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The Importance of Lexical Cohesion in Public Speaking

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Zásady pro vypracování:

Studentka se ve své bakalářské práci zaměří na charakteristiku a užití prostředků lexikální koheze v mluvených projevech. Nejprve na základě studia relevantní odborné literatury z oblasti lingvistiky definuje pojem „koheze" a vymezí a popíše základní jazykové prostředky lexikální koheze. Zaměří se především na opakování lexikální jednotky a sémantické vztahy mezi lexikálními jednotkami, jejich užití a funkce. Na základě analýzy vybraných mluvených projevů M. L. Kinga zmapuje výskyt popsaných lexikálních prostředků koheze, zhodnotí frekvenci užití jednotlivých prostředků a pokusí se zdůvodnit převažující tendence. Na závěr shrne jejich funkce a efektivitu s ohledem na vliv na posluchače.

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Abstract

This bachelor paper analyzes the importance of lexical cohesion in public speaking. First the term cohesion is explained and the connection with textual coherence is shown, and then brief outline of grammatical cohesion follows. The second part analyzes individual devices of lexical cohesion, dividing the phenomenon into two parts: reiteration and collocation together with lexical field. The last chapter concludes on how the speech *I Have a Dream* benefited form M. L. King's careful work with the devices of lexical cohesion.

Key words

lexical cohesion, public speaking, reiteration, collocation, lexical field

Název

Důležitost lexikální koheze v mluvených projevech

Souhrn

Tato bakalářská práce se zabývá důležitostí lexikální koheze v mluvených projevech. Nejdříve je vysvětlen termín lexikální koheze, je naznačena jeho provázanost s textovou koherencí a následuje krátký přehled prostředků gramatické koheze. Ve druhé části jsou podrobně analyzovány jednotlivé prostředky lexikální koheze, která je rozdělena na dvě části: reiteraci a kolokaci spolu s významovými okruhy. Poslední kapitola shrnuje důsledky použití prostředků lexikální koheze v projevu M. L. Kinga *I Have a Dream*.

Klíčová slova

lexikální koheze, veřejný projev, reiterace, kolokace, významový okruh

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1   Introduction

Cohesion is an essential feature of each text, should the text be easy to comprehend. Lexical cohesion forms the pivotal concept of all texts, and public speakers exploit it when trying to convey their thoughts, explain important facts, persuade people or call them to action. As majority of public speeches is prepared in advance, enormous effort is exerted to choose the proper lexical forms, corresponding to the aim of the speech.

This Paper examines the devices of lexical cohesion from the point of view of their importance in public speaking, and is based on M. A. K. Halliday and R. Hasan's book *Cohesion in English* (1976) which compiled the information of the study of cohesion and has become the most quoted work in the field.

The explanation of the concept of lexical cohesion is supported by the analysis of M. L. King's speech *I Have a Dream* (from here on referred to as the *Speech*, see Appendix), and more than one hundred occurrences of the below mentioned devices of lexical cohesion are described. The analysis itself is interconnected with the theoretical part and whenever a term or a phenomenon is described and explained, it is immediately supported by examples from the Speech (such examples are followed by the line number so that they can be easily located in the Speech) or, if not acknowledged otherwise, on examples created by the author of this Paper.

First part of the Paper establishes the base for further analysis as the term cohesion is explained. The basic division of cohesion is outlined and the whole concept is divided into grammatical and lexical cohesion according to what structures and devices are used. This part also proves that cohesion is interconnected with coherence and that both are essential for a text to be understandable. In the first part the individual devices of grammatical cohesion are briefly outlined: reference, substitution and ellipsis, and conjunction, as they are divided by Halliday and Hasan.

The second, main part elaborates on the individual devices of lexical cohesion and is divided into two sections: the first one explains the concept of reiteration, the semantic relations as is synonymy, antonymy, hyponymy, superordination and the class of general words; the second section describes how a lexical field contributes to the clarity of a text, and what can be achieved by using collocations as a semantic means.

The last part places the information of the analysis into the context of M. L. K.'s Speech and concludes how the devices of lexical cohesion are used in this particular speech.

The aim of the Paper is to demonstrate how lexical cohesion contributes to clarity, comprehensibility and success of a public speech.

2 Cohesion

Many linguists have studied what it is that makes a text appear unified to its hearer or reader, among the most famous there belong Michael A. K. Halliday and Ruqaiya Hasan, who cooperated on the fundamental book in this field, *Cohesion in English*; Michael Hoey, who analysed cohesion and especially the lexical one in his book *Patterns of Lexis in Text*; and others who studied discourse analysis as whole, for example G. Brown, G. Cook, T. A. van Dijk, D. Geaney, J. O. Östman, D. Schiffrin, M. Taboada, G. Yule and others. This Paper presents opinions and theories of some of the above mentioned linguists and explains them on examples.

As has been foreshadowed, there are certain rules and principles that a sequence of sentences has to follow to be considered a text; the sentences have to be linked one to another somehow. Hoey describes it as "the way certain words or grammatical features of a sentence can connect that sentence to its predecessors (and successors) in a text," (1991: 3) which is the basic definition of cohesion. Cohesive is also the following example:

> Ex1   … a great American (…) signed *the Emancipation Proclamation. This momentous decree* came as a great beacon light of hope (…) *It* came as a joyous daybreak… (lines 3-6)

The Ex1 contains three sentences and they all mention the same object, *the Emancipation Proclamation*. In the second sentence, though, there is *this momentous decree* instead of *the Emancipation Proclamation* and in the third one there is the pronoun *it*. As all the expressions reflect the same idea, it can be concluded that there is some kind of a tie between them. This is what Halliday and Hasan call a *cohesive tie*, and they explain that such a tie is "an occurrence of a pair of cohesively related items," (1976: 3).

It has been mentioned that such a tie can be implemented either by words, i.e. lexical relations, or by grammatical features. This provides for the basic categorization of cohesion: lexical cohesion will be, as the subject of this Paper, analysed in a whole chapter, and grammatical cohesion will be shortly mentioned in the following subchapters.

However, not every text that is cohesive has to be meaningful at the same time, as the next example shows:

Ex2   I bought a *Ford*.   A *car* in which President Wilson rode down the Champs Elysées was *black*. *Black* English has been widely *discussed*. The *discussions* between the presidents ended last *week*. A *week* has seven *days*. Every *day* I feed my *cat*. *Cats* have four legs. The *cat* is on the *mat*. *Mat* has three letters. (Enkvist 1978: 197)

The Ex2 is a cohesive text, as *car* is a superordinate of *Ford*, *black* repeats *black*, etc.; the text is lexically cohesive but does not make sense. The reason for this is that the text is not coherent, or in other words, it is not meaningful. Coherence occurs on a more abstract level than cohesion and "implies an intelligible progression of ideas through a text. For a text to make sense, the progression needs to be logical, and must also be sufficiently explicit and rational," (Armstrong 2005: 192). Coherence therefore is associated with the overall organization of text, whereas cohesion occurs across a rather limited number of sentences and refers to concrete cases of semantic connections (Maynard 1998: 24). The Ex2 is a piece of evidence that the terms cohesion and coherence cannot be interchanged, yet the phenomena are interconnected.

2.1   Grammatical cohesion

Grammatical cohesion is expressed by the grammatical relationships between sentence structures, individual clauses or utterances (Taboada 2004: 160; McCarthy 1991: 35). Halliday and Hasan in 1976 divided grammatical cohesion into reference, substitution, ellipsis and conjunction but pointed out that conjunction stands on the border of grammatical and lexical cohesion. This Paper treats conjunction as a device of grammatical cohesion particularly because most of it is achieved by conjunctions, i.e. grammatical items.

2.1.1   Reference

Reference occurs when a certain structure (reference item) points to another structure in the previous or following sentence or clause. Halliday and Hasan divide reference items into the following groups: personal (e.g. *he, she, it, him, they*, etc.), demonstrative (*this, that, these, those, here, the*), and comparative (*same, other, better,*

etc.) (1976: 31). More comprehensive a list can be found in Halliday and Hasan (1976: 38-39), as well as the following scheme (p. 33).

Reference
[situational]   [textual]
exophora   endophora

[to preceding text]   [to following text]
anaphora   cataphora

Exophoric reference relies on the outside context and does not refer to anything that has been mentioned previously in the discourse. A reference item in such a case points outside of a text to the situation in which the text is uttered (Gelman and Byrnes 1991: 502), as for example:

Ex3   In a sense we've come *to our nation's capital* to cash a check. (line 13)

Out of context, it is not obvious to which city M. L. K. refers in Ex3 as he does not say *We've come to Washington, D. C., to cash a check.* He relies on the audience knowledge of the situation.

Endophoric reference, on the other hand, occurs inside the text. A reference item can refer back to what has already been mentioned and that is called anaphoric reference, for example:

Ex4   …many of our *white brothers*, as evidenced by *their* presence here today, have come to realize that *their* destiny is tied up with our destiny. *They* have come to realize that *their* freedom is inextricably bound to our freedom. (lines 49-51)

M. L. K. first mentions *our white brothers* and then points to them by using the pronoun *they/their*. If he did not use reference, the sentences would sound clumsy, as evidenced by the following example:

Ex5   …many of *our white brothers*, as evidenced by *our white brothers'* presence here today, have come to realize that *our white brothers'* destiny is tied up with our destiny. *Our white brothers* have come to

realize that *our white brothers'* freedom is inextricably bound to our freedom.

Less common is the reference pointing forward, so called cataphoric reference. Sometimes that is used for emphasising the subject, as for example:

Ex6   *He* would never come on time, *my brother*.

In Ex6, first the pronoun *he* is used and it refers to *my brother*. If *my brother* did not appear in the second clause, the sentence would not be understandable, as it would not be clear who *he* is. That is why Halliday and Hasan emphasized that one element of cohesion is not interpretable without another, one occurrence of cohesion is dependant on another (1976: 4).

An extensive analysis of reference can be found in Halliday and Hasan (1976: 31-87).

2.1.2   Substitution and Ellipsis

Substitution occurs when one item in a text is replaced by another; in case of ellipsis one item is replaced by nothing (Halliday and Hasan 1976: 88). For the purpose of this Paper, both phenomena are treated as one, based on the similarity of their definitions mentioned above.

Depending on what is substituted or ellipted, both substitution and ellipsis can be divided into nominal, verbal and clausal. Examples follow, substitution and ellipsis respectively:

Ex7   … the Negro's basic mobility is from a smaller *ghetto* to a larger *one*… (lines 59-60)

Ex8   … the Negro's basic mobility is from a smaller *ghetto* to larger…

In Ex7, the word *ghetto* is substituted by *one* and in Ex8 it is ellipted; *ghetto* is a noun and therefore the substitution and ellipsis are called nominal.

Ex9   I don't *know* her and I don't think you *do* either.

Ex10   Do you *know* her? – No I don't.

In Ex9, the word *know* is replaced by *do* because there is no need to repeat *know* again. In Ex10, *know* is missing from the second sentence, it is ellipted. Because what is substituted/ellipted is a verb (and a direct object), it is called verbal substitution/ellipsis.

Ex11   Do you think *it will rain*? – They say *so*.

Ex12   Don't *tell anyone what you saw*. – OK, I won't.

In Ex11, *so* stands for the whole previous sentence, and in Ex12 the whole *tell anyone what you/I saw* is left out from the answer. This is called clausal substitution/ellipsis because a whole clause is substituted/ellipted.

2.1.3   Conjunction

Conjunction stands out among other types of cohesion as its elements are not cohesive in themselves but indirectly; they do not work anaphoricaly or cataphoricaly but they connect the sentences, clauses or utterances throughout meaning (Halliday and Hasan 1976: 226). According to the conjunctive relation which the items express, Halliday and Hasan (1976) categorized them to the following groups: temporal, additive adversative and causal. Examples of each follow respectively:

Ex13   *As the night fell*, Bob set off for his goal.

Ex14   *And* by the midnight came, he had traced his potential victim.

Ex15   *But* he had left his gun home.

Ex16   *So* he could not complete his goal.

Ex13 establishes the time settings (temporal c.), Ex14 adds what the subject did after that (additive c.), Ex15 reverses the subject's condition (adversative c.) and Ex16 states what the result of it was (causal c.).

In the previous sub-chapters the basic overview of grammatical cohesion, the form of cohesion that is realized through the grammatical system of a language, has been outlined. The whole concept of grammatical cohesion is described in detail in Halliday and Hasan's *Cohesion in English* (1976).

3   Lexical Cohesion

Contrary to grammatical cohesion, lexical cohesion is not dependant on the grammatical structures of a text. It is the kind of cohesion that is provided by the semantic relations between words and phrases, both by their meaning and distribution.

3.1   Reiteration

One of the most comprehensible definitions of the concept of reiteration is that of Halliday and Hasan's (1976: 278):

> "Reiteration is a form of lexical cohesion which involves the repetition of a lexical item (…); the use of a general word to refer back to a lexical item (…); and a number of things in between – the use of a synonym, near-synonym, or superordinate."

The above written definition might be illustrated on the following examples form the Speech:

Ex17   I still have a *dream*. It is a *dream* deeply rooted in the American dream. (lines 75-76)

Ex18   *Five score years ago*, a great American, in whose symbolic shadow we stand today, signed the Emancipation Proclamation. (lines 3-4) … But *one hundred years later*, the Negro still is not free. (line 7)

Ex19   My *country* 'tis of thee, sweet *land* of liberty, of thee I sing. *Land* where my fathers died, *land* of the Pilgrim's pride... (lines 105-106)

Ex20   …signed *the Emancipation Proclamation*. This *momentous decree…* (line 4)

In Ex17, there is an example of repetition, as *dream* refers back to *dream*. In Ex18, *five score years* stands for the same time period as *one hundred years*; that means that these two expressions are synonymous. In Ex19, *country* and *land* are expressing the same thing, yet the semantic meaning is slightly shifted and the two words could not be substituted one with another in all contexts, as *country* refers rather to a state or a political body (both in the abstract sense), whereas *land* may refer to the ground, estate (in a more concrete sense). They are near-synonyms. In Ex20, the particular one proclamation, *the Emancipation Proclamation*, is referred to by a more general word,

a decree, which is termed as its superordinate. Individual types of reiteration will be detailed in the next subchapters.

3.1.1   Repetition of a lexical item

Repetition of a word or a phrase may be unintentional, as it often happens in a conversation or an unprepared speech, or it can be employed on purpose to achieve a wide range of aims. It is creatively used particularly in public speaking where it is carefully planned what and how often will be repeated. Repetition as a linguistic phenomenon can be further divided, as is described below.

First it should be established what is considered an identical lexical item. According to Tomášková (1999: 32), an identical lexical item is not bound to the grammatical category of the word, nor to the morphological structure of it. She considers identical various forms of one word, i.e. inflectional variants (e.g. *is − are*: line 1; *slave − slaves*: lines 79-80), and also various morphological variations derived from one root, i.e. derivational variants (e.g. *[to] promise − a promise − promissory*: lines 16-18). However, this Paper relates to other linguists (e.g. Hoey 1991, Halliday 1976), who consider identical only the inflectional variants of a word.

Hoey (1991: 52-56) divides the concept of repetition into two main parts: simple and complex repetition.

By simple lexical repetition he means the occurrence of "a lexical item that has already occurred in a text [and] is repeated with no greater alteration than is entirely explicable in terms of a closed grammatical paradigm," (Hoey 1991: 53).

Hoey also suggests omitting the repetition of closed-set lexical items from this part of analysis because connections between determiners, prepositions, auxiliaries and other grammatical items belong to grammatical cohesion. However, this Paper analyses repetition in connection with public speaking and as such the repetition of any lexical item, open- or closed-set, is crucial and equally important for the lexical structure of a speech. The following examples demonstrate repetition of both open- and close-set lexical items:

Ex21   This momentous decree *came as* a great beacon light… It *came as* a joyous daybreak… (lines 4-6)

Ex22   "When will you be *satisfied*?" We can never be *satisfied*… (lines 55-56)

Ex23   … *as long as* the Negro is the victim of the unspeakable horrors…, … as long as our bodies, heavy with the fatigue of travel, cannot gain lodging…, … *as long as* the negro's basic mobility is from a smaller ghetto to a larger one... (lines 56-60)

Ex24   I still have a *dream*. It is a *dream* deeply rooted in the American dream (lines 75-76)

Ex25   *I have a dream that* one day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed…, *I have a dream that* one day on the red hills of Georgia, the sons of former slaves and the sons of former slave owners will be able to sit down together…, *I have a dream that* one day even the state of Mississippi (…) will be transformed into an oasis of freedom and justice…, *I have a dream that* my four little children will one day live in a nation where… (lines 77-85)

In Ex21, there is an example of repetition of a verb, *come*, in Ex22, *satisfied* is a repetition of an adjective, in Ex23, there is a repetition of *as long as*, which is a conjunction, and in Ex24, there is a repetition of a noun, *dream*. In Ex25, M. L. K. repeats the whole phrase and because it functions as one unit and because all its repetitions have the same grammatical function, it can be considered a simple lexical repetition.

Complex lexical repetition is closely related to simple repetition but the lexical item is not exactly identical. Hoey's explanation is following:

"[Complex lexical repetition] occurs when two lexical items share a lexical morpheme, but are not formally identical (…), or when they are formally identical, but have different grammatical functions." (1991: 55)

The examples to support this definition are based on the Speech:

Ex26   [to] *promise* – a *promise* – *promissory* (lines 16-18)

Ex27   … a former *slave* and the son of a former *slave* owner… (lines 79-80)

In Ex26, all the repeated words share the root *-promis-* but are not formally identical. On the other hand, in Ex27, *slave* seems identical but the first one is a noun,

whereas the second one is a noun-modifier and thus has a different grammatical function than *slave* as a noun.

Contrary to Hoey, though, this Paper disregards the possible shift in meaning that a repetition of a lexical item could cause. Such a shift happens for example in conversation when one of the participants repeats a lexical item in a different context or redefines the item used by another participant. This is not usual in a monologue and therefore is not taken into account in this analysis.

This chapter describes what repetition is and how it can be divided. As a device of lexical cohesion it is frequently used in speeches prepared in advance and serves for grading the speech's intensity.

3.1.2 Synonymy

Even though there are a large number of Thesauri (i.e. books that contain synonyms and sometimes antonyms) in various languages, and they claim to compile synonymous words, usually the meanings of the words included in them may be considered synonymous only in a limited number of cases, and other meanings are more or less different one from another. This sub-chapter compares the views of various linguists and divides the phenomenon of synonymy according to the most common opinions.

Generally, it is impracticable to find a definition of synonymy on which all linguists would agree. Taylor in his work of 1813 considered words *freedom* and *liberty* not merely similar but identical in meaning, synonymous, different only in their origin (1813: 6). From the following example from the Speech it is obvious that Taylor's definition of synonymy, old nearly two hundred years, needs to be refined:

Ex28   "And they have come to realize that their *freedom* is inextricably bound to our *freedom*." (line 51)

vs.

Ex29   "And they have come to realize that their *liberty* is inextricably bound to our *liberty*."

From the context (lines 48-51), it is clear that the Ex29 version would not make sense in the Speech. The Ex29 sentence is not grammatically or lexically wrong, yet it could not be used in this context as there is a shift in the meaning of the two words. In

his essay, Stromberg (2001) admits that the two words may be used rather interchangeably but that *freedom* appears more concrete and "world-bound" than *liberty*, which, on the other hand, evokes the "abstract public liberty in relation to the state".

Moreover, M. L. K. would call his actions "*freedom struggle*" and not *"*liberty struggle*", he was a leader of a "*freedom movement*" and not of a *"*liberty movement*" (for more information se Partial synonyms, condition (ii)).

What is synonymy, then? There are two main interpretations of the term: one is stricter and one looser.

The stricter one states that two items are synonymous if they have the same meaning (Lyons 1968: 446). This implies that the criterion for two words to be considered synonymous is the identity and not mere similarity of their meanings (Lyons 1995: 60).

Many linguists (Ullman 1962, Meyer 2005, Hansen 1982, Kreidler 1998, for example) argue that there are but a few, if not none, such words that would have identical meaning in all contexts. Hansen (1982: 213) calls this phenomenon "economical principle of language" and Kreidler elaborates that, "It would be wasteful for a language to have two terms that occurs in exactly the same sense," (1998: 97).

The looser interpretation of synonymy states that two words are synonymous if they are relatively similar in sense (Lyons 1968: 447), or if they have "the same sense in a given context," (Kreidler 1998: 10).

Usually, words of foreign origin are considered synonymous to their English counterparts, for example *noun* and *substantive*, *car* and *automobile*. This assumption is based on the looser interpretation of synonymy because it would not satisfy a condition stating that, "Two words are synonyms if they can be used interchangeably in all sentence contexts," (Jackson 1988: 65). Jackson and other linguists (among others Lyons 1995 and Murphy 2003) distinguish two types of meaning that a word has, denotative and connotative meaning. Denotation refers to the exact meaning of the word and is usually equalled with the word's definition that can be found in a dictionary. Thus *quicksand* (line 30) is "a deep mass of loose wet sand into which heavy objects readily sink," (The Penguin Dictionary 2003: 1145).

As for the connotations, Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Synonyms defines them as,

> "the ideas which colour the word's meaning and are the product of various influences, such as etymology, language of origin, and historical and literary association." (1984: 25a)

In his Speech, M. L. K. deliberately uses the word *Negro* (lines 7, 9, 34, etc.) which in his time was already starting to feel offensive. On the other hand, *African American* denominates the same idea and is perfectly politically correct. This shows how two words describing the same thing may differ in emotional suggestions or associations connected to them, i.e. the words have different connotative meanings.

Getting back to Jackson's "all sentence contexts", it is now obvious that two synonymous words might differ in connotations and thus not fit in different contexts. Words *noun* and *substantive*, and *car* and *automobile* differ in the language of origin and this designates them to be used in different contexts: the foreign one in a more formal context, and the English one in an informal one. M. L. K. did use the words *Negros*, *black men* and *citizens of color* – synonyms – but a contemporary public speaker would probably opt only for the second and third one, or she or he would use the one most politically correct, *African Americans*, which proves that the above mentioned words could not be interchanged in all sentence contexts and that is why they fail to satisfy Jackson's strict condition for synonymy and could be classified synonymous only according to the looser definition mentioned above.

This Paper identifies with the following definition taken from the Introduction of Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Synonyms (1984: 24a-25a) because it is one of the most comprehensive ones:

> "A synonym [is] one of two or more words in the English language which have the same or very nearly the same essential meaning. (…) Usually they are distinguished from one another by an added implication or connotation, or they may differ in their idiomatic use or in their application [i.e. the restrictions in a word's use as prescribed by idiom or in accordance with the nature of the other words with which it may be associated (Merriam-Webster 1984: 25a)]. They may be and usually are interchangeable within limits."

It has been shown that what some linguists call synonymy, the others reject. As a result it has been suggested to quantify synonymy, to arrange sets of lexical items on a scale of similarity and difference of sense (Lyons 1968: 447). Lyons distinguishes three categories of synonyms, based on their identity/similarity of meaning: absolute synonyms, near-synonyms and partial synonyms.

For synonyms to be absolute, Lyons lists three conditions that have to be satisfied:

(i)   all their meanings have to be identical
(ii)   they have to be synonymous in all contexts
(iii)   they have to be semantically equivalent in all dimensions of meaning, descriptive or non-descriptive (Lyons, 1995:61).

Majority of the linguists who accept this definition agree that this kind of synonymy is only rarely found in English (Cruse 2000: 157, Hurford 1983: 102, Lyons 1995: 61, Saeed 1997: 65, for example). This is also what has been mentioned earlier in this Paper as Lyon's stricter definition of synonyms.

Partial synonyms, as another group, fail to satisfy at least one of the above mentioned conditions for absolute synonyms:

Condition (i) suggests that all meanings of two synonyms have to be identical and thus the two synonyms are interchangeable. Lyons' following example compares two words that are commonly considered synonymous, *big* and *large*:

Ex30   They live in a *big* house.

Ex31   They live in a *large* house.

Ex32   I will tell my *big* sister.

Ex33   I will tell my *large* sister.

In Ex30 and Ex31 the two synonyms are interchangeable and the meaning of the sentence will always be the same: the size of the house is the same. On the other hand, Ex32 and Ex33 mean two different things: *my big sister* refers to a relative that is older then the subject; *my large sister* is a rather derogative way of referring to the sister's body shape or size. This demonstrates that while one meaning is identical, the other is not and this is the reason why *big* and *large* are considered only partially synonymous.

The second condition, (ii), is connected with the collocational range of a word, or in other words with the set of contexts in which the word can appear (Lyons 1995: 62). Lyons again compares the words *big* and *large* in the following set expression:

Ex34   You are making a *big* mistake.
Ex35   *You are making a *large* mistake.

It is obvious that while Ex34 is correct and understandable, Ex35 is grammatically malformed and fails to satisfy Lyons' second condition for absolute synonymy, i.e. *big* and *large* are again proved to be only partially synonymous.

Another example of collocational difference between synonyms is provided by the word's ability to occur with or without a direct object, as Cruse's example demonstrates (1986: 96):

Ex36   Have you *finished*?
Ex37   *Have you *completed*?

Complete and *finish* are considered partially synonymous because *finish* can occur without a direct object, as in Ex36, while *complete*, as evidenced in Ex37 has to have a direct object.

The concept of the third condition, (iii), has been explained earlier in this Paper on the pages 12-13, though it was termed differently. What Lyons terms descriptive and non-descriptive meaning, others term denotation and connotation respectively (e.g. Merriam-Webster Dictionary of Synonyms, 1984).

Near-synonyms are, according to Lyons, "expressions that are more or less similar, but not identical, in meaning." (1995: 60) Usually there is some subtle difference of lexical meaning and thus the words are not synonymous but only nearly-synonymous.

Cruse distinguishes two kinds of near-synonymy, cognitive synonyms and plesionyms. His cognitive synonyms are words that when intersubstituted in a sentence preserve their truth-conditions, but may change the expressive meaning (Cruse's idea of expressive meaning corresponds to what other authors call connotative meaning, as was explained earlier), style, or register of the sentence, or may involve different

idiosyncratic (i.e. having an individualizing characteristic or quality) collocations (Cruse 1986: 290).

Ex38   We cannot be satisfied as long as a *Negro* in Mississippi cannot vote and a *Negro* in New York believes he has nothing for which to vote.

vs.

Ex39   We cannot be satisfied as long as an *African American* in Mississippi cannot vote and an *African American* in New York believes he has nothing for which to vote.

Both of the above written sentences, first of them taken from the Speech and the second one with a substituted word, mean basically the same. A *Negro* means the same as an *African American*, yet M. L. K would not intersubstitute them as they have different expressive meaning.

Cruse's plesionyms, on the other hand, change the truth-conditions, but still yield semantically similar sentences (1986: 285). Cruse gives the following examples to explain what plesionyms are (1986: 285):

Ex40   We stopped by the side of a *lake*, or more exactly, a *loch*, since there was an opening to the sea.

Ex41   It wasn't *foggy* last night – just *misty*.

Ex42   He wasn't *murdered*, he was legally *executed*.

As is obvious from the examples, one plesionym denies another: what is a *lake*, cannot be a *loch* at the same time, as well as *foggy* is not the same weather condition as *misty*. Yet the words are similar in meaning and a careless speaker could interchange them without preventing the sentence understanding. The difference between *murdered* and *executed* is more apparent, yet the words both denominate the action of someone killing someone else.

Hoey terms the above mentioned concept of synonymy and near synonymy paraphrasing and lists it as another way of repetition. He divides paraphrasing into two groups, simple and complex paraphrasing, where complex paraphrasing corresponds to other authors' definitions of collocation and unified lexical field (1991: 62-68).

Simple paraphrase occurs, according to Hoey, when "a lexical item may substitute for another in context without loss or gain in specificity and with no discernible change in meaning" (1991: 62). He admits that in some cases it is rather subjective to determine what is a paraphrase and what is just a group of more or less related words. Contrary to Lyons, Hoey does not treat synonymy and near-synonymy as two different things, even though he divides the concept of simple paraphrase into two groups – mutual and partial simple paraphrase, with these two groups slightly resembling synonymy and near-synonymy respectively.

Partial paraphrase, according to Hoey, occurs when the substitution works in one direction only, whereas mutual paraphrase has to work both ways and it has to be possible to switch the two lexical items without preventing the sentence from being properly understandable.

Hoey's terminology and the whole concept of paraphrasing are rather uncommon ones among other linguists. More detailed an overview of his theory may be found in *Patterns of Lexis in Text* (Hoey 1991).

In this sub-chapter, various theories and opinions on synonymy has been presented, with a particular emphasis on Lyons' categorization of absolute synonyms, near-synonyms and partial synonyms because this classification of synonymy is the most renowned and accepted one among other linguists.

3.1.3 Antonymy

Similarly as with synonyms, there have been several different conceptions of the phenomenon of antonymy and several more or less similar definitions. Some of the English language dictionaries define antonymy as follows:

(i)   "a word of opposite meaning" (*Webster's New international Dictionary*, 2nd Ed.)
(ii)   "a term which is the opposite or antithesis of another; a counter-term" *(Oxford English Dictionary)*
(iii)   "a word directly opposed to another in meaning; a counterterm; the opposite of synonym" *(Funk and Wagnall's New Standard Dictionary)*
(iv)   "a counterterm; an opposite; an antithetical word; the opposite of synonym" *(Century Dictionary)*

(v)   "a word that is an opposite in meaning of a particular word" *(New Century Dictionary)*
(The list of definitions was adopted from Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Synonyms, 1984: 26a).

In all of the above mentioned definitions, the term antonymy is explained by the use of *oppose* or *opposite* and that is how most linguist see antonymy – as an opposition of two concepts. Yet there is an opinion that only gradable antonyms can be called antonyms, whereas non-gradable are called opposites (for example in Cruse 1986, 2000; Lyons 1963, 1977) but this Paper does not identify with this view. Antonymy in its broadest sense of word is a relation between words of the same category, as for example *life* vs. *death*, which both are nouns; or between words of different category, which Jackson and Amvela call a "relation between concept and denotation" and as example they use:

Ex43   *"Lighten* our *darkness*, we pray."
(Jackson and Amvela 2000: 99)

One of the possible classifications is based on the morphological structure of the words: they can be morphologically unrelated as *despair* and *hope* in:

Ex44   … hew out of the mountain of *despair* a stone of *hope* (line 98);

or they can be derived by affixes, as for example joy*ful* vs. joy*less* (suffix) and married vs. *un*married (prefix).

The usual categorization (e.g. Jackson and Amvela 2000; Saeed 2003; Lyons 1963, 1977; Cruse 1986, 2000) of antonyms is into following groups: gradable, contradictory or complementary, converses, reverses and taxonomy.

Gradable antonymy, as the term suggests, does not pose two words into either/or relation but expresses a degree of certain quality. The opposition is not direct as with the following groups but follows a more/less scale. Among the two antonymous words, there are usually so called mediate terms, as are *warm*, *tepid* and *cool* in the following example:

Ex45   HOT – warm – tepid – cool – COLD

The gradation of such antonyms can be achieved either semantically, as it is in Ex45, or morphologically by adding the –er and –est morphemes, or by using quantifiers and intensifiers as for example *less*, *hardly*, *very*, etc.

The positivity of one member of the pair of antonyms does not necessarily imply the negativity of another, as for example:

Ex46   "The water is not *hot*," does not imply that, "The water is *cold*." It can be *warm* or *cool*.

One of the pair of antonyms is marked and one is unmarked, depending on what Jackson and Amvela call "assumptions" (2000: 99). Should, for example, a person want to know the length of a street, s/he would ask:

Ex47   "How *long* is the street?" and not, "How *short* is the street?"

The "usual" or "assumed" antonym (i.e. in Ex47 *long*) then is termed unmarked. Other examples are *old* vs. *young* ("How *old* are you?") or *high* vs. *short* ("How *high* is the building?").

Another group are contradictory or complementary antonyms; the two names reflect the two possible points of view from which they are explained. Both views are best shown on an example of *dead* vs. *alive*. The two words are contradictory because when someone is *dead*, s/he cannot at the same time be *alive*. On the other hand, the two antonyms are complementary because when someone is not *dead*, it is implied that s/he is *alive* (popular literature excused). The relation holding of these antonyms then is of direct oppositeness and therefore unlike the gradable ones, contradictory antonyms form only two-term sets with no mediate terms. Consequently contradictory antonyms are usually not graded; for example a coroner would probably not mark one dead body *more dead* or *deader* than another. These antonyms, though, can be graded in a creative way, usually when one is exaggerating:

Ex48   She was *more dead* than alive.
Ex49   He was *half dead* with fear.

Such antonyms, when the opposition is clear with no mediate terms, are sometimes called simple antonyms (Saeed 2003) or binary antonyms (Kreidler 1998; Murphy 2003).

A group of antonyms that are called converses and reverses represents a similar concept; their understanding also depends on the point of view. With converses, one is a paraphrase of another, as in *own* vs. *belong to* or *above* vs. *below*. One can say, "This violin *belongs* to me," and it means the same as if s/he says "I *own* this violin." Same as "He stood *above* the river, *on* a bridge," means the same as, "The river was *below* him, *under* the bridge."

The term reverses is sometimes used for antonyms expressing movement (Saeed 2003: 67), yet the concept is the same as with converses; for example *pull* vs. *push* and *right* vs. *left*. On the door of a shop, there is usually a label saying *Push* at one side, and *Pull* at another, again depending on the direction from which one comes. The same reverse concept is employed when a car turns *left*, to the cars going in opposite direction it will appear as if it turned *right*.

An outstanding group of antonyms, sometimes not even considered antonyms, are taxonomies. Cruse (1986: 137) treats them as a sub-species of hyponymy because they are words at the same level, yet the positivity of one indicates the negativity of another and that is why they are included under the heading of antonymy in this Paper. Examples of taxonomy are *days of a week*, *types of dogs* or *colours*. When one says, "It is *Monday* today," it eliminates the possibility of someone else saying, "It is *Wednesday* today," at the same time. Similarly, when a dog owner proudly says "I have a *border collie*," s/he would be probably insulted if someone else referred to the same dog as a *poodle* or a *mongrel*. Also when a car is *red*, it cannot at the same time be *green*. In M. L. K.'s Speech, there is also an example:

Ex50   This sweltering *summer* of the Negro's legitimate discontent will not pass until there is an invigorating *autumn* of freedom and equality.

M. L. K. contrasts two seasons, *summer* and *autumn*, to emphasise the conditions that his movement established.

There can be unlimited number of the members of one taxonomy, for example *flavours of ice-cream*, *colours* and *Christian names*: those are called open taxonomies. Logically, closed taxonomy will be such that cannot be further extended, as for example *continents*, *months in a year* or *days in a week*.

Taxonomies are not true antonyms, as based on the previous examples one cannot say that the opposite of *summer* is *autumn*, yet they are considered opposite enough to be included into this chapter. As has been mentioned, they are usually discussed together with hyponymy and will be mention further.

It has been illustrated that there exist various types of lexical oppositeness according to the relation holding between the contrasted words. There are classes of antonyms which contain only two-word sets in direct opposition, and also multi-word groups of opposites which contain more or less broad variety of gradable antonyms with multiple mediate terms.

3.1.4 Superordinate Relations

Under the heading of superordinate relations, hyponymy and meronymy is included in this Paper. However, it is discussed whether these relations individually function cohesively in a text; Halliday and Hasan (1976: 278-280), for example, mention superordination as whole, not further dividing it. This chapter presents examples of cohesive use of both hyponymy and meronymy.

Earlier in this Paper, it was described what taxonomy is. It is a horizontal relationship of so called taxonomy-sisters, words on one level, example of which are *red*, *green*, *blue*, etc. Taxonomies usually have a superordinate term that includes them all, as the word *colours* includes all above mentioned taxonomy-sisters. The same example could be described in different terminology, where the relationship between the words is vertical: *red*, *green* and *blue* are hyponyms of *colours*, whereas *colour*s is their hyperonym (sometimes also spelled hypernym). More generally, hyponymy is a relation in which one wide term includes other more specific words, hyponyms, whereas the hyponyms include the meaning of the general word (Saeed 2003: 68), as can bee seen from the example:

Ex51   *cat, dog, rabbit, squirrel, crocodile* are *animals*

In Ex51, *cat, dog, squirrel* and *crocodile* are hyponyms, and *animals* is their hyperonym. Standing on the same level, these hyponyms are called co-hyponyms. It is obvious that the general term *animals* includes all the named species and also that every one of the listed species is an *animal*. This is the evidence that hyponymy is a relationship of inclusion.

As well as other semantic relations, words of various word-classes may enter hyponymous relations. Nouns can be hyponymous, as for example Ex51, verbs also can enter the hymonymy relationship, as for example:

Ex52   Did she *hit* him? – Yes, she *punched* him.

Punch in Ex52 is a hyponymy of *hit*, as well as *thump* and *slam* are.

Adjectives can be hyponymous, and an example was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter:

Ex53   red, green, blue, etc. are *colours*

Red, *green* and *blue* are apparently adjectives and they are the hyponyms of *colours* or *coloured*.

M. L. K. used hyponymy as a cohesive device in his Speech for two main reasons, as is analysed on the following examples:

Ex54   … signed *the Emancipation Proclamation*. This momentous *decree*…

Ex55   … *all men*, yes, *black men* as well as *white men*…

Ex56   ... *all of God's children* [or *people*], *black men* and *white men*, *Jews* and *Gentiles*, *Protestants* and *Catholics*…

In Ex54, *the Emancipation Proclamation* is a hyponym of *decree*, as there could be other decrees (e.g. *The Decree of Kutná Hora, The Decree of Establishing the Landscape Area Třeboňsko*), *decree* being the hyperonym, the superordinate term. The reason for preferring the superordinate term over a simple repetition of the phrase *Emancipation Proclamation* is that M. L. K. chose the imaginative alternative to make his Speech more creative. In Ex55, *black men* and *white men* are hyponyms of *all men*, and in Ex56, M. L. K. enumerated who is included in the idea of *all God's children*, presumably because he wanted to point out the equality of all the hyponyms.

To generalize, hyponymy is a relation of a number of subordinate terms which are umbrelled by a superordinate term which is called a hyperonym. It functions cohesively if a more specific term is substituted in the adjacent sentence by a superordinate term, and it adds up to the originality of the text.

A different kind of hierarchical relationship between words is meronymy (sometimes also called partonymy) in which, similarly as in a hyponymy relationship, one word is superordinate to others. Meronymy is usually defined as a part-whole relation (Croft and Cruse 2004: 150-151), and the usual examples of meronymy are:

Ex57   *finger* and *hand*

Ex58   *handle* and *door*

Ex59   *pages* and *book*

Generally it can be said that meronymy occurs in two frames:

(i)   X is a part of Y;

and simultaneously

(ii)   Y has X;

where X is the first word of each pair of the above mentioned examples Ex57 to Ex59, and Y is the second one: thus *A finger is a part of a hand* and *A hand has a finger*; *A handle is a part of a door* and *A door has a handle* and *Pages are part of a book* and *A book has pages*.

In M. L. K.'s Speech, the following examples of meronymy can be found:

Ex60   But we refuse to believe that the *bank* of justice is bankrupt. We refuse to believe that there are insufficient *funds* in the great *vaults* of opportunity of this nation.

Ex61   … people, who stand on the warm *threshold* which leads into the *palace* of justice (lines 41-42)

It has been mentioned that meronymy is a hierarchical relationship; in Ex60, the superordinate term is the *bank*, and the subordinate terms are, in addition to the *funds* and the *vault*, for example *safe deposit box*, *counter* and *cash dispenser*. Put into the

above mentioned frames, *Funds and vaults are parts of a bank* and *Bank has funds and vaults*. Similarly in Ex61, *A threshold is a part of a palace* and *A palace has a threshold*.

Meronymy may and may not work cohesively in a text, it depends on the context. This chapter presented examples from the Speech, in which meronymy functions cohesively (Ex60 and Ex61).

3.1.5 General word

The class of general noun stands, according to Halliday and Hasan, on the borderline between lexical and grammatical cohesion because as a lexical item a general noun is a member of an open set, and as a grammatical item it is a member of a closed system. Halliday and Hasan describe the class of general nouns as "a small set of nouns having generalized reference within the major noun classes." (1976: 274)

As they are very general in meaning, the general nouns are often interpretable only in connection with other referential elements in the text. Because the meaning conveyed must be understood by all the participants of the discourse, the general nouns are usually used in smaller groups of people where everyone is familiar with the subject and thus can easily guess the meaning of the general noun. They also tend to appear in informal texts rather then in the formal ones.

General nouns operate as a kind of a synonym or a superordinate to more specific nouns, as for example:

(i)   "*people, person, man, woman, child, human, boy, girl* (human)
(ii)   *creature* (non-human animate)
(iii)   *thing, object* (inanimate concrete count)
(iv)   *stuff* (inanimate concrete mass)
(v)   *business, affair, matter* (inanimate abstract)
(vi)   *move* (action)
(vii)   *place* (place)
(viii) *question, idea* (fact)"

(Halliday and Hasan 1976: 274)

For example *boy* and *creature* are used cohesively in:

Ex62   Look at *Gil*. The *boy* doesn't seem well today.

Ex63   Nick's *cat* destroyed his armchair. The poor *creature* can't come near Nick these days or he'd kill it!

And it is obvious that both *Gil* and *boy* refer to the same person, where *boy* is the more general term, dependant on the concrete name *Gil*. It is the same with Ex63 where *creature* refers back to *Nick's cat*.

As was mentioned above, general nouns depend on the participants' familiarity with the discourse subject, and, more importantly, on the familiarity with the audience; they are also rather informal, which explains the lack of general words in M. L. K.'s Speech.

3.2   Collocation and Lexical Field

The idea to include the two phenomena, collocation and lexical field, into one chapter is based on the relatedness of their concepts. Halliday and Hasan say that generally words collocate if they are somehow typically associated with each other, if they have the tendency to occur in the same lexical environment (1976: 285-287). The words of one lexical field share the same characteristic – they usually appear in the same environment and are associated one to another too.

Some words are expected to occur together with others. Generally, some words co-occur with greater than random probability and this phenomenon is called collocation (Hoey 1991: 7). Because it may be subjective to establish which words collocate and which do not, linguists hesitate in coining a strict definition of collocation. Halliday and Hasan, for example, suggest grouping all the above mentioned semantic relations (see 3.1) and treating them under the general heading of collocation or collocational cohesion (1976: 287). On the other hand, not all synonyms or antonyms collocate and thus such a generalization is not effective.

More objective a view presents Siepmann (2005: 47-48) who based his categorization of fixedness of collocation on Howarth (1996), Hausmann (1984) and classical Russian theory on degrees of idiomaticity:

(i)   Complete restriction on the choice of any element: *fixed expressions* or *idioms* (e.g. spill the beans, call the shots);

(ii)   Complete restriction on the choice of one element, some substitution of other elements: *idiom* or *strong collocation* (e.g. give the appearance/impression);

(iii)   Some substitution at several structural places: *central restricted collocation* (e.g. make/give a speech/presentation);

(iv)   Freedom of substitution of one element, some restriction on the choice of other elements: *weak collocation* (e.g. accept/agree to/ adopt a plan/proposal/suggestion/recommendation/convention);

(v)   Freedom of substitution of any element: *free combination*, also called *non-restricted compositional sequence* .

Of the above listed degrees (i) to (v), particularly (ii),(iii) and (iv) are important for lexical cohesion, as fixed expressions are usually treated as grammatical items, and free combinations generally are not cohesive. The following examples of collocation are taken from the Speech:

Ex64   to *shake* the *foundations* (line 39)

Ex65   *bright day* (line 40)

Ex66   *drinking* from the *cup* of bitterness (line 44)

Ex67   *physical violence* (lines 46)

Ex68   *rise* to the majestic *heights* (line 46)

Ex69   *police brutality* (lines 57)

Ex70   *trials and tribulations* (line 66)

Of the examples, the phrase *trials and tribulations* can be considered an idiom or a strong collocation, and it is often used for example in popular culture (Jesus Christ Superstar – the "rock opera", M. Jackson's lyrics, the name of a computer game, etc.). On the other hand, *bright day* is a weak collocation, considering that many other thing/people may be bright (bright pupil, sound, future, etc.).

As has been mentioned, collocation is a subjective phenomenon and therefore some of the examples might be classified as strong collocation, weak collocation – or someone would not consider them collocational at all.

The words of one lexical field usually also occur together, they collocate in the means of weaker collocation though. The lexical field theory is associated with Jost Trier and the German structuralist school who first realized that a word does not exist in isolation in speaker's/hearer's mind, but that it forms a structured set of elements that are conceptually related and have a reciprocal influence on each other (Bussmann,

Trauth and Kazzazi 1996: 275). Firbas and Hladky state that vocabulary of a language can be ordered into lexical fields according to logical principles (2003: 164). All words of every one group name things of the same conceptual area. The most common examples of lexical fields are kinship terms (*mother, son, aunt, cousin, brother-in-law,* etc.), weather conditions (*sunny, rain, wind, atmospheric pressure, warm front,* etc.), food and meals (*restaurant, eat, plate, waiter, vegetables, snack,* etc.), health and diseases (*shoulder joint, illness, bacteria, body, respiratory,* etc.) and numerous others.

From the randomly chosen example fields and words above, it is obvious that any such group of words of one lexical field is not limited by word categories, as there examples of nouns, adjectives, verbs and phrases. However Crystal (1995) sees three main problems in distinguishing lexical fields:

(i)   some fields are vague or difficult to define;
(ii)   some words may be assigned to more than one lexical field
(iii)   it is difficult to define one lexical field in relation to other lexical fields
        (Adopted from Crystal 1995: 157, and Jackson and Amvela 2000: 15.)

To support the first point, (i), Jackson and Amvela point out the impossibility to assigning the words *noise* or *difficult* to a lexical field, as the terms are vague. The second difficulty in distinguishing lexical fields,(ii), takes into account the fact that for example *orange* can be assigned to two different lexical fields: *fruit* or *colours*; and some would assign *tomato* to the group of *fruit*, some to the group of *vegetables* (Jackson and Amvela 2000: 15). The third problem, (iii), may be illustrated on the above mentioned lexical field of *food and meals*: if the word *carrot* is added to this lexical field, it is perfectly appropriate as a *carrot* is indeed food. But then the question arises whether *carrot* should not be rather assigned to the group of *vegetables*, *vegetables* being also in the lexical field of *food*. This proves that the individual lexical fields are not discrete units and that there are a lot of indistinct cases. However the majority of lexical groups are clear-cut and they contribute to the cohesiveness of a text.

In M. L. K.'s Speech, there can be found two distinct lexical fields. The main one corresponds to the topic of the Speech and may be described as *fight for equality and desegregation*, which is the heading for a group of logically connected words. As this idea spreads throughout the Speech, examples of this lexical field may be found in

the whole text, for example: *demonstration, freedom, nation, Emancipation Proclamation, hope, slave, injustice, captivity, free, segregation, discrimination, equal, rights, democracy, racial, discontent, struggle, violence, dignity, racist,* etc.

Another group of words specific for one area is used when M. L. K. compares the Declaration of Independence to a promissory note and thus uses a metaphor to portray the current situation of the African Americans. This lexical field may be entitled *bank* and some of the words used in the Speech are for example: *cash a check, promissory note, default, obligation, bad check, insufficient funds, bankrupt, vault,* etc.

The variety of lexical fields is given by the intuitiveness with which they are perceived by the general public or by individual linguists. Lexical fields are thematic units, sets of words that are related to a common concept, and as such they are open to individual interpretation.

4   Lexical Cohesion in the Situational Context of the Speech

Generally, when delivering a speech, M. L. K. had to take into account the audience in front of which he presented his views, the intentions that he had with the particular speech, and political situation. Partly he had to rely on the audience's background knowledge; he expected them to know what the topic of the speech would be. On the other hand, he had to make his speech clear enough for every one to understand and, ideally, to induce the audience to consider the content of the speech. He had to make his statement organized, engaging, urgent and powerful.

When writing his speech *I Have a Dream*, the main goal M. L. K. had in his mind was to make his audience aware of the dreadful conditions of African Americans in the United States. His audience was expected to consist mainly of African Americans and M. L. K. thus knew that his listeners would be well informed of the situation from their own experience. He therefore did not have to present facts or new information, or to appeal to the listeners' minds by logical arguments, but he rather appealed to their emotion. He wanted to emphasize the social needs of his audience and to do so he had to carefully think about their fears and interests. To support his attitude in the situation, M. L. K. made use of numerous linguistic devices that helped his Speech sound more acute and unified.

M. L. K. talked in the first person plural for the majority of the Speech, for example:

Ex71   … a great American, in whose symbolic shadow *we* stand today, signed the Emancipation Proclamation. (lines 3-4)

Ex72   And so *we*'ve come here today to dramatize a shameful condition. (line 12)

Ex73   In a sense *we*'ve come to our nation's capital to cash a check. (line 13)

Ex74   But *we* refuse to believe that the bank of justice is bankrupt. (line 22)

This strategy is usually employed when the speaker tries to present himself/herself as a part of the group or wants to be levelled with the audience. Contrary to that, when M. L. K. wanted to indicate that he knew what his audience's problems were, when he wanted to turn the attention to each member of the audience individually, he addressed them by the pronoun *you*, as in:

Ex75   I am not unmindful that some of *you* have come here out of great trials
         and tribulations. (line 66)

Ex76   Some of *you* have come fresh from narrow jail cells. (line 67)

Ex77   *You* have been the veterans of creative suffering. (lines 69-70)

Of other linguistic devices typical for this kind of speech, M. L. K. used for example personal addressing of the audience, "I say to you today, *my friends*," (line 74), or he talked about them as of "*my people*" (line 41). Thus he maintained contact with the listeners and created the atmosphere of togetherness. M. L. K. made use of a dialogical question, "*When will you be satisfied?*" (line 55-56), directly answered it as if he had been speaking for the audience and this way he again suggested that he was there to advocate their collective needs.

However, this Paper is concerned with lexical cohesion and therefore it will be now concluded on the basis of the preceding analysis how the speech *I Have a Dream* benefited from M. L. K.'s employing lexical cohesion:

Repetition as a means of lexical cohesion has been described (see 3.1.1) and here are three main reasons why M. L. K. used it in his Speech: first and the most important, repetition equals emphasis. If the listener hears one word or phrase for the second or third time, he or she subconsciously realizes that the said word or phrase is of some importance and thus worth remembering. This happened for example with the word *freedom* (lines 2, 25, 35, 43, 51, 68, 84, etc.) which M. L. K. repeated several times throughout the Speech – he thus implicitly established the main topic of the Speech.

Second, M. L. K.'s repeating set phrases became a mantra for his audience. While M. L. K. repeated *I have a dream* several times throughout his speech, he convinced his audience that not only was that his *dream* but that it was a *dream* of them all.

And third, repetition adds up to the overall coherence of the Speech, as there are certain structures (*One hundred years later* (lines 7-10), *Go back to Mississippi, go back to Alabama...* (lines 71-72, 97), *I have a dream* (lines 77-93), *Let freedom ring* (lines 109-118), etc.) which are repeated throughout the Speech and thus form a structured

whole. More information about repetition can be found for example in *Repetition* (Fischer 1994) or *Repetition and Semiotics* (Metzidakis 1986).

Then synonymy was described and now it remains to conclude how the Speech benefited from M. L. K.'s using it. Various publications on rhetoric (Clark 1982, Dohalská et al. 1985, Lotko 1997) agree that synonyms are used to make a speech sound more vivid, creative and attractive. M. L. K. used *five score years* (line 3) instead of repeating *one hundred years* which certainly maked the sentence more resourceful than if he had just kept repeating the same phrase. His careful work with synonyms can be noticed in the whole Speech as he kept choosing imaginative words instead of limiting himself to the dull ones. Thus he said *seared in the flames* (line 5) instead of *burnt by the flames*, he used they are *sadly crippled by the manacles of segregation* (line 8) instead of being satisfied with unimaginative *they suffer form segregation*, he wanted *to rise to majestic heights* (line 46) instead of *rising high*, his audience was *battered by storms* (line 68) instead of just being *beaten*, etc. This creative way of using language adds up to the Speech's merits.

It has been also suggested that M. L. K. purposely used words with strong connotations mainly to appeal to his audience's emotion. Therefore he kept using the words *black men*, *citizens of colour* and *Negroes* which are synonymous but have different connotations. These connotations change with time, as was satirized by cartoonist Jules Feiffer in 1967:

> "As a matter of racial pride we want to be called '*blacks*.' Which has replaced the term '*Afro-American*' – Which replaced '*Negroes*' – Which replaced '*colored people*' – Which replaced '*darkies*' – Which replaced '*blacks*'" (Quoted in Safire 2008: 57-58).

According to Crémieux (2001) and Safire (2008: 57-58), by the time M. L. K. wrote the Speech, the terms *Negro* and *coloured people* were becoming to be perceived negatively by the African Americans and the term *black people* was reintroduced. It is concluded then, that M. L. K. of all the synonyms chose *Negro* to draw a strong reaction from the audience. On the other hand, he used the terms *white* and *black men* to compare the two races and put them on the same level, as for example:

Ex78   This note was a promise that *all men*, yes, *black men as well as white men,* would be guaranteed the "unalienable Rights" of "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." (lines 16-17)

Ex79   … one day right there in Alabama little *black boys* and *black girls* will be able to join hands with little *white boys* and *white girls* as sisters and brothers. (lines 89-91)

Ex80   … we will be able to speed up that day when *all* of God's children, *black men and white men*, Jews and Gentiles, Protestants and Catholics, will be able to join hands and sing in the words of the old Negro spiritual... (lines 120-123)

The word *African-American* was coined in 1980's together with other hyphenated terms (*Irish-American, Hispanic-American*, etc.) and was replaced by *African American* while the hyphen was deleted as it implied an idea of sub-category. Nevertheless, M. L. K. employed three of the several synonymous terms and by their careful distribution proved that different connotations determine them to be used in different contexts.

Antonymy has been illustrated on numerous examples and according to Jackson and Amvela (2000: 98) there may be three main reasons why antonyms occur together in one sentence or in adjacent sentences: first, some expressions are structured in this way and they are used idiomatically, for example a matter of *life* and *death,* from *start* to *finish*, the *long* and the *short* of it, neither *friend* nor *foe*, etc.

The second reason why public speakers fill their speeches with antonyms is to emphasize a point, as for example:

Ex81   … that *all men*, yes, *black men* as well as *white men* (line 16)

Ex82   Nineteen sixty-three is not an *end*, but a *beginning. (line* 35)

In Ex81, reiterating *black men* and *white men* emphasizes the phrase *all men*, and M. L. K. may have used it to create the atmosphere of equality and togetherness.

The third reason to contrast two antonyms in one sentence is to make a rhetorical flourish, which happens particularly in public speeches very often:

Ex83   It came as a joyous *daybreak* to end the long *night* of their captivity. (line 6)

Ex84   … a lonely *island of poverty* in the midst of a vast *ocean of material prosperity* (lines 9-10)

Ex85   Now is the time to rise from the *dark and desolate valley of segregation* to the *sunlit path of racial justice.* (lines 28-30)

Ex86   Now is the time to lift our nation from the *quicksands of racial injustice* to the *solid rock of brotherhood.* (lines 30-31)

In Ex83 to Ex86, M. L. K. uses contrastive metaphors to attract people's attention. It is not suggested that for example *daybreak* and *night* are opposites according to the strictest definitions of antonyms, but they create the contrastive impression and as such are considered antonymous.

Hyponymy and meronymy were explained and illustrated on examples and it has been already indicated how they are used cohesively in the Speech. Instead of repeating the same phrases, M. L. K. used superordinate terms, as was illustrated for example on Ex54 where the term *Emancipation Proclamation* had been substituted by a more general term – a hyperonym – *decree*.

Meronymy adds up to the overall cohesiveness of the Speech particularly when M. L. K. compares the promises of the Constitution and Declaration of Independence to *promissory notes*, justice to a *bank* and opportunities to *vaults*. He created a metaphor based on the meronymous relation of a bank and its parts and thus illustrated his point on a vivid example.

Finally, collocation and lexical field have been described and on the examples taken from the Speech it was shown how M. L. K. worked with two different lexical fields. The main topic of the Speech forms one lexical field, a complex one and sophisticated, and thus the whole Speech appears unified and organized. The second lexical field, the bank metaphor, enlivens the Speech as it compares the topical situation of African Americans to something that every one member of the audience can imagine, to a bank in which it is very probable that every one member of the audience have been.

In this chapter, it was illustrated how individual devices of lexical cohesion were used in M. L. K.'s Speech and it may be concluded that because M. L. K. had the possibility to prepare his Speech in advance, he chose the relevant lexical devices. By his careful work with lexical cohesion, he managed to create a speech that was coherent,

unified and sophisticated. It has become a prototype speech of the African Americans'
fight for desegregation in 1960's.

5   Conclusion

By the analysis, it was illustrated that lexical cohesion contributes to the overall coherence of public speech, as was demonstrated on M. L. King's speech *I Have a Dream*, a famous speech of 1960's civil rights movements. This Speech has been analysed and it was shown on the examples how careful work with individual devices of lexical cohesion can produce an easily understandable, engaging and memorable speech.

First, it was explained that cohesion and coherence are two separate phenomena, yet they are interconnected and one without another has only a very limited ability to make a comprehensible text. Cohesion as such can be divided into two large sections according to what structures form it, into grammatical and lexical cohesion. Because grammatical cohesion is not the subject of this Paper, it was only marginally described.

In the second part, lexical cohesion was explained in detail and duly illustrated on examples. M. A. K. Halliday and R. Hasan's book *Cohesion in English* was chosen as the most comprehensive one in the field and according to it, the devices of lexical cohesion were categorized. Thus the devices of lexical cohesion were included into two groups: reiteration, and collocation together with lexical field; and both were properly described and analysed on examples of the Speech.

In the final part, it was concluded how individual devices of lexical cohesion were used in M. L. K.'s Speech and what effect it may have had on the audience.

The whole Paper has showed that not only the topic is important for a speech, but that the way how the speech is composed is important and that every word has to be carefully chosen for the speech to have the desired impact.

6   <u>Resumé</u>

Záměrem této práce je analyzovat použití lexikální koheze v projevu M. L. Kinga *I Have a Dream*. Celá práce je koncipována jako teoreticko-praktická studie, kdy nejdříve je vysvětlen určitý termín či jev a ten je ihned analyzován na příkladech, z nichž většina pochází z projevu *I Have a Dream*. Pro základní rozdělení koheze byla použita kniha M. A. K. Hallidaye a R. Hasanové *Cohesion in English* (1976), ve které je koheze členěna na několik obecně uznávaných skupin.

Jako registr, na němž je lexikální koheze analyzována, byl vybrán veřejný mluvený projev, pro nějž je charakteristické, že se mluvčí zaměřuje především na výrazovou stránku a jeho cílem je působit na city a postoje posluchačů. To se projevuje hlavně ve výběru jazykových prostředku, které je potřeba volit tak, aby samy o sobě ovlivňovaly posluchače a pomáhaly řečníkovi zaujmout mnohdy velmi rozmanité publikum.

Na začátku práce je vysvětleno, že skupina po sobě jdoucích vět může a nemusí tvořit text. Jsou-li tyto věty provázány jedna s druhou pomocí lexikálních prostředků či gramatických struktur, pak se jedná o text a to, co ony věty spojuje, jsou prostředky lexikální a gramatické koheze. Koheze jako taková se projevuje především na limitovaném počtu vět a jen některé prostředky prostupují celým textem, jak bude vysvětleno později. Pro text však není dostačující, aby byl kohezivní, ale musí být zároveň koherentní, což znamená, že musí jako celek dávat smysl. Koherence textu se projevuje jako abstraktnější jev a jeho zásadou je, aby se jednotlivé myšlenky logicky seskupovaly do smysluplného celku.

Jak bylo naznačeno, koheze se dělí do dvou základních skupin podle toho, jakými prostředky je zajišťována, na gramatickou a lexikální kohezi. Prostředky gramatické koheze jsou reference, substituce, elipsa a konjunkce, které tvoří gramatické vztahy mezi jednotlivými větami či výroky.

Lexikální koheze funguje pomocí významových vztahů mezi slovy či frázemi a využívá tak lexikálního systému jazyka. Halliday a Hasanová dělí lexikální kohezi na reiteraci (neboli různé druhy opakování lexikálních jednotek) a kolokaci (čili společný výskyt slov) spolu s významovými okruhy (poli).

Pod pojem reiterace spadá opakování identické lexikální jednotky, synonymie, antonymie, hyponymie, meronymie a opakování lexikální jednotky s všeobecným významem.

Zatímco neúmyslné opakování identické lexikální jednotky bývá typické pro konverzaci či jiné předem nepřipravené texty, záměrné opakování je charakteristické pro veřejné projevy. Za identické se ve většině případů považují slovotvorné varianty jednoho slova odvozené od stejného základu, jako např. *to promise* (slíbit) – *a promis* (slib) – *promissory* (slibující) v Kingově projevu. Pro opakování proto není důležité, o jaký slovní druh se jedná, a z toho důvodu je v Kingově projevu možné najít opakování sloves, přídavných i podstatných jmen a také frází. Záměrně užité opakování může být použito pro zdůraznění důležitých bodů projevu či pro zpřehlednění textu. King například opakoval slovo *freedom* (svoboda), čímž nepřímo naznačil hlavní téma svého projevu.

Dalším druhem opakování je synonymie, kdy není opakováno slovo samo, ale je nahrazeno jiným se stejným nebo podobným významem. Lyons (1968) rozeznává dvě definice synonymie, jednu striktnější a druhou volnější. Podle striktnější definice jsou synonymní pouze slova, která mají identický význam, a takových je v angličtině pouze několik (podle některých lingvistů žádná). Volnější definice považuje za dostatečné, aby si slova byla významově blízká, případně aby shodný význam měla jen v daném kontextu. Kontext je pro synonyma důležitý proto, že jednotlivá slova mají denotativní a konotativní význam a právě kvůli konotacím ne každé slovo může být v určitém kontextu použito. Denotace označuje přesný význam slova, který je k nalezení ve výkladových slovnících. Oproti tomu konotace označuje citové zabarvení slova, které může být důsledkem historických či literárních asociací, jazyka původu nebo etymologie. Je proto zjevné, že synonyma s rozdílným konotativním významem nemohou být použita ve stejném kontextu, jak je ukázáno na použití slov *Negro* (negr) – *citizen of color* (barevný, občan barevné pleti) – *black man* (černý, černoch).

Protože je obtížné stanovit definici synonymie, na které by se všichni lingvisté shodli, začala se synonymie dělit podle míry podobnosti slov na absolutní (absolute) a částečná (partial) synonyma a na slova významově blízká (near-synonym). Pojem absolutních synonym odpovídá Lyonsově striktní definici synonymie a většina lingvistů se shoduje, že je pro jazyk ekonomické mít takových synonym jen omezené množství.

Částečná synonyma se liší například v konotativním významu nebo v kontextu, ve kterém se mohou objevit. Slova významově blízká mají podobný smysl, ale rozdíl mezi nimi je většinou snadno rozeznatelný, jako například mezi slovy *murder* (zavraždit) a *execute* (popravit). King ve svém projevu používal synonymii především při nahrazování jednotvárných slov výrazy barvitějšími, čímž celému projevu dodal na zajímavosti.

Jistým druhem opakování je i antonymie, kdy mluvčí kontrastuje dvě slova místo pouhého opakování slov stejných.. Antonyma mohou být klasifikována podle své morfologické struktury: morfologicky rozdílná slova jsou například *despair* (zoufalství) a *hope* (naděje) z Kingova projevu; anebo antonymie je dosaženo pomocí derivace příponami jako např. *joyful* (radostný) a *joyless* (neradostný). Častější je ale roztřídění do následujících skupin: polární (gradable), kontradiktorní či komplementární (contradictory/complementary), konverzní či vztahová (converses) a kontextová čili paralelní (taxonomy).

Polární či graduální antonymie nestaví dvě slova do přímého protikladu, ale kontrastuje je podle stupnice a mezi dvěma krajními, polárními, antonymy se nacházejí ještě další stupně (mediate terms), jako např. *hot* (horký) – *warm* (teplý) – *cool* (chladný) – *cold* (studený). Antonyma tohoto druhu mohou být stupňována buď pomocí přípon *-er* a *-est* nebo pomocí intenzifikátorů a kvantifikátorů, např. *less, very, hardly* atd.

Kontradiktorní neboli komplementární antonyma jsou taková, která se navzájem vylučují, jako např. *dead* (mrtvý) a *alive* (živý) a ta jsou stupňovatelná pouze v obrazných přirovnáních, jako např. *He was half dead with fear* (Byl napůl mrtvý strachy).

Konverzní čili vztahová antonyma závisí na pohledu mluvčího, jako je tomu u *above* a *below* v příkladu *He stood above the river – The river was below him* (Stál nad řekou – Řeka byla pod ním).

Kontextovými neboli vztahovými antonymy se rozumí slova, která v určitých situacích tvoří protiklady, ale obecně jsou členy jedné skupiny, jako například dny v týdnu či příchutě zmrzliny. Jedno popírá druhé např. ve větě *It is Sunday, not Wednesday* (Dnes je neděle, ne středa).

Dalším druhem opakování je hyponymie, která souvisí s výše zmíněnými kontextovými antonymy. *Dny v týdnu* jsou nadřazeným termínem (hyperonymem) pro např. *pondělí, pátek* a *sobotu*, která jsou označována jako hyponyma nadřazeného termínu. M. L. K hyponymii využívá, když staví na stejnou úroveň osoby *černé* i *bílé* pod nadřazený termín „*všichni lidé*".

Na podobném principu jako hyponymie je za založena meronymie, jež označuje slova, která tvoří části nadřazeného pojmu, jako v případě Kingova projevu *banka* a její části *sejf* a *fondy*.

Posledním nástrojem opakování, jehož však King ve své řeči neužívá, je nahrazení slova lexikální jednotkou s všeobecným významem. V jednom z příkladů je místo opakování jména *Gil* je užito slovo *chlapec*, které je obecnější, ale odkazuje na stejného člověka, viz věta *Look at Gil, the boy doesn't seem well today.* (Koukni na Gila, tomu chlapci dnes není dobře.). Tento kohezní prostředek je však vzhledem ke své neformálnosti používán spíše v konverzaci.

Druhou velkou část lexikální koheze tvoří vedle reiterace i kolokace a významový okruh slov, kterým je věnována společná kapitola v této práci. Kolokace je definována jako skupina slov, která se v textu objevují společně s více než náhodnou pravděpodobností. Co se kategorizace týče, nejobjektivnější přístup zvolil Siepmann (2005), který rozdělil kolokaci podle míry strnulosti daného výrazu do pěti kategorií počínaje idiomy a strnulými výrazy (fixed expressions) až po volná slovní spojení (free combinations), z nichž však ne všechny kategorie působí kohezně (např. volná slovní spojení ke kohezi textu nepřispívají). Příkladem kolokace z Kingova projevu je například *rise* a *heights* v *rise to majestic heights* (vystoupat do majestátní výše)

Slova z jednoho významového okruhu se také často vyskytují pohromadě, proto jsou zahrnuta v této kapitole. Slovní zásoba jazyka se dá podle logických principů seřadit do skupin (významových okruhů), příkladem jsou například *členové rodiny: matka, syn, teta, sestřenice,zeť* apod. Významový okruh je jedním z prostředků lexikální koheze, který většinou prostupuje celým textem, jako v případě Kingova projevu, kdy se hlavní významový okruh dá nazvat boj za rovnost a desegregaci, ze kterého King použil např. slova *demonstrace, svoboda, naděje, otrok, nespravedlnost, národ* apod. Druhým významným okruhem v projevu jsou slova, jež se dají opatřit hlavičkou *banka*,

a která King použil pro metaforické přirovnání situace Afroameričanů a příkladem jsou např. *směnka, splatit, závazek, bankrot* apod.

Z analýzy se dá soudit, že nejen téma projevu je důležité, ale že pro řečníkův úspěch je zásadní i to, jak svůj projev koncipuje a jaké výrazové prostředky zvolí.

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Appendix

<u>KING, M.L. *I Have a Dream*. Delivered 28 August 1963, at the Lincoln Memorial,</u>
<u>Washington, D.C</u>

1   I am happy to join with you today in what will go down in history as the greatest
2   demonstration for freedom in the history of our nation.

3   Five score years ago, a great American, in whose symbolic shadow we stand today,
4   signed the Emancipation Proclamation. This momentous decree came as a great beacon
5   light of hope to millions of Negro slaves who had been seared in the flames of withering
6   injustice. It came as a joyous daybreak to end the long night of their captivity.

7   But one hundred years later, the Negro still is not free. One hundred years later, the life
8   of the Negro is still sadly crippled by the manacles of segregation and the chains of
9   discrimination. One hundred years later, the Negro lives on a lonely island of poverty
10 in the midst of a vast ocean of material prosperity. One hundred years later, the Negro
11 is still languished in the corners of American society and finds himself an exile in his
12 own land. And so we've come here today to dramatize a shameful condition.

13 In a sense we've come to our nation's capital to cash a check. When the architects of our
14 republic wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution and the Declaration of
15 Independence, they were signing a promissory note to which every American was to fall
16 heir. This note was a promise that all men, yes, black men as well as white men, would
17 be guaranteed the "unalienable Rights" of "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."
18 It is obvious today that America has defaulted on this promissory note, insofar as her
19 citizens of color are concerned. Instead of honoring this sacred obligation, America has
20 given the Negro people a bad check, a check which has come back marked "insufficient
21 funds."

22 But we refuse to believe that the bank of justice is bankrupt. We refuse to believe that
23 there are insufficient funds in the great vaults of opportunity of this nation. And so,
24 we've come to cash this check, a check that will give us upon demand the riches of
25 freedom and the security of justice.

26 We have also come to this hallowed spot to remind America of the fierce urgency of
27 Now. This is no time to engage in the luxury of cooling off or to take the tranquilizing
28 drug of gradualism. Now is the time to make real the promises of democracy. Now is
29 the time to rise from the dark and desolate valley of segregation to the sunlit path of
30 racial justice. Now is the time to lift our nation from the quicksands of racial injustice
31 to the solid rock of brotherhood. Now is the time to make justice a reality for all of
32 God's children.

33 It would be fatal for the nation to overlook the urgency of the moment. This sweltering
34 summer of the Negro's legitimate discontent will not pass until there is an invigorating
35 autumn of freedom and equality. Nineteen sixty-three is not an end, but a beginning.
36 And those who hope that the Negro needed to blow off steam and will now be content
37 will have a rude awakening if the nation returns to business as usual. And there will be
38 neither rest nor tranquility in America until the Negro is granted his citizenship rights.
39 The whirlwinds of revolt will continue to shake the foundations of our nation until the
40 bright day of justice emerges.

41 But there is something that I must say to my people, who stand on the warm threshold
42 which leads into the palace of justice: In the process of gaining our rightful place, we
43 must not be guilty of wrongful deeds. Let us not seek to satisfy our thirst for freedom
44 by drinking from the cup of bitterness and hatred. We must forever conduct our
45 struggle on the high plane of dignity and discipline. We must not allow our creative
46 protest to degenerate into physical violence. Again and again, we must rise to the
47 majestic heights of meeting physical force with soul force.

48 The marvelous new militancy which has engulfed the Negro community must not lead
49 us to a distrust of all white people, for many of our white brothers, as evidenced by their
50 presence here today, have come to realize that their destiny is tied up with our destiny.
51 And they have come to realize that their freedom is inextricably bound to our freedom.

52 We cannot walk alone.

53 And as we walk, we must make the pledge that we shall always march ahead.

54   We cannot turn back.

55   There are those who are asking the devotees of civil rights, "When will you be
56   satisfied?" We can never be satisfied as long as the Negro is the victim of the
57   unspeakable horrors of police brutality. We can never be satisfied as long as our bodies,
58   heavy with the fatigue of travel, cannot gain lodging in the motels of the highways and
59   the hotels of the cities. We cannot be satisfied as long as the Negro's basic mobility is
60   from a smaller ghetto to a larger one. We can never be satisfied as long as our children
61   are stripped of their self-hood and robbed of their dignity by a sign stating: "For Whites
62   Only." We cannot be satisfied as long as a Negro in Mississippi cannot vote and a
63   Negro in New York believes he has nothing for which to vote. No, no, we are not
64   satisfied, and we will not be satisfied until "justice rolls down like waters, and
65   righteousness like a mighty stream."

66   I am not unmindful that some of you have come here out of great trials and tribulations.
67   Some of you have come fresh from narrow jail cells. And some of you have come from
68   areas where your quest – quest for freedom – left you battered by the storms of
69   persecution and staggered by the winds of police brutality. You have been the veterans
70   of creative suffering. Continue to work with the faith that unearned suffering is
71   redemptive. Go back to Mississippi, go back to Alabama, go back to South Carolina, go
72   back to Georgia, go back to Louisiana, go back to the slums and ghettos of our northern
73   cities, knowing that somehow this situation can and will be changed.

74   Let us not wallow in the valley of despair, I say to you today, my friends.

75   And so even though we face the difficulties of today and tomorrow, I still have a dream.
76   It is a dream deeply rooted in the American dream.

77   I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its
78   creed: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal."

79   I have a dream that one day on the red hills of Georgia, the sons of former slaves and
80   the sons of former slave owners will be able to sit down together at the table of
81   brotherhood.

82 I have a dream that one day even the state of Mississippi, a state sweltering with the

83 heat of injustice, sweltering with the heat of oppression, will be transformed into an

84 oasis of freedom and justice.

85 I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will

86 not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character.

87 I have a *dream* today!

88 I have a dream that one day, down in Alabama, with its vicious racists, with its governor

89 having his lips dripping with the words of "interposition" and "nullification" – one day

90 right there in Alabama little black boys and black girls will be able to join hands with

91 little white boys and white girls as sisters and brothers.

92 I have a *dream* today!

93 I have a dream that one day every valley shall be exalted, and every hill and mountain

94 shall be made low, the rough places will be made plain, and the crooked places will be

95 made straight; "and the glory of the Lord shall be revealed and all flesh shall see it

96 together."

97 This is our hope, and this is the faith that I go back to the South with.

98 With this faith, we will be able to hew out of the mountain of despair a stone of hope.

99 With this faith, we will be able to transform the jangling discords of our nation into a

100 beautiful symphony of brotherhood. With this faith, we will be able to work together,

101 to pray together, to struggle together, to go to jail together, to stand up for freedom

102 together, knowing that we will be free one day.

103 And this will be the day – this will be the day when all of God's children will be able to

104 sing with new meaning:

105 *My country 'tis of thee, sweet land of liberty, of thee I sing.*

106 *Land where my fathers died, land of the Pilgrim's pride,*

107   *From every mountainside, let freedom ring!*

108   And if America is to be a great nation, this must become true.

109   And so let freedom ring from the prodigious hilltops of New Hampshire.

110   Let freedom ring from the mighty mountains of New York.

111   Let freedom ring from the heightening Alleghenies of Pennsylvania.

112   Let freedom ring from the snow-capped Rockies of Colorado.

113   Let freedom ring from the curvaceous slopes of California.

114   But not only that:

115   Let freedom ring from Stone Mountain of Georgia.

116   Let freedom ring from Lookout Mountain of Tennessee.

117   Let freedom ring from every hill and molehill of Mississippi.

118   From every mountainside, let freedom ring.

119   And when this happens, when we allow freedom ring, when we let it ring from every
120   village and every hamlet, from every state and every city, we will be able to speed up
121   that day when all of God's children, black men and white men, Jews and Gentiles,
122   Protestants and Catholics, will be able to join hands and sing in the words of the old
123   Negro spiritual:

124   *Free at last! Free at last!*

125   Thank *God* Almighty, we are free at last!