that is coined from almost pure gold. The golden scudi were coined in this physical form also at the time of the pontificate of Paul III. The largest standard silver coin was represented

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42 ASR, Amministrazioni militari – Commisariato delle Soldatesche e Galere, busta 88 (Conti straordinari 1541–1552), fasc. 1546–Introito et exito delli denari per la guerra d[i] Alemagna di qui di conto d[i] tesoriere segreto Giovanni Aleotti.

by the nominal referred to as *giulio* (or *paolo*),<sup>43</sup> which theoretically paid 2 soldi in the monetary system (1 scudo = 10 giuli). The real exchange rate of the gold coins against the “common currency”, which consisted mainly of silver coins (and the copper coins with the lowest value), may have varied. At this time, the “agio” of the gold coins (i.e., the increase in real purchasing power to above the nominal value) was around 10 %. To pay off the book value of 1 scudo it was necessary to pay 11 giuli in nominal value of 22 soldi in 1546; and similarly, for lower value coins. Therefore, even in Aleotti's accounting documentation, in some cases, the recalculation of “coin” (i.e. in silver coins) appears to a lower amount that is recorded in “golden scudo in gold”.<sup>44</sup>

Only exceptionally, other coins of the Papal monetary system appear in the accounts: i.e. golden ducats with a higher weight (cca. 3.5 g of pure gold) and thereby also a higher payment power than *scudi oro di oro*; and then also small coins referred to as *baiocchi*. These coins, the name of which gave rise to an entirely new monetary unit, thereby accelerated the gradual transition to a simpler decimal accounting system (1 scudo = 100 baiocchi; 1 teston = 30 baiocchi, 1 giulio = 10 baiocchi; 1 baiocco = 5 quattrini) that was used in the papal accounting in the middle of the 16th century. However, Allioti's accounting documentation is kept in an old monetary accounting system (1 scudo = 20 soldi, 1 soldo = 12 denari).



Fig. 1-2: Pope Paul III (1534–1549), mint Roma, gold scudo (photo P. Vorel)

43 Allen G. BERMAN, *Papal Coins (A Complete Catalogue of the Coins of the Popes from the Middle Ages to the Present)*, New York 1991, pp. 96–99.

44 See the Editorial Attachment, income section, 18. 9. 1546: An income of 2,000 “scudi di moneta” is converted to “scudi oro di oro” only at 1818 scudi 3 soldi and 8 denari. Ibidem, 1. 11. 1546: An income of 3,333 “scudi di moneta” is converted to 3,000 “scudi oro di oro”. Ibidem, 10. 11. 1546: An income of 950 “scudi di moneta” = 864 “scudi oro di oro”. The conversion rate therefore oscillates between 1.09 and 1.11; the actual calculation of the resulting amount also probably depended on what specific “common coins” were used for payment (not only the papal coinage, but also the coins of other Italian issuers and foreign mints were used).



Fig. 3-4: Pope Paul III (1534–1549), mint Roma, silver giulio (photo P. Vorel)

If we attempt to create a more detailed content analysis of this document, then it is possible to completely separate the revenues and expenditures. The revenue component is (in addition to cash reserves) for the most part made up of standard instruments that have only been formally reported as a source of funding: i.e. loans that have been guaranteed by papal income or taxes levied for a special purpose. For the papal accounting of that time, it did not matter what sources the money came from, only the sum was important. On the contrary, the expenditure component covers mainly the needs, actually or at least formally related to the military campaign to Germany in autumn 1546. However, that was not always the case.

### 1) Income of 275,024 scudi and 8 denari

The money that the Pope's accountant Aleotti reported as income for the "German War" can be divided into several different sources, thereby substantially differing in their type, their character and the total amount. These resources in the accounting documentation can be summarised as follows:

#### *Cash deposited earlier in the Papal Treasury*

By far, the largest source was cash, collected from the Papal Treasury located in the Angelic Castle, to which Aleotti (as a papal secret accountant) had direct access. Due to the campaign to Germany, he reached a total of six times in the papal chest (individual sums ranging from 5,000 to 88,000 scudi), collecting a total of 152,000 scudi in cash (i.e. 55.27 % of the recorded income for the "German War"). The original source of this money

cannot be identified in any way. It was money that the Papal Treasury had previously accepted in cash form.

In the analysed documentation from 1546, Aleotti does not specifically describe how he took away that much cash from the treasury. However, it is logical to assume that he proceeded in a similar way, as was described in detail in December 1552 (at that time he had already taken over the Bishop's office in Forlì, while he still remained a secret papal accountant) in another account concerning the cost of the Papal army passing through Rome. The gold coins were then counted in commissions and embedded in coloured purses, which were bundled, sealed and marked with the amounts that had been deposited in them. One thousand scudi or a little more were usually stored in one purse: In 1552, Aleotti distributed 22,000 scudi to twenty labelled and sealed purses. Another 15,600 scudi were prepared for release so that 2,000 scudi were put into one large red pouch (which weighed almost 7 kg), and the remaining 13,600 scudi were divided into thirteen smaller green purses.<sup>45</sup>



**Fig. 5:** Roma, the Angelic Castle, main papal treasury during the 16<sup>th</sup> century (photo P. Vorel)

<sup>45</sup> ASR, Commisariato delle Soldatesche e Galere, busta 88, fasc. Conto delli denari, che si spenderantio nelle casse della militia per pr[e]sidio et securenza dell Alma Cita di Roma (13. 12. 1552).

### ***Administrative expenses that were reported as being Aleotti's income***

On the 18<sup>th</sup> of September 1546, a relatively high amount of 15,535 scudi and 1 soldo was assigned for the “German War”; this amount was issued for the administrative activity of the Roman Papal Office in August 1546, on the basis of an explicit Pope’s decree. The reason is not entirely clear from the context. This amount is explicitly mentioned as part of a “third income” (*terzia entrata*), which seems to have meant the financial resources that served to pay the “third instalment of the army payroll” (see expenditure items below). The specific breakdown of this item was also attached as a special appendix to Aleotti’s accounts, perhaps also to ensure that the follow-up commission inspection could not object the inclusion of this item in the revenue folder of Aleotti’s documentation (which is really illogical), since it was an explicit command from the Pope.

### ***New cash incomes of the Papal Treasury***

In terms of accounting documentation, this group mainly includes income from the “Jewish tax” paid by the Jewish population settled in the territory of the Papal State. In the context of the entirety of Aleotti’s accounting documentation, it was not a large amount (all “Jewish taxes” totalling 6,484 scudi and 16 soldi), but it was a much more complex matter. From other sources it is clear that under the pretext of financing the “German War”, the Jewish population was burdened with much higher taxes than it appears from the income items of Aleotti’s account. That is why below I have paid particular attention to this issue: See below Digression a) Jewish *vingesima* to “German War”.

A unique sum (400 scudi) is also reported as a new cash income, which was paid for somewhat unclear reasons to the Papal Treasury by Giovanni di Pace<sup>46</sup> on September 22, 1546.

### ***Drawing cash from long-term loans, guaranteed by the permanent incomes of the Papal Chamber***

By the end of the first half of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, the vast majority of permanent Papal revenues were “leased” to Italian bankers on the basis of long-term credit agreements. The actual bankers took on current payment obligations (and covered them from their sources), while managing the long-term Papal assets financially and disposing of their debts (of course, with the appropriate interest). This was a low-risk investment and therefore the interest rate on such guaranteed loans was lower.

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46 I was unable to establish the identity of this person.



In relation to the “German War” itself, I see no causal link between why any of these specific “open loans” was used for the needs of this military campaign. These were the following long-term loans:

- a) Contributions from the three provinces of the Papal State, the proceeds of which were guaranteed by the loan provided to the Papal Chamber by Johann Baptist Perini<sup>47</sup> (Campania), Bartolomeo Sauli<sup>48</sup> (Perugia) and Benvenuto Olivieri<sup>49</sup> (Romagna).
- b) Papal tithe from two Italian territories outside the Papal State (Milan, Florence); with this source the Papal Chamber guaranteed the loan provided by above-mentioned Benvenuto Olivieri and the Bandini Bank House.<sup>50</sup>
- c) Regular income of St George Knights’ Order<sup>51</sup> (this source was used for guaranteeing the loan provided by the above-mentioned Benvenuto Olivieri) and of St Lawrence (the Papal Chamber used this income for guarantees to the Altoviti Family Bank).<sup>52</sup>
- d) This group also includes the 1,000 scudi item, received on January 22, 1547, from Benvenuto Olivieri, a Florentine banker, that was guaranteed by government bonds

47 Johann Baptist Perini, a Florentine burgher and merchant, working at the Roman Papal Court. He is mentioned by Bruscoli in the position of a witness in a document from 1545; any other direct credit activities in relation to the Papal Chamber have not yet been identified. See F. G. BRUSCOLI, *Papal Banking*, p. 233.

48 Bartolomeo Sauli, a member of the branched Roman bank family, regularly financing the Papal budget. In this documentation he is acting along with his relative Girolamo Sauli (Archbishop of Bari), with whom he did systematic business in financing of the Papal budget, see *ibidem*, pp. 22, 87, 92–93, 137–139, 150–151, 235.

49 A separate section is dedicated to Benvenuto Olivieri, see Digression b) Benvenuto Olivieri and the Papal tithe for the “German War” from the Province of Romagna.

50 Aleotti’s accounts mention only the “Bandini” surname. Apparently, it refers to the entire Bandini financial company, which was at that time represented by Piero Antonio Bandini and Alamanno Bandini. See F. G. BRUSCOLI, *Papal Banking*, pp. 18–21, 88–92, 127, 150.

51 This medieval Order of Byzantine tradition, the activity of which was interrupted for some time in the early 16<sup>th</sup> century, was restored by Paul III in the early 1540s during an upcoming offensive against the Ottoman Empire. The hereditary grandmasters of the Order were always the oldest living male members of the Komnenos family, descendants of the Byzantine reign, who after the fall of Constantinople (1453) resorted to Italy. For an overview of the history of this Order, see [anonymous], *Compendio storico dell’origine, fondetione, e stato Privilegii Imperiali, Regi et Bolle, brevi, Motuproprii, Monitorii, Fulminatorii, Pontifici, et altri Diplomi dell’Ordine Equestre Imperiale Angelico Aureato Costantiniano di San Giorgio del Cavaliere Gran Croce*, Venezia 1696, p. 32.

52 There is no distinction in Aleotti’s accounting documentation as to who specifically from the Altoviti family provided the loan; they are denoted as the whole family community by plural (Degli Altoviti). It was the originally Florentine banker family who had found shelter in Rome after the expulsion from Florence during Medicean rule. The main representatives of this bank house in the middle of the 1540s were Bindo Altoviti (1491–1557) and his son, the titular Florentine bishop Antonio Altoviti, see F. G. BRUSCOLI, *Papal Banking*, p. 17.

(“*à conto di Monte*”).<sup>53</sup> In the case of Olivieri, who was at that time a governor of the State Debt of the Papal State, this is not an unusual procedure (see Note 49).

### ***A new one-off special purpose loan, guaranteed by the collection of duties by the Papal State***

A one-off loan of 30,000 scudi, guaranteed by the duties collected by the Papal State. This loan was co-sponsored by bankers Christoph Sauli (22,500 scudi) and Tobias Palavicini (7,500 scudi).<sup>54</sup>

### ***A new short-term one-off cash loans guaranteed by a debit note***

This form of obtaining operating cash was the most expensive one (with a high interest rate) and therefore it was used by the Papal Chamber only exceptionally. In this manner Pope Paul III borrowed 19,000 scudi for the “German War” from two financiers: 15,000 scudi for Thomas Cavalcanti<sup>55</sup> and another 4,000 scudi from Giovanni di Rossi and Luigi Ruccellay.<sup>56</sup> However, these two loans were accounted for the “German War” only formally. First, they had not been realised until April and June 1547 (when the remnants of the Papal army had long returned to Italy); moreover, more than half of that money (10,000 scudi) was returned by Aleotti back to the main treasury in Angelic Castle in cash in July 1547. In this way, this transaction only fictitiously increased the

53 Ibidem, pp. 103–110. The creation of the systemic state debt of the Papal State by issuing government bonds (*Monti Camerali*) began in 1526 under the pontificate of Clement VII. It was a permanent, gradually growing public state debt, guaranteed by the property and income of the Papal State, that was managed by Florentine bankers. The long-term development of this form of financing of the Papal State is being analysed by Moritz ISENMAN, *Die Verwaltung der päpstlichen Staatsschuld in der Frühen Neuzeit (Sekretariat, Computisterie und Depositerie der Monti vom 16. bis zum ausgenenden 18. Jahrhundert)*, Stuttgart 2005, pp. 19–20. However, this comprehensive study focuses mainly on the later period of the 17<sup>th</sup> – 18<sup>th</sup> centuries. To clarify the origins of this system and its functioning during the 16<sup>th</sup> century, earlier Italian works are more important, see Armando LODOLINI, *I „Monti Camerali“ nel sistema della finanza pontificia*, Archivi storici delle aziende di credito 1, 1956, pp. 263–278 and Michele MONACO, *Il Primo debito pubblico pontificio: il Monte della Fede (1526)*, Studi Romani 8, 1960, pp. 553–569.

54 They both were the members of the branched Roman bankers’ families, who regularly lent resources for the Papal Budget, see F. G. BRUSCOLI, *Papal Banking*, pp. 22, 84–85, 87, 92–93, 137–139, 150–152, 250.

55 Ibidem, pp. 22, 83–84, 127, 178.

56 Luigi Ruccellay, a notary at the Papal Court, was a member of a branched Roman banking company that commonly financed the Papal budget. See ibidem, pp. 18–19, 22, 40–41, 89–92. The exact identity of Giovanni di Rossi, with whom Ruccellay participated in this loan, was not found. He was probably a member of a branched family of that name, originally from Parma, see Letizia ARCANGELI – Marco GENTILE (red.), *Le signorie dei Rossi di Parma tra XIV e XVI secolo*, Florence 2007.

total amount expended for the “German War”. Part of this money was taken from Aleotti by Pope Paul III himself for his personal use.

### ***Items of another type that someone else paid for the Papal Chamber***

The only item that belongs to this income group is the amount of 950 scudi “*in coins*” (that is, paid in common silver or small copper coins) paid by Benvenuto Olivieri for the accommodation of the Duke of Parma and Piacenza, at that time that was Pier Luigi Farnese, the Pope’s illegitimate son. This item was recorded in the accounting documentation on November 10, 1546, as an income item, that is a form of loan that Olivieri had repaid in a different way. The aforementioned 950 scudi “*in coins*” were recorded after conversion as 864 scudi “*in gold*”<sup>57</sup>

**Table 1:** A summary table of income reported by P. G. Aleotti in connection with the “German War”

Accounting justification of income items		Creditors or payers in place of the Papal Chamber	total	%
Cash withdrawal from the Papal Treasury in the Angelic Castle		-	152,000	55.27 %
Administration Costs for August 1546		-	15,535 <sup>1s</sup>	5.65 %
Jewish tax	Marca (6000 sc for <i>vingesima</i> ; withdrawn was 5158 <sup>10s</sup> )	the Altoviti Bank House	6485 <sup>16s</sup>	2.36 %
	Campania (2 instalments 363 <sup>13s</sup> each = 727 <sup>6s</sup> )			
	Rome (600)			
A purpose loan of 30,000 sc payable from the collection of duties of the Papal State		Christoph Sauli	30,000	10.91 %
		Tobias Palavicini		
Drawn from a long-term loan guaranteed by the collection of contributions from the provinces of Campania, Perugia and Romagna		Johann Baptist Perini (Campania = 4818 <sup>3s</sup> <sub>8d</sub> )	7720 <sup>3s</sup> <sub>8d</sub>	2.81 %
		Bartolomeo Sauli (Perugia = 2000)		
		Benvenuto Olivieri (Romagna = 902)		
Drawn from a long-term loan guaranteed by the collection of tithe from Florence		Benvenuto Olivieri	19,500	7.09 %

<sup>57</sup> See Note 44.

Drawn from a long-term loan guaranteed by the collection of tithe from Milan	Pier Antonio Bandini (4800)	8800	3.20 %
	Benvenuto Olivieri (a total loan of 20,700, drawn 4000)		
“Bulk” payments not differentiated in terms of individual items	Cassi	3,200	1.16 %
Drawn from the long-term loan guaranteed by the income of the Order of Knights of St George	Benvenuto Olivieri	6,200	2.25 %
Drawn from the long-term loan guaranteed by the income of the Order of Knights of St Lawrence	the Altoviti Bank House	1,000	0.36 %
Drawn from credit guaranteed by the income from Portugal	Pier Antonio Bandini	3,300	1.21 %
Drawn from a bank loan	Benvenuto Olivieri	1,000	0.36 %
One-off loan with interest under a special agreement	Giovanni di Rossi (4,000)	19,000	6.91 %
	Thomaso Cavalcanti (15,000)		
Cash issued to the Duke of Farnese for accommodation	Benvenuto Olivieri	864	0.31 %
Cash received to the Papal Treasury	Giovanni di Pace	420	0.15 %
<b>total</b>		<b>275,024<sup>-s</sup><sub>sd</sub></b>	<b>100 %</b>

In the above-described income items, I would like to draw attention to two broader connections that we can document through the information from other sources (these are further documented in short digressions, attached after the main text of this study):

The first is the question of the “Jewish Tax”, declared by Pope Paul III in connection with the “German War” [see Digression a) Jewish *vingesima* for the “German War”].

The second is the question of the extent of the financial services provided by the Florentine banker Benvenuto Olivieri [see Digression b) Benvenuto Olivieri and the Papal tithe for the “German War” from the Province of Romagna].

## 2) *Expenditure in the amount of 274,954 scudi and 14 soldi*

The expense component of Aleotti’s accounting documentation is somewhat simpler than income, but its informative value about the course of the campaign of the Papal army to Germany is, in my opinion, very high. Here we can find a relatively large amount of data that is easiest to analyse in their chronological order. That is to say that the expense part is broken down (even if it is not apparent at first glance) according to the terms of payroll of the Papal army. Pope Paul III contractually guaranteed its funding for six months, which not only can be symbolically divided into six monthly instalments of the army payroll, but Aleotti indeed used this division, although it is explicitly specified only for two instalments (fourth and fifth, quoted as “*quarta paga*” and “*quinta paga*”).

**Two (the first and the second) instalments of the army payroll (June and July 1546)  
= 100,000 scudi**

The largest volume of cash was paid from the Papal Treasury at the very beginning of the campaign. This money can be divided into three parts: 12,000 for lower commanders, 82,000 for soldiers' payroll and 6,000 for Farnese brothers.

The first part of this sum includes the salary for the lower military commanders (captains), whose names are mostly explicitly specified. This is the main source that refers to staffing of the lower command corps at the beginning of the campaign. Given the extent and complexity of this information, I have separated this topic and I deal with it below in a special digression: See Digression c) Command corps of the Papal army in the Schmalkaldic War.

Payments to lower commanders (captains) were booked as an expense item on the 22<sup>nd</sup> Juny 1546 in the amount of 12,000 scudi, either 300 (mostly cavalry commanders) or 200 (infantry commanders). The payments to captains had not been recorded as a spending item anywhere else (with the only exception),<sup>58</sup> from which I conclude that this amount represented the payroll to captains for the entire duration of this military campaign and it was paid in full for all the 6 months at the beginning of the campaign.

Pope Paul III needed to make this advance payment quickly and in cash. That is why he ordered to reach deep into the Papal Treasury in the Angelic Castle and he withdrew this money from a long-term cash reserve in gold. The secret papal accountant Piero Giovanni Aleotti had new purses produced for this purpose.<sup>59</sup>

Ordinary mercenaries (whose names are not recorded anywhere) were paid a total payroll of 82,000 scudi (i.e. 41,000 per month) two months in advance in Bologna, i.e. during the campaign from Rome to the Danube region. This spending item was recorded on the 3<sup>rd</sup> July 1546. The money for the army was taken over by Matthias Gherardi di San Cassiano,<sup>60</sup> referred to as the director of the Datary (*datario*), as post master (*maestro delle poste*) or *mastro di campo* (Matthias Gherardi was responsible for the army payroll and for the relocation of the field and its technical background during

58 The captain named "*Hieronimo di Pisa*" (next Jerome from Pisa) was paid 100 scudi of "*retained payroll*" ("*... a conto della prouisione di maestro di campo non pagata gli...*") on 25. 4. 1547, i.e. three months after the troops returned to Italy.

59 A. BERTOLOTTI (ed.), *Spesie segrete e pubbliche*, p. 200: "[...] *sacchetti delli scudi 12 M che si sono pagati alli capitani che hanno a far fronte contro lutherani [...]*".

60 This man, who, according to Aleotti's record, demonstrably held the position of the Datary director at that time, is not recorded amongst the holders of this office by F. G. BRUSCOLI, *Papal Banking*, p. 296.

the campaign). The first instalment was assisted by an official from his office, Giouani Battista da Toffia.<sup>61</sup>

One day later, the two principal representatives of the Papal army were paid: Cardinal Alessandro Farnese, the Papal legate in this campaign charged with a diplomatic mission at the Imperial Court, and his brother Duke Ottavio Farnese, who served as the chief military commander in this campaign. Both received 3,000 scudi, that is a salary for three months in advance (June to August, each 1,000 scudi per month).

### ***The third instalment of the army payroll (August 1546) = 43,500 scudi***

At the end of August 1546, the third payroll instalment was paid to the army, in the amount of 41,500 scudi, which in total corresponds to the first and second instalment. Matthias Gherardi di San Sassino again arranged the orderly payment. Together with this money for the army, a reward was paid in advance (as a deposit for September 1546) to the two Farnese brothers, 1,000 scudi each.

### ***The fourth instalment of the army payroll (September 1546) = 35,300 scudi***

48,227 scudi were formally transferred for the fourth payroll instalment (“*a conto della quarta paga*”), but Matthias Gherardi used only 35,300 scudi to pay the soldiers – only this amount was entered in Aleotti’s accounting records.<sup>62</sup>

The difference of 13,527 scudi was explained by the fact that the banker Bartolomeo Sauli had already paid the sum of 1,727 scudi to the Papal Chamberlain (*camerlengo*) in Perugia. The banker Benvenuto Olivieri also paid 5,000 scudi to the same chamberlain in Perugia and in Bologna he paid out 4,800 scudi to Matteo Palmerini (i.e. 11,527 scudi in total). The remaining 2,000 were paid by the same Olivieri in Perugia to the Farnese brothers (“*al Cardinal et al Duca*”), 1000 scudi each (even though they drew an advance on the September payment already in August).

During these cash transactions, the accounting difference was caused by the overvaluation of the gold coin (or the *scudo oro in oro* which was a currency equivalent to the gold coin) in relation to the silver coin.<sup>63</sup> A cash payment in the amount of 1,950 scudi was received in the accounting, but these were silver coins. The agio in the amount of

61 Ibidem, p. 246.

62 During this fourth payment (in September), it seems likely that the cash-handling machination in regard to the payroll had reached more significant proportions, as indicated by the instruction from 21. 9. 1546, received by Flaminio Savello who was sent by the Pope to oversee the proper payment, see NBD I/9, pp. 265–266: “[...] *si stabili l’ordine de pagamenti noc la defalcatione da farsi del un scudo per fante anticipato et delli denari prestati per l’arme [...]*”.

63 See Note 44.

10 % (i.e. 19½ scudi) was counted as a loss or an expenditure item that was accepted by the dealer and merchant Bernardo Corbinegli.<sup>64</sup>

At the same time, the cash costs of 5,000 scudi were paid, which Matthias Gherardi continuously expended for the technical provision of military camps. Thus, the influx of money from Italy to the army ceased for a longer time, certainly in connection with the military activities that accompanied the conquest of Ingolstadt and the positional war in the Danube region, taking place in September and October 1546, which did not produce any clear result.

The lack of money and the related dissatisfaction within the Papal army (which had suffered significant losses at that time) is quite well documented by the testimony of the captured Italian nobleman named Hanibal Suarius, who was captured by the troops of the Schmalkaldic League at the end of October 1546. He was very outspoken in the captivity; among other things, he also mentioned what had been said in the Habsburg camp in connection with the overdue payroll: “[...] *sagt auch, er habe gehört, der Bapst wölte dem Keyser kein Geld mehr schicken, denn er besorget sich, so der Keyser geschlagen were, würde er auch geschlagen sein. Derhalben halte e ran sich, und wölte dem Keyser nichts mehr helfen* [...]”. Of course, this could be well used in the leaflet propaganda of the time.<sup>65</sup>

During October, however, according to Aleotti's record, no money was sent from Rome to the army. Aleotti posted only two payments that were not directly related to the Schmalkaldic War: On October 16, 1546, the accountant Aleotti received an extraordinary reward of 210 scudi from Paul III for his great work. (i.e., in the amount exceeding the half-year payroll of the Infantry Battalion Commander). On the same day (also on the basis of the Pope's own decree), Antonio Gavrieli, a lawyer in papal services,<sup>66</sup> was paid an amount of 48 ducati and 66 baiocchi, which, when converted to the accounting monetary unit, was 52 scudi, 18 guili and 5 denari.<sup>67</sup>

### ***The fifth instalment of the army payroll (November 1546) = 24,000 scudi***

The new money supply was not sent to the German battlefield until the beginning of November 1546; Aleotti expressly refers to it as “*the fifth payroll*” (“*quinta paga*”). It was again Matthias Gherardi who received the money, but only 24,000 scudi were sent from

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64 This man belonged to the middle-class of Florentine merchants working at the Papal Court, see F. G. BRUSCOLI, *Papal Banking*, pp. 156–157, 215, 246.

65 *Wahrhaftige zeitungen, aus dem Feldlager bey Sengen, Vom Fünffzehenden, bis in den zwentzigsten tag Octobris Anno M. D. xlvj.*, Sengen, 20. 10. 1546, fol. a IIII – a IIIIV.

66 F. G. BRUSCOLI, *Papal Banking*, p. 235.

67 See Note 44.

Rome. It is not clear from the context why it was exactly this amount; the gradual decline of the army payroll (starting with the fourth instalment in September) apparently reflects the decreasing numbers of soldiers as a result of death in combat, sickness or desertion. The Papal Chamber issued a total of 180 scudi to a carrier of Bergamo mailing company for the transport of cash (which was transported over the mountains to the military camp in the Danube region). Matthias Gherardi also charged the amount of 9,705 scudi spent on the operation of the military camp and its numerous relocations at that time, as well as 130 scudi that he paid for chartered carriers.

### ***The sixth instalment of the army payroll (December 1546) = 20,500 scudi***

The last payment is included in the amount of 20,500 scudi, which Matthias Gherardi received for this purpose on December 13, 1546.<sup>68</sup>

11,500 scudi were discharged in cash from the Papal Treasury, while the remaining 9,000 were secured by Cornelio Malvasia<sup>69</sup> through a credit note issued in Bologna. Ottavio Farnese received 1,500 scudi from this sum, the rest (19,000 scudi) was intended for the payment to the remainder of the Papal infantry (“[... scudi] 1500 al signor duca Orrauo et il resto alla Fanteria [...]”); i.e. that part of the army, which was commanded by Duke Ottavio and which was (despite increasingly declining numbers) dangerously plundering the area of the Bavarian Danube region.

By making the payment for December (i.e. the sixth month of the military campaign), the funding of the Papal army was ended, the army no longer intervened in the struggle with the Schmalkaldic League and provided for the livelihood as it was possible, especially by looting and plundering the countryside in South Germany.<sup>70</sup>

On January 22, 1547, Paul III issued the decision to withdraw his troops from Germany. The only additional money that was charged in the context of the Schmalkaldic War, was only the cost that Matthias Gherardi incurred in association with the transport of the army back through the Alps at the end of January and in February 1547.

January supply of money (the 22<sup>nd</sup> January 1547 in the total amount of 8,180 scudi) was delivered from Rome mostly in cash (7,000 scudi, 180 scudi was paid for the transfer

68 Matthias Gherardi himself explicitly mentions this amount (20,500 scudi) as money that was “[...] *comportanda in Germaniam pro sexta pagha exercitus [...]*” in his bill of income from 13. 12. 1546, see NBD I/9, Nr. 119, pp. 387–390 (here Note 1, p. 389).

69 F. G. BRUSCOLI, *Papal Banking*, pp. 81, 90–91, 110, 140.

70 The poor behaviour of the mercenaries of the Papal army in connection with the problems in the army payroll is also mentioned by Veralo in his reports sent to Pope Paul III from Ulm on 7. and 8. 2. 1547, see NBD I/9, Nr. 134, pp. 462–471.



of money), with a smaller portion (1,000 scudi) being again secured by Cornelio Malvasia in Bologna via a credit note.<sup>71</sup>

At the beginning of February (the 4<sup>th</sup> February 1547) the gradual return of troops was secured by a similar amount (altogether 8,000 scudi), but in the opposite proportion. Cornelio Malvasia secured 6000 scudi based on a credit note in Bologna; the remaining 2000 scudi were sent in cash (while the carrier named Cherubio retained 150 scudi).

In February 1547, the actual funding of the army ended; the pitiful remnants of the Papal army returned to Italy and did not enter the war in Germany again. Nevertheless, in April and in June 1546, the accountant Aleotti was still reporting relatively high sums in the item “income” (new cash loans of 24,500 scudi from Benvenuto Olivieri and Tomaso Cavalcanti), but also “expenditure” (from April to September 1547 he records expenditures in the amount of 20,177 scudi, 5 soldi and 7 denari).

From these “post-war” expenditures, the only one definitely associated with the campaign to Germany was an additional payment in the amount of 100 scudi paid to one of the infantry chiefs (Jerome from Pisa) on April 20, 1547, and, in a way, also the payment to Alessandro Vitelli (101 scudi, 7 soldi and 4 denari).

The other expenditures were no longer related to the war: they are various types of spending or internal accounting assignments, for example, when Aleotti transferred 10,000 scudi in cash to the treasury in the Angelic Castle. In a certain sense, as a “military” expense we can consider the money (454 scudi, 10 soldi and 10 denari) paid by Aleotti to Silvestro Berreto, the governor of the great Nepi fortress, located near Rome. Beretto was to inspect the fortress and secure its defence ability. This fortress, which in 1546, together with the adjoining city of the same name, formed the territorial enclave of the Farnesian Duchy of Castro (ruled by Ottavio Farnese), certainly did not have anything to do with the Schmalkaldic War, nor could it be assumed that the Lutheran troops could endanger this fortress located in the Italian inland.

In July 1547 Pope Paul III himself withdrew 1,700 scudi from the account of the “German War” for his own needs and Aleotti declared additional more than 900 scudi as expense for the unspecified needs of the Farnese family and the Pope himself. And eventually, perhaps the most curious cost item charged by Aleotti in connection with the German War: a pearl necklace with the price of 4,300 scudi, which was for the personal use of Paul III, secured by the banker Tomaso Cavalcanti.

It is a pity that Aleotti had not written down on which girl's neck this necklace had ended (though he probably knew which for lady the Pope bought this jewel). We can

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71 NBD I/9, Nr. 127, pp. 421–425.

assume, however, that only the Emperor's illegitimate daughter, Margaret, could deserve such a gift at that time, the wife of the Papal grandson, Ottavio Farnese, and the mother of the two recently born Papal great-grandsons. Why would the Pope buy such a precious jewel for someone else, beyond the closest family?

**Table 2:** Expenses recorded by Aleotti in connection with German War from June 1546 to September 1547 (according to the chronological breakdown) [in: scudi <sup>soldi</sup> denari ]

period	salary			securing troops and a camp	Other costs of the cam-paign	Other costs of unclear determination	Costs that are not directly related to the War		total
	Farnese brothers	captains	soldiers				issued to the Pope (cash and jewels)	other	
1546 / VI – VII	6 000	12 000	82 000	-	-	-	-	-	100 000
1546 / VIII	2 000	-	41 500	-					43 500
1546 / IX	(2 000)	-	35 300	5000	19 <sup>10</sup> <sub>0</sub>	(11 527)			40 319 <sup>10</sup> <sub>0</sub> (+ 13 527)
1546 / X	-	-	-	-	-	-		262 <sup>18</sup> <sub>5</sub>	262 <sup>18</sup> <sub>5</sub>
1546 / XI	-	-	24 000	9705	310	-		-	34 015
1546 / XII	1 500	-	19 000	-	-	-		-	20 500
1547 / I	-	-	-	8000	180	-		-	8 180
1547 / II	-	-	-	7850	150	-		-	8 000
1547 / III	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-
1547 / IV	-	100	-	-	-	-		405 <sup>9</sup> <sub>2</sub>	505 <sup>9</sup> <sub>2</sub>
1547 / V	-	-	-	-	-	-		2661 <sup>7</sup> <sub>3</sub>	2761 <sup>7</sup> <sub>3</sub>
1547 / VI	-	-	-	-	-	-	4300	-	4300
1547 / VII	-	-	-	-	-	-	1700	10 101 <sup>7</sup> <sub>4</sub>	11 801 <sup>7</sup> <sub>4</sub>
1547 / VIII	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1547 / IX	-	-	-	-	-	-	909 <sup>1</sup> <sub>10</sub>	-	909 <sup>1</sup> <sub>10</sub>
total	9 500 (2 000)	12 100	201 800	30 555	659 <sup>10</sup> <sub>0</sub>	(11 527)	6909 <sup>1</sup> <sub>10</sub>	13 421 <sup>2</sup> <sub>2</sub>	274 954 <sup>14</sup> <sub>0</sub> (+ 13 527)

The accounting documentation led by Pietro Giovanni Aleotti in connection with the Papal campaign to Germany represents, in my view, an important source not only for the study of the history of the Schmalkaldic War itself but also for the history of the diplomatic, military, monetary and fiscal policies of the Papal court in the mid-16<sup>th</sup> century.

It unequivocally illustrates the direct dependence between the funding of the Papal troops and the rate of their activity on the German battlefield. It was clear from the

documentation available to L. Pastor that there were problems with the payment of salary from the very beginning of the operation of the Papal army in Germany.<sup>72</sup> That is probably why the Papal army behaved on the German territory the way they were used to behave in the Northern Italian wars: That is like villains, looting rural houses and robbing anyone who cannot resist, no matter whether it is a subdued enemy or an ally. Moreover, it was hardly possible to distinguish it in the complex territory of southern Germany, especially since the Papal soldiers, in their vast majority, did not speak German.



**Fig. 6:** Coat of Arms of the Pope Paul III; main gateway of the Nepi Fortress (photo P. Vorel)

Description of violence allegedly committed by Papal troops to southern Germany rural population was indeed a normal part of contemporary propaganda which was in the form of printed leaflets disseminated by the enemy (Lutheran) side, but inappropriate

<sup>72</sup> L. PASTOR, *Geschichte Papst Pauls III*, p. 575.

behaviour of Papal troops in Germany was also clearly expressed by Emperor Charles V himself.<sup>73</sup>

The army itself ended in an infamous way. A large part of the Italian soldiers perished directly on the battlefield, some of which died of hunger and cold in an unexpected worsening of weather at the end of November 1546<sup>74</sup> and during the return trip through the Alpine passes at the turn of January and February 1547.<sup>75</sup>

The entire Papal “German War” is a matter of sharp contrasts and questions still unanswered. The initial impetus to the whole event probably came from the Papal, not from the Imperial side. The promises of great financial and military support by the Papal State were probably the main argument on a plate of imaginary diplomatic scales which eventually outweighed the Emperor Charles V’s political considerations on the side of the military solution to his long-standing conflict with the Schmalkaldic League. Without the promise of massive Papal support, he would probably consider this step more cautiously; at the beginning of June, the Emperor explicitly appreciated that Papal money would allow for easy financing of the war in Germany and that the Pope’s terms are quite acceptable.<sup>76</sup>

However, Aleotti’s accounts show clearly that, in the case of the “German War”, Pope Paul III was willing to reach deep into the cash reserve in the chests at the Angelic Castle. This is unusual, because the vast majority of other expenditures (including earlier military activities) were solved by loans, contributing both to the total debt of the Papal State and to the long-term decommissioning of regular income sources, through which these loans were guaranteed (and subsequently used for instalments). In my opinion, the reason is that a substantial part of the cash (paid out in gold) ended directly in the hands of the nearest Pope’s relatives of the Farnese family, whether it was their direct remuneration for the military and diplomatic service to the Papal State or the money issued in association with financing of the mercenary army (which was also subsequently available to the Farnese).

73 W. MAURENBRECHER, *Karl V. und die Deutschen Protestanten*, Nr. 11, pp. 86–99. The letter of Charles V addressed to Diego Hurtado de Mendoza was sent from Ulm on 11. 2. 1547. There the Emperor outlines the course of the Danubian campaign and criticises the behaviour of the Papal command and the mercenaries (pp. 89–92) in indiscriminate words. For an Italian excerpt of this letter written in Spanish and its interpretation, see G. LEVA, *Storia documentata di Carlo V*, Vol. IV., pp. 256–257.

74 Girolamo FALETTI, *Prima Parte delle guerre di Alamagna*, Ferrara 1552, pp. 108–109.

75 Rolando BUSSI (ed.), *Cronaca di San Cesarino (dalle origini al 1547) – Alessandro Tassoni seniore Cronaca di Modena (1106–1562)*, Mantova 2014, p. 264: “[...] e in quell’esercito morirono per fame e per freddo molti Modenesi [...]”.

76 J. D. TRACY, *Emperor Charles V*, p. 209.

From the very beginning of this campaign, the family representation and the advancement of the glory of his grandchildren represented a crucial issue for Paul III.<sup>77</sup> This is also quite well documented by a relatively detailed source, available to us in the form of contemporary newspaper. The Italian public was regularly informed of the news from the battlefield (and above all, of the merits of the Farnese brothers) in the form of brief newspaper leaflets produced by the Farnese in large volumes in the printing shop at the piazza di Parione. Almost every day, the Romans could follow the “heroic epic” of the Farnese who were supposed to wipe out the nest of “Lutheran heresy” and repair the humiliation caused to Papal Rome twenty years ago (*Sacco di Roma*, 1527), starting with the outpouring of the Papal army from Rome, through their festive parade in the Imperial camp and the first military experience in the siege of Ingolstadt and other minor events. This regular supply of news ends in October 1546.<sup>78</sup>

The Papal army actively participated in two larger combat operations within the coalition army: The first of these was a several-day artillery battle during the siege of Ingolstadt in early September 1546. At that time, a major field battle was expected, in which the Papal units were placed at the forefront. Therefore, they suffered greater losses immediately at the outset, during the enemy's unexpected massive artillery fire. Especially the Papal soldiers then participated in repeated minor skirmishes taking place on the plains spreading between the enemy field camps in the period between the artillery fire. The second major combat action conducted by the Papal troops independently was an unexpected night raid and conquest of the city of Donauwörth on the 8<sup>th</sup> October 1546. This, however, was the last most significant military action in which the Papal army operated in the Danube region, as part of the Habsburg coalition army. Ten days later, on the 18<sup>th</sup> October 1546, the rest of the Papal army separated from the allied troops (with the exception of Savello's cavalry troops) for unclear reasons (apparently due to disagreements regarding command) and began to operate in the territory of Bavaria without coordination with the main Habsburg command.<sup>79</sup>

There were probably several reasons for this development (disagreements between the commanders and the Farnese brothers themselves, the absence of Cardinal Farnese in the army due to recurrent illness, the impossibility of fulfilling the declared purpose of the crusade against the Lutherans); the decisive role in the disintegration of the Papal

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77 A similar conclusion was also reached already by the contemporaries of Paul III, who were more involved in the backstage of “high politics”. As early as 1539, the main Pope's interests were characterised by the Venice ambassador at the Imperial Court, Pietro Mocenigo, see Gustav TURBA (ed.), *Venetianische Depeschen vom Kaiserhofe*, Bd. I, Wien 1899, p. 328 (22. 5. 1539) and NBD IX/I, p. 446.

78 P. VOREL, *Za obnovu řádu v říši a pravé víry*, pp. 100–116.

79 *Ibidem*, p. 117.

army was undoubtedly played by the problems with the payroll for the soldiers who were last paid at the end of September 1546. From October 1546 until the end of December 1546 and the beginning of January 1547, the soldiers did not receive any money, while the supply was also seriously weakened. The Papal Infantry began to plunder the Bavarian countryside, ensuring both their supply and spoil by looting, regardless of whether the estates belonged to Catholic or Lutheran rulers. On the 23<sup>rd</sup> November 1546, unusually strong frost struck the area in the Danube region, to which the Italian soldiers were not accustomed. The numbers of Papal soldiers began to shrink rapidly in field conditions; the loss was caused not only by hunger, frost and illness, but also by frequent desertions. At the turn of 1546 and 1547, when the money for the payroll instalments for the fifth and sixth months of the campaign arrived from Rome to the field camp near Heilbronn, only about two thousand infantrymen remained from the original twelve thousand army. On the 22<sup>nd</sup> January 1547 Pope Paul III issued an order to end the military campaign and withdraw the rest of the army back to Italy. The winter return over the Alps, which lasted until the second half of February 1547, caused further loss of life due to cold and hunger.

Contemporary commentators (including the Emperor Charles V) evaluated the Pope's participation in this part of the Schmalkaldic war as a great disgrace to the whole of Italy and as a failure to fulfil the promises which the Pope contractually committed to in June 1546. However, in March 1547, when the Habsburgs ended up in defensive on the Eastern Front in Saxony, the Emperor Charles V asked Pope Paul III for an urgent military assistance again. Yet this time with no success. The Papal troops did not participate in the surprise victory of the Habsburg army at the Battle of Mühlberg (on the 24<sup>th</sup> April 1547).

Pope Paul III completely lost his interest in another armed struggle with German Lutherans. From his point of view, the campaign of the Papal army to Germany did not meet the expectations he had put in it. Even the Pope did primarily pursue the military liquidation of the Lutheran "heresy" (it was only a propaganda at the beginning of the campaign); the military campaign was to bring fame to the Pope's two grandsons and to confirm their dominant position amongst the European aristocracy. This effect did not occur, however; on the contrary, the Farnese demonstrated their incompetence both in the battlefield and in the diplomatic negotiations associated with this campaign, disgraced themselves and, under the pretext of military spending, they reached deep into the financial resources of the Papal State. Already during the year 1547, when the Pope's son Pier Luigi Farnese was murdered, Emperor Charles V occupied the Duchy of Parma and in the last years of Paul III's pontificate there was an outbreak of apparent hostility between the Emperor and the Pope, growing into a state of war.

There was nothing to boast of. The Pope's low military effectiveness in combat, the scornful condemnation of the Emperor, the infamous end of parts of the remnants of the

papal expedition in the snow-drifts (only a small fraction of the original army returned to Italy in February 1547) and a new war that began in Italy in 1547 between Pope Paul III and Emperor Charles V, put aside the original idea of using the military campaign of 1546 in the interest of the Farnese family representation. For this, an appropriate situation did not occur until two decades later, when the Farnese family in European politics was represented primarily by Margaret of Parma, the illegitimate daughter of Emperor Charles V, and her son Alessandro Farnese (1545–1592). Only then, after clarifying the property-legal relations to the Duchy of Parma and Piacenza (for the benefit of the Farnese) and after an active involvement of the entire family on the side of King Philip II of Spain in his struggle with the Dutch insurgents, a historical fiction emerged, involving the role of Pope Paul III and his grandsons in the Schmalkaldic War. This fiction came in both literary (in the form of printed interpretations of the contemporary history at that time) and visual (in the family palace in Rome and Caprarola) form.<sup>80</sup> However, this is already a connection that far exceeds the scope of this contribution.

Digression a)

### **Jewish *vingesima* to “German War”**

The relatively complicated relations that formed between the Papal Chamber and the Jewish population of the Papal State by the middle of the 16<sup>th</sup> century are documented in detail by the research of S. Simonsohn's. It was also made accessible to the public by a comprehensive small-scale (hardly accessible in Europe) edition of medieval and early modern judaica from the Vatican archive (the period of Paul III is covered in volume VI.)<sup>81</sup> and the final synthetic volume.<sup>82</sup> S. Simonsohn obviously could not use Aleotti's accounting documentation, because it was stored in a different archive fund than the one which represented the main source for his monumental editorial project.

Although the main intermediaries of the loan for Papal Chamber in the middle of the 16<sup>th</sup> century were Florentine bankers, the Jewish financiers also had their irreplaceable role in the complex financial system of that time. Primarily because in their case the legally limited interest rate in Europe was set considerably higher than in the case of Christian financiers or it was not limited at all. Thus, any financial assets could be much better multiplied through Jewish financiers, as long as a sufficiently secure legal space

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80 Ibidem, p. 133–145.

81 Shlomo SIMONSOHN (ed.), *The Apostolic See and the Jews, Vol. 6, Documents: 1546–1555*, Toronto 1990.

82 Shlomo SIMONSOHN, *The Apostolic See and the Jews, Bd. VII (History)*, Toronto 1991.

was created for such a transaction. Extraordinary taxes and levies imposed on Jewish financiers by the monarchs may not have always been a negative phenomenon for Jewish entrepreneurs, it was often about a mutually beneficial agreement. The requirements for extraordinary “Jewish” taxes were often accompanied by a politically-guaranteed extension of the license to perform credit operations at riskier (significantly higher) interest rates. It is evident from the preserved documentation that it was similar to the relationship between the papal power and the Jewish bankers operating in the territory of the Papal State by the time of the pontificate of Paul III.<sup>83</sup>

Right at the beginning of the pontificate of Paul III, in 1534, Jewish banking was subordinated directly to the Papal Chamber, both in Rome (where the most important Jewish financiers resided), and in the territory of the entire Papal State. The renewal of the privileges for the Roman Jewish bankers<sup>84</sup> was followed by the gradual adjustment of the legal status (more favourable for the credit activities of Jewish bankers) and other parts of the Papal state.<sup>85</sup> Along with this centralization, Paul III began to strive for a clear determination of settlement area for this community. From earlier times, the number of Jewish bankers in Rome was limited to twenty “families”; this number was raised to forty in 1543. Former and newly established Jewish bankers were to be confined only in the designated part of Rome (later Piazza Giudea and Via Guidea) since 1545. Although this rule failed to become fully enforced during the pontificate of Paul III, the basis of the Roman Jewish ghetto of the 16<sup>th</sup> century was created at that very time.

Pope Paul III (or the Papal Chamber officials) was interested in expanding the number of Jewish financiers and their lending activities, but the negotiations were interfered by the efforts of the “old families” to maintain their former exclusivity. The compromise solution of 1543 took the form of an agreement, according to which the maximum interest rate for the former twenty licensed Jewish bankers was reduced from 60 % to 48 % (at the same time, it was reduced from 10 % to 6 % for Christian financiers in Protestant Europe), while twenty “new” Jewish bankers were allowed to lend money at a maximum annual rate of 30 %.<sup>86</sup>

As a result of the centralization described above, the officials of the Papal Chamber had a better insight into the lending activities of the Jewish financiers, and could easily enforce a variety of taxes and fees.

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83 Kenneth R. STOW, *Taxation, community and state (The Jews and the fiscal foundations of the early modern papal state)*, Pápste und Papsttum, Bd. 19, Stuttgart 1982.

84 S. SIMONSOHN, *The Apostolic See*, VII, pp. 407–409, 412.

85 Max RADIN, *A Charter of Privileges of the Jews in Ancona of the year 1535*, Jewish quarterly review, N.S. 4, 1913, no. 2, pp. 225–248.

86 S. SIMONSOHN, *The Apostolic See*, VII, pp. 413–414.



The “proper” Jewish tax was twofold: 1) the so-called “Jewish tithe” (*decima*), which was taken out of all movable and immovable property (just like the religious tithe in the case of the Christian population); 2) a tax on all interest earned by Jewish financiers with high interest-bearing loans; to collect this tax (the amount of which was not precisely fixed), the Pope Commissars could use any means.

In addition to these “proper Jewish taxes”, an extraordinary tax called *vigesima* was collected in the middle of the 16<sup>th</sup> century. Originally, it was a special tax of 5 % of all property and income, announced in 1460 to finance struggle against Turks. It was to be collected for only three years, but the later Popes also sometimes collected it.

Formally, therefore, the tax burden on the Jewish population was so high that tax collection at an official level was economically unrealistic. The “Jewish tax” was therefore collected in a non-systematic way, essentially at such level as the papal collectors were able to enforce. In practice, its level stabilized on the usual “tithe”, increased by a “fine” of 4 %. Even these measures contributed to a significant decline in the number of Jewish inhabitants in the territory of the Papal State at the beginning of the 16<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>87</sup>

It was not until the beginning of the pontificate of Paul III when this situation has changed significantly. Instead of vaguely defined taxes, papal clerks agreed with the leaders of the Jewish community on a fixed amount (traditionally called *vigesima*), which consisted of 10,000 scudi from the whole of Italy throughout the year. The Roman Jewish bankers themselves contributed 560 scudi to this sum. The precisely defined financial obligations of the Jewish community then allowed the Papal Chamber to use this income to regularly guarantee loans granted to Pope Paul III by Florentine and Genovese bankers. Those bankers then organized the Jewish *vigesime* collection themselves (as in the case of the Papal tithe from the Christian population or other permanent incomes of the Papal Chamber).

Due to the wars into which Pope Paul III was drawn during the 1540s, the originally agreed financial model was disrupted and the Pope began to raise demands on Jewish bankers. The first such step was the launch of a new “war” tax in 1542 that was designed to defend the coast of the Papal State against the attacks of the pirate Barbarossa, then operating in the service of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>88</sup> This tax was to be collected from the Jewish population of the coastal provinces of Marche and Ancona (for the fortification of the Ancona port, the Jews from these provinces were said to had paid a respectable amount of 15,000 scudi), but soon it spread to Rome as well.<sup>89</sup>

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87 Ibidem, pp. 418–419.

88 Ernle BRADFORD, *The Sultans Admiral (Barbarossa – Pirate and Empire-Builder)*, London 2009, pp. 138, 161.

89 K. R. STOW, *Taxation*, p. 24; S. SIMONSOHN, *The Apostolic See*, VII, p. 420.

Paul III chose a similar procedure for financing of the Schmalkaldic War. A new Jewish *vigesima* was announced, which was supposed to bring 20,000 scudi.<sup>90</sup> It concerned the Jewish population under the jurisdiction of the Papal State (not the whole of Italy), and also the French enclaves (Avignon and Venaissin).<sup>91</sup>

This tax, which was originally to be collected directly by the Papal collector, was soon used (as well as most of the permanent papal receipts) to guarantee a cash loan of 20,700 gold scudi. This was a one-year loan, with an interest rate of 12 %.<sup>92</sup>

The consortium of creditors, which consisted of five Florentine bankers working at the Roman Papal Court (Alois de Oricellaris, Benvenuto Oliveri, Pier Antonio Bandini, Aleman Bandini and Jerome Ubaldino), should receive 23,144 scudi in total; the costs of the actual collecting of the money (collector's fee) of several hundred scudi were added separately.

This loan was guaranteed mostly by the Jewish *vigesima* mentioned above, respectively the money collected in the city and province of Bologna, the province of Romagna, the Ravenna Exarchate,<sup>93</sup> the province of Umbria and the French enclave (the county of Venaissin and the city of Avignon); the cost of two collectors for two years amounted to one hundred scudi.

However, the Jewish *vigesima* would not be sufficient to cover the repayment, the interest and the cost of collection, even if it was collected in full (which could not be assumed). Moreover, the territory in which the consortium was to collect *vigesima* for the creditors did not concern the entire territory of the Papal State.<sup>94</sup> Therefore, the range of guarantees was extended to two additional sources of cash collected from Christians to make up for insufficient funds: 1) arrears of the last two tithes in the city of Bologna and the dioceses of Bologna, Marche, Umbria and the French enclave (*Patrimonium*

90 S. SIMONSOHN (ed.), *The Apostolic See*, Vol. 6, Nr. 2621, 2622, 2631, 2633, 2634.

91 The task of collection of the extraordinary Jewish tax for financing of the war in Germany in the papal enclave in France (Avignon, Venaissin) was given to Zikmund Albano, a clergyman from Urbino on 2. 11. 1546. For the city and the province of Bologna, Alessandro Franceschi of Foligno was appointed as the main collector on 4. 11. 1546, see S. SIMONSOHN (ed.), *The Apostolic See*, Vol. 6, Nr. 2646–2647, pp. 2557–2558.

92 This contract was fully published by S. SIMONSOHN (ed.), *The Apostolic See*, Vol. 6, Nr. 2644, pp. 2556–2557. The contract is not dated; but was concluded before 5. 11. 1546. On the Papal side, four high-ranking officials signed the loan agreement: Cardinal Guido Ascanius Sforza, Bernardinus Elvini, Bishop of Ancona and Treasury Secretary Julius Gonzaga and Julius de Grandis, President of the Papal Chamber. It is probably the same loan of 20,700 scudo (dated 30. 10. 1546), which is registered in Florentine sources by Bruscoli F. G. BRUSCOLI, *Papal Banking*, p. 90 (he mentions Luigi Rucellai instead of Aleos Oricelaria in the consortium, but otherwise the conditions are virtually the same).

93 S. SIMONSOHN (ed.), *The Apostolic See*, Vol. 6, Nr. 2648, p. 2558.

94 *Ibidem*, Nr. 2651 and Nr. 2653, p. 2559.

*Provinciis*); in addition to the cost for collectors of one hundred scudi; 2) tithe from Milan (cost per 4 collectors – one hundred scudi).

The increased financial burden on Jewish financiers was accompanied by a higher level of legal protection. Just at the time when the extraordinary *vigesima* was collected, Pope Paul III ordered the Roman municipality (via a letter dated December 3, 1546) not to punish four Jewish Roman bankers (Master Josef, Isaac Zarfari, Leo Abem Pensat and David Rossulus) in connection with credit activities (which apparently violated the maximum interest rates) as they are not under the jurisdiction of the city of Rome, but in legal affairs they are subject to the Papal chamberlain. A few days later (December 8, 1546), the same argument was used again in the case of the aforementioned Isaac Zarfati (who is explicitly mentioned as one of the twenty “old” Jewish bankers in Rome as defined in 1543, see above) and in addition (July 4, 1547), the protection also concerned Isaac’s sons Salomon and Joseph and his grandson Isaac.<sup>95</sup>

From the surviving sources it is not clear whether the aforementioned extraordinary Jewish tax for the “German War” was collected in full. It was probably not, because after the end of the Papal participation in this military campaign in early 1547, officials of the Papal Chamber again began to negotiate with representatives of Jewish communities regarding the amount of regularly levied taxes. This is documented, for example, by the agreement between the Papal Chamber and the Jewish Community in the province of Marche, in the city of Ancona (where the very large and influential Jewish community was still settled in the late 1540s due to the special economic position of this port city) and other locations (Ascoli, Camerino, Fano) about their share of regular “Jewish taxes”.<sup>96</sup> From these negotiations, it is clear that before July 1547, it was agreed that the Papal Chamber ceased collecting the rest of the extraordinary *vigesima* (announced under the pretext of mobilizing resources for the war in Germany in the amount of 20,000 scudi). The Jewish community proceeded to pay two tax instalments in the previously agreed amount (of 6,000 scudi), but the condition was the return to the original conversion rate between the “ordinary coin” and the gold scudi (*scudo oro in oro*, the main monetary accounting unit of papal accounting). Within the aforementioned extraordinary *vigesima*, the value of the golden scudo had been increased by 10 % (to pay 1 scudo it was necessary to pay 11 silver giuli “to the coin”).<sup>97</sup> After the 4<sup>th</sup> July, 1547, to pay 1 scudo (as a monetary unit)

95 Ibidem, Nr. 2652 and Nr. 2654, pp. 2559–2560.

96 Ibidem, Nr. 2694, p. 2592.

97 This accounting practice is documented in the edited Aleotti documentation. For money collected from the “Jewish tax” and registered as income on 17. 9. 1546 (see receipts in the Editorial Attachment), the amount of 400 *scudo di moneta* was registered as income in the accounting amount of 363 scudi and 13 soldi. However, this was not a specific feature of the “Jewish tax”; similarly, the gold coins (and

within taxes levied on the Jewish population, only 10 silver giuli were enough, as it was in the past.

The sources we have on the collection of the “Jewish tax” for the war in Germany seemingly do not correspond much with Aleotti’s accounting records. This is logical, however, because the most of the anticipated yield of this tax was transferred to the consortium of bankers to cover the cash loan shortly after it was announced. The collection of money from the Jewish population was already arranged by the Florentine bankers themselves. Nevertheless, there is a considerable amount in Aleotti’s record (6,485 scudi and 16 soldi), the source of which is the “Jewish tax”. It is a *vigesima* collected in other territories of the Papal State (Marche, Campania and Rome itself) than those included in the aforementioned loan agreement in the amount of 20,700 scudi (the provinces of Bologna, Romagna, Umbria, the Ravenna exarchate and the French enclaves, that is the Venaissin county and Avignon). Here the largest item is the 3,000 scudi that Aleotti received from the Altoviti bank house on the 1<sup>st</sup> November 1546; these were guaranteed by the Jewish *vigesima* from Marche province. This transaction was apparently connected with the Papal regulation of the same day (1<sup>st</sup> November 1546), according to which Bindo de Altoviti, the Treasurer of the provinces of Marche and Ancona, who at the same time acted as the extraordinary collector of the Jewish *vigesima*, was supposed to hand over the amount of 2,390 scudi in cash to the Pope’s secret accountant, Pietro Giovanni Aleotti (here written in the form of “Aleveto”).<sup>98</sup> The *vigesima* payments from Campania and Rome were handed over by the Papal collectors in cash.

The extraordinary *vigesima*, intended to cover parts of the cost of the withdrawal of the Papal army against German Lutherans, was the last measure by which Paul III tried to increase the tax burden on the Jewish population (and, above all, financiers and bankers settled in Rome and Ancona). Yet basically it can be said that Paul III, as an experienced politician, was aware of the benefits that the Papal Treasury got from consensual relations with the leaders of the Jewish community settled in the territory of the Papal State. That is why he did not insist on consistent enforcement of *vigesima* for the “German War”, once the activity of the Papal army in this conflict had ended. However, his followers on Peter’s Throne did not follow this strategy and did not hesitate to use violent means to enforce special taxes on profits, generated by high interest rates on short-term loans. Then, in 1555, this also led to executions of the main leaders of the Jewish community in Ancona.

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hence the main monetary units of the accounting system of the Papal Chamber) were overvalued by about 10 % over the “ordinary coin”, see Note 44.

98 S. SIMONSOHN (ed.), *The Apostolic See*, Vol. 6, Nr. 2645, p. 2557.

## Digression b)

**Benvenuto Olivieri and Papal title for the “German War” from the province of Romagna**

In the middle of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, the fiscal policy of the Papal Chamber was virtually entirely dependent on the services of the Italian financiers, bank houses or consortia of investors, mostly located in Rome. A substantial part of these financial entrepreneurs came from Florence, the main medieval centre of Italian finance. The Florentine financiers were of course attracted to the “eternal city” primarily by the wealth based on a regular influx of money from the entire Christian world. This flow was again directed to Rome at the end of the 14<sup>th</sup> century, when the main Papal residence was moved back to Rome from French Avignon. Some of the Florentine bankers also resorted to the Papal Court for political reasons when the Medici family took over the government of Florence.<sup>99</sup> The Olivieri (in the Italian sources also written “*Ulivieri*”)<sup>100</sup> banker family also belonged to the large group of Florentine families settled in Rome in the first half of the 16<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>101</sup> It was represented primarily by Paul Olivieri (born in 1464) and his sons,<sup>102</sup> who controlled a major bank house and were co-owners in a number of lending companies.

At the end of the pontificate of Paul III the interests of the “Olivieri Bank” were represented primarily by Benvenuto Olivieri (1496–1549), one of the sons of the aforementioned Paul, whose position at the Papal Court was quite extraordinary. He belonged to the main creditors of the Papal Chamber, the loans he had granted had a long-term guarantee from a significant portion of the permanent income of the Papal State and through his officials or associates in various consortia he actually controlled the Papal fiscal policy.<sup>103</sup>

Of course, Benvenuto Olivieri was not the only creditor of the Papal Chamber, but his role in financing Papal policies is comparable to the contemporary significance of

99 Melisa M. BULLARD, *Filipo Strozzi and the Medici (Favor and Finance in Sixteenth-century Florence and Rome)*, Cambridge 1980; Tim PARKS, *Medici Money (Banking, Metaphysics, and Art in Fifteenth-Century Florence)*, New York – London 2005.

100 F. G. BRUSCOLI, *Papal Banking*, pp. 25–68.

101 Melisa M. BULLARD, „*Mercatores Florentini Romanam Curiam Sequens*“ in *the early sixteenth century*, *The Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 6, 1976, pp. 1–18.

102 F. G. BRUSCOLI, *Papal Banking*, p. 27, Table 2–Genealogy of the Olivieri family: the branch of Michele di Matteo.

103 A detailed analysis of these relationships was carried out by F. G. BRUSCOLI, *Papal Banking*, pp. 69–206: Part Two: Benvenuto Olivieri and the Apostolic Chamber.

the Augsburg Banking House of Fuggers in relation to the Habsburgs.<sup>104</sup> In the last years of the pontificate of Paul III (in 1543 and later), Benvenuto Olivieri was the chief of the three Florentine bankers who led the administration of the accounts of the Papal Chamber (with him there were Tobias Pallavicino and Bindo Altoviti).<sup>105</sup>




Fig. 7: Archivio di Stato di Firenze, Segnatura Galli Tassi 1874, title page (photo P. Vorel)

In the context of the very complicated relations between the Olivieri Bank House and the Papal Chamber, F. G. Bruscoli mentions the accounting of the credit for the “German war” in connection with the collection of tithe in the province of Romagna, where Olivieri served as the administrator of collection of papal tithe.<sup>106</sup> That is why I was curious to find out how the Olivieri’s financiers actually went about collecting the money to repay the loan for the “German War” granted to the Pope. It is a view “from the other side”, which cannot be comprehended in the archives of the Papal Chamber.

The archive fund of the Olivieri Bank House preserves a detailed overview of the collection of papal tithe from the Romagna province, which should have repaid the “German War” loan.<sup>107</sup> Aleotti did not consider this source in the income part of his accounts; it is clear that, just as in a number of other cases, it was just a normal loan guaranteed by one of the permanent income sources of the Papal Chamber. This

104 Jean-François BERGIER, *From the Fifteenth Century in Italy to the Sixteenth Century in Germany: A New Banking Concept?*, in: *The Dawn of Modern Banking*, New Haven – London 1979, pp. 105–129.

105 Consequently, they were also officially titled, see for example ASR, Camerale I, Mandati Camerali, seg. 877 “Liber mandatorum d[omini] Pauli pape III” (3. 2. 1543): “[...] *Bindo de Altovitis, Thobie Pallavicino, Benvenuto Olivieri, merc[atores] flor[entini], pecuniarum Camere Apostolice generali administratores* [...]”.

106 F. G. BRUSCOLI, *Papal Banking*, pp. 129, 161–162.

107 Archivio di Stato di Firenze, Segnatura Galli Tassi 1874.

corresponds with the title of the whole document, from which it is clear that it is only one of the chronologically continuous series of volumes, documenting the collection of papal tithe from the respective territory (“*Entrata della Dec[i]ma Papale della Romagna Pontificia attenente alla Ragione Olivieri di Roma del 1546*”). Only the subtitle specifies the loan project to which the documentation relates (“*Dua x<sup>mi</sup> Romagna 1546 p[ro]la Guerra d Germania*”).

I chose the term “loan project” intentionally, because of the fact that it has no other connection with the war in Germany. The Bank House of Olivieri has only provided the Pope with an interest-bearing loan, and basically, they did not care what resources would be used to repay it, as long as the expected profit and reimbursement were achieved.

Consequently, it is clear from the context that Benvenuto Olivieri provided Paul III with just one more unspecified loan for warfare in Germany (one of many) in the order of tens of thousands scudi, which was to be repaid by the collection of two papal tithe from the province of Romagna, situated in the north-eastern part of the Papal state, along the Adriatic coast. The preserved document records the income from this source, which was collected in 1546 (i.e. one of the two presumed annual instalments of tithe).<sup>108</sup>

The data on the collection of the Papal tithe respect the church division of the province of Romagna, then into nine bishoprics (of a very small scale, in comparison to Central European conditions): Ravenna, Forlì, Faenza, Rimini, Imola, Casena, Sarsina, Cernia and Bertinoro. Within each bishopric, data are related to particular payers of papal tithe, be it parishes, monasteries, houses of church orders, but also individual “altars” (adminstrating income from real estate or financial sources tied to individual church altars), possibly private persons, who, for any legal reason, possessed property or income subject to papal tithe. Such a detailed account therefore provides an elaborate overview not only of the theoretical amount of paid tithe, but also of the church structure of the province itself in the given year and of the economic potential of the given area. From this point of view, the most prominent in the province of Romagna are the three “rich” bishoprics of Faenza, Rimini and Imola. However, in the case of the Rimini bishopric, the resulting amount is affected by the fact that, for an unknown reason, a special surcharge (“*per lo aumento*”) in the range of 25–30 % was added to the original tithe. A similar “privilege” was held by the bishopric of Sarsina, but this surcharge was lower (10–15 %).

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108 It is a well-preserved original copy of standard accounting documentation; paper sheets of standard format are tied together with five leather straps into a workbook and fitted with parchment sheets tied with four leather straps. Several blank sheets were later cut out; together with them (apparently by mistake) also fol. 10, on which a part of the Forlì bishopric accounting records was documented. However, this partial loss of information is not essential in the context of the whole source.

Andrea Tanini di Ponto, the administrator of the papal tithe in the province of Romagna, prepared the accounting documentation and presented it to Olivieri. For the year 1546 he collected papal tithe in the amount of 8,471 scudi and 1 soldo in the province of Romagna; however, it was necessary to deduct a commission of 423 scudi and 11 soldi, which was retained by the accounting administrator for his work.<sup>109</sup>

From the tithe collection of Romagna province in 1546 the Bank of Olivieri deducted only the amount of 8,047 scudi 10 soldi and 6 denari for repayment the loan.

In this case, the difference between the theoretical amount of collectable tithe and the actually collected money is important. The papal tithe collectors collected in cash just over half (58.5 %) of the Papal tithe to be collected from the Romagna province.<sup>110</sup>

It was not the case, however, that the unpaid tithe was “not collectable”. The accountant kept his annual records accurate and knew well how much was to be collected from whom. There are two items in each of the bishoprics: money collected (“*Denarii riscossi*”) and the remaining money, i.e. “arrears” (“*Denarii residui*”). These records were kept continuously on a long-term basis (individual annual billing followed each other) and consistently from the accounting point of view, so as not to miss even a tiny bit of papal income. For example, even though a certain Julio Ceseri Masini in the diocese of Cesena paid the Papal tithe in the amount of 29 scudi and 3 soldi, he still remained on the list of debtors because the money paid was registered only as a payment of arrears from previous years, not as a new tithe for 1546.<sup>111</sup>

However, the relatively low “yield” of the collection of tithe was rather caused by the fact that many taxpayers had some special exceptions, due to which they either did not have to pay the tithe in the given year at all or settled this payment obligation to the Papal Chamber in a different way. The most common reason for which the taxpayers were listed as “*residui*” was justified in the accounting records by the fact that they submitted a written receipt from the Papal Chamber (the dating of such receipt ranges from August 30<sup>th</sup>, 1546 to May 20<sup>th</sup>, 1547) confirming they were not obliged to pay any money to the


109 He also probably retained an amount of 34 scudi and 8 soldi, which was additionally collected from the five taxpayers in the Imola bishopric. This income was additionally credited to fol. 38 (after the summary for Imola bishopric on fol. 37v). In the basic register, all five taxpayers were listed under arrears (on fol. 40–40v) but in their record an information is added that they paid with delay and that the record of this can be found on folio 38 (“*pago et posto ant in fol. 38*”). However, the sum of 34 scudi and 8 soldi did not end up in the total sum of revenues (neither at the Imola bishopric level or in the total sum of the province of Romagna) even though it was paid. Apparently, it was left in the collector’s purse “by mistake”.

110 Precise calculation was not possible due to the loss of part of the information on money not collected for the Forlì bishopric. In the enclosed table, I estimated this figure according to the other bishoprics, in order to make a cumulative calculation.

111 Archivio di Stato di Firenze, Segnatura Galli Tassi 1874, fols. 46–47.



collector. There were 24 such cases recorded in 1546; their payment obligation amounted to 742 scudi, 15 soldi and 2 denari. The second most frequent reason was the fact that the taxpayer kept his own accounting records (“*Composti co[n]ti regularii*”). This group of eleven taxpayers with a total payment obligation of 1,335 scudi and 11 giuli were mostly wealthy monasteries, of which the greatest payer was the St Mary’s Abbey in the bishopric of Rimini.<sup>112</sup>



**Fig. 8:** Archivio di Stato di Firenze, Segnatura Galli Tassi 1874, detail of the section “denarii residui” where is (among others) recorded the obligation of Pietro Giovanni Aleotti to pay (or more precisely “to be in an abeyance” to pay) the Papal tithe (photo P. Vorel)

112 Among the payers of the papal tithe who were deprived of the obligation to pay money to the collector in favour of the Olivieri Bank House through a special charter of the Papal Chamber was the Pope’s secret accountant, Pietro Giovanni Aleotti. In the bishopric of Bertinoro, he had an obligation to pay three benefices (at the Church of St Mary in the village of Lizzano, at the vicary in the town of Meldola, and from the church of St Cosma) totalling 50 scudi and 14 soldi, see also the photo-documentation attached to this study.

**Table 3:** A summary of the collection of Papal tithe in the province of Romagna in the year 1546 [scudi – soldi – denari]

Bishopric	Money collected	Money remaining	Total
Ravenna	1,086–8–0	231–3–0	1,317–11–0
Forlì	1,067–3–0	approX. 230–0–0	approx. 1,297–3–0
Faenza	1,682–9–4	888 – 9–6	2,570–18–10
Rimini	1,527–14–0	1,510–6–0	3,038–0–0
Imola	1,504–14–0	1,347–14–4	2,852–8–4
Cesena	760–16–2	1,296–5–0	2,057–1–2
Sarsina	299–6–10	95–1–10	394–8–8
Blacks	61–2–8	22–17–8	84–0–4
Bertinoro	481–7–6	320–2–10	801–10–4
<b>Total</b>	<b>8,471–1–6</b> (58.8 %)	<b>approx. 5,942–0–2</b> (41.2 %)	<b>14,413–1–8</b> (100 %)

Digression c)

### Command corps of the Papal army in the Schmalkaldic War

At first sight, this topic seems to be very simple: in Aleotti's documentation, we have a precise list of commanders who had been paid in advance. Also, current news from the battlefield and contemporary historical work inform us in detail about the personnel composition of the Papal army command corps at the beginning of the campaign: Probably, while at the military camp in Landshut (in early August 1546), Nicolaus Mammeranus made and later published a detailed list of the commander corps of the Papal army.<sup>113</sup>

Since then, this information was continuously adopted by younger publications, until they became part of an extensive schematics of the coalition army,<sup>114</sup> published by

113 Nicolao MAMERANO, *Catalogvs Omnivm Generalivm, Praefectorum, Primariorum Ducum, seu Capitaneorum & Commissariorum totius exercitus Caesaris in expeditionem super Rebelles, & Ferdinandi Regis Roman. Super Rebelleis inobedientis Germ. quosdam Principes ac Ciuitates inobedientes quosdam Germaniae Principes conscripti, onscripti, & Coacti, Anno M. D. XLVI.*, Ingolstadt 1548. A brief mention of Papal cavalry is here on fol. Bi ("Equestris Pontificiae Armaturae Primarius"); a detailed description of the infantry (which was adopted by all the younger authors, including the numerical data) is here on fol. Biiiv–Cii ("De Primariis peditum italorum").

114 I have included this schematic overview (created based on a comparison of Mammeranus' and Hortleder's data) as an attachment entitled "Reconstruction of the Papal army command structure at a Land Camp in the Landshut at the beginning of August 1546" to the aforementioned analytical study, see P. VOREL, *Za obnovu řádu a pravé víry v říši*, pp. 146–153.

Friedrich Hortleder<sup>115</sup> at the beginning of the 17<sup>th</sup> century (and in an earlier edition of his work from 1645).

From a source directly from the Farnese (to whom the respective book was dedicated, first part to Ottavio, second part to Alessandro), the data on the command corps of the Papal army were available at the beginning of the sixties of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, apparently also available to Cipriano Manente from Orvieto, who included this list in his extensive publications on the history of Italian states.<sup>116</sup> Similarly, the Lutheran historiographer Sleidan<sup>117</sup> included a list of the most important commanders of the Papal army in his historical work. And the bravery of some of them is chanted in a poem dating back to 1557, included by Giulio Ariosto into a set of festive texts on the Farnese brothers, the grandsons of Pope Paul III.<sup>118</sup>

Still, this is not a trivial matter. The older authors (starting with L. Pastor) were content to refer to the list published by Mammeranus, or (later) in the Friedensburg edition. No more accurate analysis of the list has ever been carried out. The apparent lack of interest in this source of information apparently stemmed from the fact that some of the major commanders, who were provably in the service of Pope Paul III with this army, are not listed in Aleotti's list. On the other hand, the majority of the names mentioned here are completely unknown in the history of the Italian military of the 16<sup>th</sup> century. And to

115 Friedrich HORTLEDER (ed.), *Der Römischen Keyser- Vnd Königlichen Maiestete, Auch des Heiligen Römischen Reichs Geistlicher vnnd Weltlicher Stände, Churfürsten, Fürsten, Graffen, Reichs- vnd andeder Stätte, zusampt der heiligen Schrifft, geistlicher und weltlicher Rechte Gelehrten, Handlungen und Außschreiben, Rathschäge, Bedencken, Send- und andere Brieffe, Bericht, Supplicationsschriften, Befehl, Entschuldigungen, Protestationes, Recusationes, Außführungen, Verantwortungen, Ableinungen, Absagungen, Achterklärungen, Hüßbrieffe, Verträge, Historische Beschreibungen und andere viel herrliche Schriften und Kunden, mehr: Von Rechtmässigkeit, Anfang, Fort- und endlichen Ausgang deß Teutschen Kriegs, Keyser Karls deß Fünfften, wider die Schmalkaldische Bundsoberste, Chur- und Fürsten, Sachsen und Hessen, und. I. Chur- und Fürstl. G. G. Mitwerwandte, Vom Jahr 1546. biß auf das Jahr 1558*, Gotha 1645, Nr. 22, pp. 375–404: “Verzeichnuß aller Generaln, Obristen, HauptLeut und Commissaren über Caroli V. Römischen Keyser und Ferdinandi Römischen Königs ganzes Kriegsheer wider etliche Rebellische und ungehorsame Fürsten und Städte in Teutsch Land Anno 1546”. The Papal cavalry is described here as sub-item Nr. 31, pp. 385–386: “Vom General und dessen RittMeisterit über die Bäpstliche Reuterey”; Papal infantry is described here as sub-items Nr. 47–55, pp. 391–392: “Von den Obristen über das Italianische FußVolck”.

116 Cipriano MANENTE, *Historie di Ciprian Manente da Oruieto. Libro secondo, nelle quali si raccontano i fatti successi dal 1400. insino al 1563*, Venezia 1566, Libro settimo, pp. 285–286.

117 Johannes SLEIDANUS, *De statu Religionis et Reipublicae Carolo V. Caesare Commentarii ac multiplici rerum utilissimarum cognitione referti*, Frankfurt 1568, p. 390.

118 *Profetia dell'illustris[sima] signora donna Antonia Gonzaga all'illustrissimo sig[nore] duca Ottavio Farnese, verificata nel MDLI. a XI. di giugno il venerdì a XII. hore, quando s'apresento l'esercito pontificio, et cesareo sotto Parma*, in: Giulio Ariosto (red.), *I fatti, e le prodenze dell'i illust[rissimi] signori di casa Farnese de'temti nostri, nepoti della santa memoria di Paolo III. Pontefice, Venezia 1557*, fol. 5–12; see here “De la guerra d'Alemagna”, fol. 7v–9v.

make it even more complicated, the names of the captains and colonels that the other authors recorded are different from Aleotti's "payroll list". Some of the captains paid in June 1546 are not recorded in the Mammeranus' list of the Bavarian field camp in August 1546, let alone in the earlier sources. On the other hand, these younger sources provide names of captains who were not registered by Aleotti or Mammeranus as part of the command corps. So where is the error?

The history of military and hired mercenary captains, who with their men served whoever paid more, is an essential part of Italian history from the second third of the 14<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>119</sup> This way of organizing military force culminated in Italy during the 15<sup>th</sup> century, but with the introduction of large permanent mercenary armies during the first half of the 16<sup>th</sup> century it no longer functional.<sup>120</sup> Actually, we can say that the campaign of the Papal troops to southern Germany in 1546 was the last significant military action that was (to such a large extent) organized by the "poor" with the help of a large number of hired captains – mercenary captains.<sup>121</sup>

We know for sure who was entrusted with the main diplomatic assurance of the entire expedition. Formally, Cardinal Alessandro Farnese, the grandson of Pope Paul III, was named the highest representative of the Papal State for this war campaign. The formal position of the chief military commander (*Capitan Generale*) was then held by his younger brother, the Duke Ottavio Farnese, Duke of Castro and Camerino. Indeed, their role in the upcoming campaign was, in my opinion,<sup>122</sup> one of the main immediate impulses that led Paul III to the idea of direct military and financial support of the Emperor Charles V in the planned intervention against the opposition in the Empire. Only by taking this step, the young grandsons of the Pope actively entered the highest levels of European politics (their father, Pier Luigi Farnese, the illegitimate son of Pope Paul III, never reached such positions – apart from the immediate Papal influence in Italy).

Ottavio Farnese was named the supreme commander of the Papal army, but although he was educated for military service and had personal experience from Italian battlefields,

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119 This makes the research of these military groups and their commanders continuous and systematic. Basic factual data from original sources is available on the Internet, see *Note biografiche di Capitani di Guerra e di Condottieri di Ventura operanti in Italia nel 1330–1550*, accessible freely on URL: <<http://condottieridiventura.it/>> [accessed 12. 10. 2017]. However, the vast majority of the officers mentioned in Aleotti's list are not in this record.

120 Geoffrey TREASE, *Die Condottieri (Söldnerführer, Glücksritter und Fürsten der Renaissance)*, München 1974, pp. 231–241; Franco CARDINI, *La crisi militare e la politica italiana fra Quattro e Cinquecento*, in: Mario Scalini (red.), *Giovani delle Bande Nere*, Milano 2001, pp. 9–41.

121 Christine SHAW, *Barons and Castellans (The military Nobility of Renaissance Italy)*, Leiden – Boston 2015.

122 See Note 14.

he was only twenty-two in 1546. The young Duke certainly did not lack courage, self-confidence and skills in dealing with the sword, but did not have the experience of a strategist capable of efficiently commanding a large army in battle.

The actual command of the battle was in the hands of two commanders: the commander of the papal cavalry, Giovanni Battista Savello (also written as “*Savelli*”),<sup>123</sup> and the infantry commander, Alessandro Vitelli (also written as “*Vitello*”).<sup>124</sup> Both were experienced soldiers; both of them had also been on military campaigns over the Alps from Italy to the Danube region as commanders of minor military troops sent by Paul III to the army grounds in Vienna (1542). From Vienna the (at that time) common Christian army (which was significantly supported by the German Lutheran princes and cities, including the members of Schmalkaldic League at that time)<sup>125</sup> was drawn to the borders of the Ottoman Empire in occupied Hungary. Although this campaign was not very successful, it was important to gain knowledge of the fighting environment. And, of course, they acquired personal experience with the chief commanders of the Schmalkaldic League, whom Savello and Vitelli knew from the joint campaign against the Turks.

The names of these two commanders are not listed in Aleotti’s “pay list”;<sup>126</sup> however, it can be assumed that both were paid in a different way than the Papal grandchildren or the hired mercenary captains or even ordinary mercenaries. This assumption corresponds to the records in the accounting documents, according to which, based on a special decree of Cardinal Farnesse, these chief commanders (and probably other members of the main command, see the Annex) were paid from the main Papal treasury in another way, and not through the special account kept by Aleotti, the secret treasurer.

Giovanni Battista Savello (1505–1551), the chief commander of the papal cavalry, had been a commander of the personal guard of Pope Paul III already before the German campaign, but he was also the husband of the Pope’s great-niece, Camilla, the daughter of the Pope’s cousin, Ranuccio Farnese († 1495). The cavalry troops were divided into two battle units that included Sforza Pallavicino (the husband of Pope’s granddaughter, Julia de Santa Fiore) and Federico Savello (the son of John Battista, who died in the

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123 *Note biografiche di Capitani di Guerra*, Nr. 1727.

124 *Ibidem*, Nr. 2173, 2185.

125 Petr VOREL, *Směnné kursy jako nástroj mocenské politiky v Římsko-německé říši počátkem čtyřicátých let 16. století*, *Český časopis historický* 112, 2014, Nr. 3, pp. 379–401.

126 Alessandro Vitelli’s name appears in Aleotti’s list; however, he did not accept the mentioned 2000 scudi for himself, but for the payment of other not-mentioned captains (the amount of the payroll corresponds to ten captains).

Sienna attack of 1554).<sup>127</sup> Each hundred riders formed a cavalry unit (a squadron) led by its own commander.

Four noble colonels were subordinate to the chief commander of the Papal infantry, Alessandro Vitelli (1500–1556): Giovanni Orsini, the Count of Pitigliano,<sup>128</sup> the Pope's grandson Sforza I Sforza di Santa Fiore (1520–1575),<sup>129</sup> Giulio Orsini<sup>130</sup> (cousin of Cardinal Farnese from the mother's side) and Paulo Vitelli.

This Paulo Vitelli (Alessandro's nephew or illegitimate son)<sup>131</sup> was an important link in the family network of the main command of the Papal army in 1546, for his wife was the daughter of Giovanni Batista Savello. The main command corps de facto only consisted of the Farnese and their close relatives, which is also applicable to the most important "professionals", Vitelli and Savello.

During the campaign, there were likely changes in the command corps, which could explain the differences in the data from the sources coming from a different time span. As for the infantry, the structure of the command corps and the size of the individual battalions are described in detail in the Mammeranus' report, written already at the beginning of August 1546. In the case of the papal cavalry, however, the extent of the command powers is explained in more detail in the summary description of the entire coalition army that Hortleder included in his edition. From this later reconstruction, the infantry colonels, who commanded several (about 6–10) battalions with their own captains, had a cavalry unit of a hundred horses at their disposal (which were subject to their direct command), but for combat actions they were represented by another authorised officer. Also, the internal organization of the Papal army (composed by the mercenary captains – private entrepreneurs in the military craft) differed from the Imperial divisions, which was also the cause of different data in the contemporary

127 C. SHAW, *Barons and Castellans*, p. 145.

128 The uncle of Cardinal Farnese from his mother's side, an Italian condottiere who had previously served in the army of the French King Franz I. As a commander of the French army he battled against the Imperial army in 1544, in the battles of Milan.

129 C. SHAW, *Barons and Castellans*, pp. 216–217.

130 Giulio Orsini later (in 1551) participated in the war of Parma. At that time, Camillo Orsini was the chief commander of the Papal army; Giulio and Carlo Orsini and Antimo Savello also took part in the struggle. *Ibidem*, pp. 145–146.

131 His identity is, however, specified in the Papal newspaper from 12. 9. 1546: [V. S. S. a P. P.], *Copia d- una Lettera del le cose successe ne i Eserciti, dall cinque sino per tutt' i Dodici del presente, Noc riscatto di M. Aurelio Ruffino, Et altri perticola Raguagli* [12. 9. 1546], Roma 1546 (see P. VOREL, *Za obnovu řádu a pravé víry v říši*, pp. 111–112). There it is explicitly stated that the military oversight was carried out also by "[...] Signor Alessandro Vitelli, con il signor Paulo suo nipote [...]", among others. In this context, we can interpret the ambiguous Italian word *nipote* as "nephew" or "grandson". Also, an illegitimate son could be identified as a *nipote*.

descriptions of the command corps (not only the number of soldiers in the individual battalions).

The most important commanders of the Papal army are not mentioned in Aleotti's list. Although this fact questions the completeness of Aleotti's records of the composition of the command corps, it also provides an explanation for why it was like that:

In the case of army costs, Aleotti recorded three types of payments: 1) An advance payment continuously paid to brothers Farnese themselves; 2) a one-off payroll to all lower commanders for the entire duration of the campaign; 3) sums to pay six monthly instalments to hired mercenaries. Higher commanders were certainly able to see that their promised money was paid in full. Through the accountant Aleotti (to whom Pope Paul III and his two grandchildren apparently had an extraordinary confidence), the Farnese checked and controlled ongoing payments of large sums, a detailed evidence of which was virtually impossible to do retrospectively.

This was the payroll for soldiers on the battlefield, which they were to receive in monthly instalments, and with money for some of the captains. They were paid in advance before the campaign, even yet without the names of all the captains who had been assigned that money. That's why Aleotti literally rewrote the list he received from Cardinal Farnese in his accounting records. For him, Farnese's order constituted an indisputable document for the accounting of the money; Aleotti made no further verification (let alone the verification of the names of specific captains). This is explicitly emphasized in his record (“[...] *Per mandato del Reverendissimo et Illustrissimo Cardinal Farnesse, legato dell' esercito in Alemagna di detto ho pagati li sottiscritti denari à sottiscritti capitani [...]*”).

Of course, it is a question of whether some (or most) names in Aleotti's list are not fictional, just for the purpose of accounting justification for such a large amount of money in cash. I do not think so; the names are real, but Aleotti could not name all of them, because at the end of June, this phase of army preparation had not yet been completed. Some of the main commanders (Alessandro Vitelli, Sforza di Santa Fiore and Paulo Vitelli) received the money for other supporters who were still to be hired. The money to pay to the captains, with whom an agreement had not yet been concluded, was also taken over by the banker Benedetto Bussini, a close associate of Benvenuto Olivieri, or Giovanni Battista di Toffia, a notary working in the Papal office.<sup>132</sup> This way, money was referred to a total of 14 officers whose names are not explicitly mentioned in Aleotti's list.

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132 F. G. BRUSCOLI, *Benvenuto Olivieri – I mercatores Fiorentini*, pp. 65–68; 271–275; F. G. BRUSCOLI, *Papal Banking*, p. 246.

When considering the structure of Aleotti's list, obviously we cannot resist the question of how the Papal party managed to organise such a relatively large command corps so quickly, and kept the information about its gathering in relative secrecy. Such preparation needed to take place well before June 22, 1546. On that day a draft of an allied treaty was approved (the Pope did not sign it until June 26, 1546), but on the same day, money was spent in cash on payroll for about sixty specific captains! Consequently, they were bound to know much earlier that they were supposed to command during the campaign to Germany and had to agree with this engagement. How did the Papal recruiters succeed in organizing this complicated action? A logical response is apparent, if we consider the very pragmatic and sophisticated approach of the Farnese to preparation of this campaign.

The captains were the key persons in the military system at that time, not only in command of combat operations, but also in hiring of mercenaries. The captain was paid for his services, which included the fact that he would arrange hiring (or even training) of the required number of soldiers (those were paid separately). For a rapid build-up of the basic structure of a large army, it was sufficient to get the necessary number of captains (then called "condottiers", the military entrepreneurs), providing them with sufficient financial motivation and adequate time to gather the necessary number of soldiers from the territory or the environment they knew.<sup>133</sup>

A key person in the preparation of the fast and more or less secret preparation of the Papal troops in the summer of 1546 was, in my opinion, Ascanio della Corgna, a Perugian nobleman and a prominent contemporary mercenary captain, who used the title of Marquis Castiglione di Lago. In the early 1540s, he served the French King in the wars with the Emperor. He remained in Habsburg captivity for a long time. However, in May 1546 Emperor Charles V released him from prison, no doubt because he was persuaded (as an experienced professional) to participate on the Papal side (then Habsburg as well) in the upcoming war.

Immediately after being released from the Habsburg prison, Ascanio called for a duel with another mercenary captain, a Florentine nobleman named Giovanni Taddei, due to an insult. Pitigliano, near Rome (located conveniently in the middle of a rock formation, consisting of gradually eroding subsoil of volcanic tuff), was chosen as the place of the combat. Pitigliano belonged to the Orsini family; Gerolama Orsini (1504–1570), the wife of Pope's son, Pier Luigi Farnese, came from there.

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133 Mario SCALINI, *Condottiero, cavaliere o soldato?*, in: M. Scalini (red.), *Giovani delle Bande Nere*, pp. 180–201.



The attractive place and reputation of the famous warrior Ascanio della Corgna attracted thousands of people on the day of the combat (May 26, 1546),<sup>134</sup> which was set as a large stage show with thousands of spectators, especially from among potential prospective military service candidates, because it could be expected that when Ascanio got out of jail after a long time, he was not going to be idle.

Of course, a number of military commanders who knew Ascanio from the former battlefields also showed up. The fight itself ended as expected;<sup>135</sup> the subsequent celebration was also used to negotiate mercenary contracts without a great concentration of mercenaries and commanders in one place raising attention (all of them came to greet Ascanio, released from jail, and to support him in the duel).

This process, and perhaps also the necessity to provide the structure of the command corps and the troops for a very large army (in terms of the Italian standard of that time), led to the engagement of less experienced soldiers in command positions, for whom this campaign was the first opportunity to prove their command skills. Even more experienced warlords, such as Savello or Vitelli, apparently arranged such an opportunity for young men from their closest family, longing for a military career.<sup>136</sup> For most of them, however, the military expedition to Germany was the last adventure of their life, for a substantial majority of the Papal soldiers (ordinary mercenaries and lower commanders) died on the battlefield or on the return trip in the Alps. Probably that is why most of the names in Aleotti's list cannot be identified with specific persons, because they did not appear in the written sources either before (they had not become renown) or after the campaign (they did not return from Germany).<sup>137</sup>

The factual accuracy of Aleotti's list is, however, confirmed in principle by an overview of the Papal army, which Mammeranus wrote in August 1546 in a field camp in Landshut. There we find most of Aleotti's list, albeit in a slightly different form of their names. We also know their exact classification in the structure of the Papal army and the number of men they commanded.

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134 Silvio LONGHI, *Il duello dipinto di Castiglione del Lago (Pitigliano, 26 maggio 1546)*, Cortona 1995. The very same text was published later, but under a different name, see Silvio LONGHI, *Il duello d'onore del XVI secolo (Pitigliano, 26 maggio 1546)*, Cortona 2008.

135 The descendants of the winner had the highlight moment of the duel depicted at their residence (Palazzo della Corgna in Castiglione del Lago) around 1573, showing the prominent Ascanio (in a red suit) striking the chest of his rival (dressed in white) with a sword. A good reproduction of this wall painting is published on the cover of the aforementioned publication, see S. LONGHI, *Il duello d'onore*.

136 G. LEVA, *Storia documentata di Carlo V.*, Vol. IV, p. 256.

137 Some of these captains remained in Papal services in the subsequent wars, e.g. in the Parma war of 1551, see Ch. SHAW, *Barons and Castellans*, p. 145.

The names of some captains who had been paid at the end of June 1546 were not recorded in Mammeranus' list, which was compiled in early August of that year in Landshut, Bavaria. Seven names in total are listed in the appendix at the end of the command corps list (in the second column, which lists the names of Aleotti's list; see Annex).

Of these seven, I found a logical explanation in just one case: Among the relatively small group of captains who were paid a higher amount (300 scudi), Giovanni Francesco da Monte Melino appears. We know that this man, before his campaign to Germany, was serving as captain of artillery in permanent Papal services.<sup>138</sup> Since the Papal army was accompanied by a convoy carrying twelve cannons of unspecified calibre (which were decisive in the successful conquest of Donauwörth on October 8, 1546), we can logically assume that captain de Monte Melino commanded the Papal artillery. However, the Mammeranus' list only records commanders of infantry battalions and cavalry squadrons (he was interested in the number of men brought by the Papal army to the battlefield) and that is probably why Monte Melino does not appear in this record.

Another captain who, according to Aleotti, was paid in June 1546 and was demonstrably present on the German battlefield, although Mammeranus did not register him in the structure of the command corps, was a man named Gostanzo d'Ascoli. In his history of the 16<sup>th</sup> century (1566), the Farnesian historian Manente of Orvieto himself described him as one of the prominent Papal commanders in a passage about the history of the Schmalkaldic War.<sup>139</sup>

There are left five names from Aleotti's "payroll list" that Mammeranus did not record in the Bavarian camp. Some of them I have succeeded to identify more closely, thanks to their subsequent engagement in Italian wars of the 1550s, but I did not find any evidence of their participation in the campaign to Germany in 1546. Two of them were honoured with a higher amount (300 scudi), so it can be assumed that they were captains of cavalry: Bell'Ant[oni]o Corso and Farina.<sup>140</sup> Three of them received a lower amount (200 scudi),

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138 In April 1546 he was paid a service payment of 25 scudi (10 paoli per scudo), see ASR, Camerale I, Mandati Camerali, seg. 882, fol. 18v.

139 See Note 116.

140 Captain named Battista Farina served in the army of the Duke of Florence Cosimo Medici in 1542–1544, see Anna BELLINAZZI – Claudio LAMIONI, *Carteggio Universale di Cosimo I de Medici: Archivio di Stato di Firenze – Inventario II (1541–1546), Mediceo del Principato, filze 354–372*, Firenze 1982, p. 83 (Filza 358, Nr. 667), p. 224 (Filza 365, Nr. 481) and p. 248 (Filza 366, Nr. 126).

therefore they were probably the infantry commanders: conté Lionetto dalla Corbara,<sup>141</sup> Ferante Corso and signor Camillo Sassatello.<sup>142</sup>

There are two possible explanations: Some captains who promised to go to Germany in June (and received a deposit) did not participate in the campaign for some reason and somebody else took their place. But Aleotti's list (supplied by Cardinal Farnese) could also be used to identify the captain's name or nickname, which they commonly used in the military environment, but was also identifiable by another name (which was recorded by Mammeranus). So far I just have not been able to identify such cases, of people mentioned in the sources under slightly different names.

There is quite a lot of captains listed in the Mammeranus' list as part of the structure of the Papal troops in August 1546, but whose names are not found with Aleotti. This is logical; among them, there must have been at least 14 captains for whom (without mentioning their names) both Vitellis, Sforza di Santa Fiore, banker Bussini and notary Toffia accepted money.<sup>143</sup> Even from the comparison of the two lists, which were created only two months apart (Aleotti at the end of June, Memmerano at the beginning of August), it is clear that the structure of the lower commanders was supplemented gradually before the army set out from Bologna towards the north to the Alps.

Aleotti did not record the names of the command corps at all, as these senior commanders and field specialists were paid from sources other than the account kept by Aleotti. Not even Mammeranus recorded this structurally largest part of the Papal troops, we only know it from Hortensius' retrospective list. Therefore, it is not clear at this point whether all the members of the Papal army were present (see the Annex) for the entire campaign, that is who actually belonged to the army and who was rather a member of the travel "courtyard" of Cardinal Alessandro Farnese, which stayed in the field only relatively shortly. Of these men, of course, attention is drawn to the presence of the Archbishop of Dubrovnik as the chief commissioner of the Papal army, as Giovanni Angelo de Medici, later Pope Pius IV (1559–1565), held this position.

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141 Lionetto Corbara served in 1554 as cavalry commander in the army of the Duke of Florence Cosimo Medici; he was the commander of a 50-horse cavalry unit and was a subject to the command of Sforza di Santa Fiore, see Jacque-Auguste de THOU, *Monsieur de Thou's History of His Own Time Translated from the Geneva Edition of 1620*, London 1729, Book XIV, p. 666.

142 Camillo Sassatello was a member of a branched noble family from the province of Romagna. At the beginning of the 1550s, he served as the cavalry colonel of the Papal army; at the time of disputes over Farnese family property after the death of Paul III (1549), the new Pope charged him with the administration of the Margraviate of Novara with the Duchy of Camerino, see Tiberio PAPOTTI, *Elogi d' Illustri Imolesi*, Imola 1841<sup>2</sup>, p. 90.

143 See Note 132.

The highest-ranking commanders and some officers were, however, of interest to those who participated in the campaign of the Papal (or Italian) army to Germany and left a written testimony about it; of course, also the historians of this era understandably observed this group. These sources are even more interesting, as there are people listed here as distinguished participants in the Papal campaign who are not recorded in Aleotti's, Mammeranus' or even Hortensian's schematic lists at all. This is the reason why I tried to include this data in the summary reconstruction table of the Papal command corps, which is attached to this study as a separate annex entitled "Command of the Papal army during the campaign to Germany in 1546". I compared lists of names that Sleidan (1568) and Manente (1566) published in the form of an enumeration of the most important commanders of the Papal army, but also those whose bravery on the battlefield in Germany in 1546 is celebrated by a versed hymn, which Ariosto included in his poetry collection compiled in honour of the Farnese family (1557). They all mention the Farnese brothers (Cardinal Alessandro and Duke Ottavio) as the main figures; so I was only concerned with references to the other officers.

In both Sleidan's and Manente's records, the order in which the names were listed is important (suggesting the importance with which the officers were perceived), while it is not so important with Ariosto, because the author primarily needed the text to rhyme.

Sleidan's list is the most difficult of these sources; there are only eleven people recorded. Of these, eight include chief commanders and colonels, the real core of the command corps, which consisted of: Giovanni Battista Savello, Alessandro Vitelli, Jerome from Pisa,<sup>144</sup> Sforza Pallavicino, Giulio Orsini, Paulo Vitelli, Nicolo de Pitigliano and Federico Savello. As the only one, Sleidan listed both the chief commanders of the guards (Giovanni Maria from Padua and Niccolo from Plumbino), whom no one else considered important. Johann Sleidan was an "opposite" historiographer of the Lutheran party. He did not have any interest in making any of the papal commanders "famous" in his work. In a relatively prominent place, both Sleidan and Manente also introduced a captain named Alexius Lascaris, who does not appear in any summary. Apparently, he was a member of the traditional family of mercenary captains of Lascari di Tenda,<sup>145</sup> but I could not find out more about this person.

Manente wrote his two-volume historical work as a celebration of the Farnese family (each part is dedicated to one of the Farnese brothers who apparently also funded this work). The second part, including the period of the Schmalkaldic War, was issued

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144 *Note biografiche di Capitani di Guerra*, Nr. 516.

145 Ch. SHAW, *Barons and Castellans*, p. 90.

two decades after the war. Thus, we can assume that besides the main “core” of the main commanders of the Papal troops (the eight people Manente had recorded in correspondence with Sleidan), in the list of deserving officers he also included other persons (including “ordinary” captains) who became famous later, and their names could serve to represent the Farnese even in the mid-sixties. It was Girolamo Cialdon, Ascanio della Corgna, Adriano Baglione,<sup>146</sup> Count Sforza di Santa Fiore, Captain Tomasso (probably Tomaso Brozzo from the town of Castello), Captain Bombaglino from Aretto, Captain Lanzi from Perugia (probably the same as Capo Aguzzo from Perugia), Captain Morgante from Prato, Giovanni Nicelius from Piacenza, Bartolomeo from Halens and Costantino d'Ascoli. We can identify these persons with the commanders of the units from Mammeranus' or Hortleder's schematics and they are mostly listed in Aleotti's list as well. “In addition”, besides from the aforementioned Alexius Lascaris, Manente also mentioned a man named Cencio di Fino, whom I have not been able to identify yet, as a prominent participant of the campaign in 1546.

Another “selection key” in celebrating the merits of Papal officers in the campaign to Germany was chosen by the author of a rhymed prophecy (“prophetia”), which was supposed to be revealed on June 11, 1551 through Antonia Gonzaga (born 1492), the cousin of Milan Governor Ferrante Gonzaga. Ariosto published this text (probably authored by Antonia's daughter, Livie Torniella),<sup>147</sup> in his compendium of verse compositions celebrating the Farnese brothers in 1557. Of the eight commanders mentioned above, on which Sleidan and Manente “agreed”, there are only five in this text: The missing ones are Jerome from Pisa, Federico Savello (though he already died in 1554) and even Alessandro Vitelli. The reason for the “concealment” of these important commanders is not clear from the context, but between 1546 and 1557 several wars took place in Italy in which the commanders were switching sides (French, Imperial, Papal, Florentine, etc.) and at the time of creation of this text (which was intended primarily for the Farnese), it was apparently undesirable that the names of these three men would appear in such a context. On the other hand, the bravery of some other specific commanders was emphasised. Some of them are also mentioned in Manente: Girolamo Cialdone, Ascanio della Corgna, Adrian Baglione, Sforza di Santa Fiore, Bombaglino from Aretto. Bartolomeo d'Almonte is apparently the same person as the lightweight squadron commander named Bartolomeo of Halese. Besides from these men, however, the poem celebrates the bravery of four other captains, whose names are not explicitly mentioned in the later history of

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146 C. SHAW, *Barons and Castellans*, pp. 56–57 and Christopher F. BLACK, *The Baglioni as tyrans of Perugia 1488–1540*, *The English Historical Review* 85, 1970, pp. 245–281.

147 P. VOREL, *Za obnovu řádu v říši a pravé víry*, pp. 110, 130–131.

this campaign: Papirio Capozucca, Marcel di Negro, Bartolomeo Boreto from Mirandola and Sforza da Tore (who is apparently the same person as Sforza of Orvieto, commander of the lightweight squadron).<sup>148</sup>



**Fig. 9:** Imperial and Papal allied forces at the beginning of the Schmalcaldic war; Caprarola Castle, Italy (photo J. Pánek)

148 At the end, the poem mentions several other valiant Italian warriors of noble origin, whose roles in the Papal troops are not clear. Due to the character of this source (which does not distinguish the soldiers in the Papal service from the military congregations of the Italian territorial princes, supported in this campaign by the Papal troops), they could have been lower commanders in the service of the Duke of Florence or Ferrara, but also Italians who were part of the Neapolitan or Milanese divisions of Charles V: Signor Carlotto Orsino, Signor Erico (Orsino), Gran Signor Torquato, Flaminio Signor di Zambecari, Grand Alcide, Ippolito Tassone and his cousin Ferrante and finally Giulio Viterbo.